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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal policy is among the most potent instruments of economic 
policy. Through it the government creates and sustains the public economy 
consisting of the provision of public services and public investment, at the 
same time, it is an instrument for re-allocation of resources according to 
national priorities, redistribution, promotion of private savings and 
investments, and the maintenance of stability. Thus the fiscal policy must 
be geared to the sustenance and growth of the public enomomy and to help 
achieve the broader objectives of planning. This implies that the methods 
of raising resources for the public sector should be such as to influence 
the rest of the economy in beneficial ways and within the public economy 
itself resources must be used in the most efficient way. 
Role of the government which was confined only to providing 
essential public service in the pre-war period has been extended to the 
sphere of social welfare and public sector investment for maintaining 
economic stability as well as promoting economic development in 
developing countries in the post-war period. Public debt which was 
intended to be used in emergencies has come to be justified for the 
purpose of economic stability and development, and subsequently it has 
been extended to the financing of the deficit. These expansions in the 
government operations have caused the size of the government budget to 
increase very fast. Therefore, high fiscal deficit become common 
phenomenon in many developing countries in the recent past. 
There is general agreement among economists that runaway 
public expenditures as compared to nearly stagnant revenue receipts 
played crucial role in the inception of fiscal imbalance in many developing 
countries as well as in India. Excessive borrowings and loss-making public 
sector enterprises added fuel to the fire. On account of these factors all 
the indicators of the deficit were on the rise by the end of eighties 
especially in India. S. K. Singh, M. Rakshit, S. Mundle et al., S. Gulati, U. 
Kapila, Datta and Sen, Ghosh and Sen, P. B. Nayak, M. G. Rao and others 
have shown in their studies that outpacing of revenues by public 
expenditure since early eighties lead the government to substantial 
borrowings, which further widened the gap between revenue and 
expenditure. According to them these consequential extensions and 
expansions have caused the problem of fiscal stabilization. 
The study covers a period of fifteen years, from 1985-86 to 
1999-2000. The choice of the period in reference is basically because a 
number of events took place in the fiscal area of the Indian economy 
during this period. In 1985-86 the government of India announced its Long 
Term Fiscal Policy (LTFP). It concerns with that part of fiscal management 
which relates mainly to direct and indirect taxation by the centre. In 1991-
92 government of India announced its Fiscal Adjustment/Stabilization 
Programme in order to combat the deepening fiscal crisis. After that a 
number of important steps have been taken by the government to restore 
fiscal stabilization. These events generated interest to study the whole 
problem with a new approach. 
To accomplish our endeavour required data have been taken from 
reports and periodicals published mainly by. Ministry of Finance, Reserve 
Bank of India, Central Statistical Organisation, and other departments/ 
offices of the Government of India. Besides these sources we have also 
taken data published by CMIE and the World Bank. In our study we have 
used both statistical as well as theoretical approach. 
In our study, we have analysed the experience of the 
developing countries regarding fiscal instability and fiscal corrective 
measures. In our study we found that the factors responsible for the 
fiscal crisis in most of the developing countries were common in nature. 
Due to declining share of direct tax in the total tax revenue and the 
declining buoyancy of custom duties because of higher rates, the tax 
revenue remained stagnant as a proportion of GDP in the countries 
experiencing fiscal crisis. Stagnant revenues coupled with rapid growing 
public expenditure and public debt indicted as main culprits behind the 
creation of fiscal imbalance. In order to put their fiscal house in order, 
countries adopted fiscal adjustment/stabilization measures. Their 
experience reveals that fiscal stabilization cannot be achieved through 
shock therapy, good fiscal measures always took time. 
Our analysis of the problem during seventh plan period shows 
that expenditures had been outpacing revenues for more than a decade, 
leading the government to substantial borrowings. Consequently interest 
payments become the single largest component of the expenditure of the 
central government. Our analysis have identified the problem related with 
the tax system. The problem was that the share of direct tax (which is 
considered most buoyant) had virtually stagnated during the entire 
eighties, it started out at 2.20 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 and stood at 
around 2.19 per cent of GDP in 1988-98. Thus whatever increase had been 
in the tax revenue brought about by exploiting indirect taxes. On 
considering dis-aggregated figures for direct and indirect taxes during the 
seventh plan period, we find that performance of direct taxes has been far 
behind the targets. Indirect taxes, however, performed better, exceeding 
seventh plan projections by a significant margin. It was certainly a very 
unhealthy development. However, overall tax revenue performance during 
the seventh plan as compared to sixth plan seems to be satisfactory. Gross 
tax revenue of the central government as a proportion to GDP moved from 
9.93 per cent during sixth plan period to 11.20 per cent during the seventh 
plan period. 
During the seventh plan period government expenditures far 
exceeded the revenue receipts. During the period in reference public 
expenditure of the central government was 20.48 per cent of GDP. This 
was particularly due to sharp rise in expenditure on interest payments, 
defence, and food and fertilizer subsidies. Interest payments contributed 
most to this unabated growth of expenditure. From 9.6 per cent of the 
total expenditure in 1981-82 interest payments rose to 16.4 pe rcent in 
1990-91. Thus our analysis of the problem during seventh plan period have 
shown sharp rise in expenditures on subsides, transfer payments, wages 
and salaries, food and fertilizer subsidies and sharp decline in the share of 
capital expenditure. This acceleration in the government expenditure has 
led to the emergence of severe fiscal imbalance. 
We have also analysed the contribution of the public sector 
enterprises in the emergence of fiscal instability in Indian economy. Net 
profits of these enterprises have declined from Rs.3789 crore in 1989-90 
to Rs. 2368 crore in 1990-91. The rate of return, as measured by the ratio 
of net profits to capital employed, declined from 4.5 per cent in 1989-90 
to 2.3 per cent in 1990-91, the lowest since 1984-85. It is clear from our 
analysis that poor returns form investments made in the public sector 
enterprises had been one of the main contributory factors in the inception 
of fiscal crisis. 
Since this fiscal deficit had to financed by treasury bills and 
market borrowings, as a result the internal debt of the government 
increased rapidly from 42 per cent of GDP at the end of 1980-81 it rose 
to 53 per cent of GDP at the end of 1990-91. The danger of the 
government falling into debt-trap was inevitable. During the seventh plan 
period government also relied partly on issuing of the treasury bills for 
the financing of the deficits. This in turn had resulted in huge monetized 
deficit. Consequently, money supply grew at an average annual rate of 
about 17.5 per cent during the period in reference. This contributed to the 
double digit increase in inflation by the end of 1990. 
Thus it is clear from the analysis of the problem during seventh 
plan period, that throughout the eighties, all the important indicators of 
fiscal imbalance were on the rise. The state of our public finances had 
reached crisis proportions by the end of eighties. Evidently, a stabilization 
programme, reversing the growth in the budget deficit, revenue deficit, 
fiscal deficit, and tightening monetary policy was called for. 
We have analysed the fiscal reform measures introduced in 
1991-92. The immediate aim of fiscal reform was to improve the fiscal 
balance in order to eliminate the inflationary pressure emanating from the 
budget deficit. The other objectives of the fiscal reform were to stop 
further accumulation of public debt, to reduce the level of subsidies in the 
economy, to direct government expenditure towards providing essential 
public services of a high quality, and to restore the government's capacity 
to make strategic investments in infrastructure and human resources. 
The government has recognised the link between compression of 
expenditures, tax reform and programme of fiscal stabilization. Fiscal 
stabilization requires a reduction in the fiscal deficit. While some of 
this can be achieved by reducing low priority expenditure, some of the 
improvement has to come from high tax collections. For this purpose 
government has introduced cuts in expenditure specially in regard to the 
emoluments and size of the bureaucracy, and subsidies to food and 
fertilizers. Also, government appointed a committee on tax reforms 
under the chairmanship of R.J. Chelliah. Government accepted the 
recommendations of the committee, emphasising tax reforms aimed at 
simplifying the structure and continuing the process of shifting to 
moderate rates of taxation. 
Inefficiencies and poor financial performance in public sector 
enterprises have contributed to the fiscal crisis. The reforms aim to 
increase efficiency and reduce losses that so many public enterprises 
impose on the government budget. In addition to this, two other key 
elements of the government's strategy for public sector enterprise reform 
are the promotion of increased private sector competition and partial 
disinvestment of equity in selected enterprises. For the retirement of 
public debt the objective of the fiscal policy reforms was to use the 
proceeds from privatisation/disinvestment, so that the interest burden is 
progressively reduced. Fiscal reforms have also recommended a sound 
management of monetary policy in the interest of financial stability, as 
many of the problems in the financial sector stemmed from the fiscal 
deficits. 
Our analysis of the effects of fiscal correction measures on 
fiscal stabilization shows that government succeeded partially in the 
restoration of fiscal stabilization. Though the growth of expenditure has 
been controlled marginally, the tax revenue as a ratio to GDP declined 
during the reform period. Our analysis of the revenue implications of 
tax reforms shows that compared to indirect taxes, direct taxes were 
more buoyant during the nineties. Between 1990-91 and 1999-2000, when 
there were substantial tax rates reductions, the ratio of gross tax revenue 
to GDP declined from 10.8 per cent to 9.2 per cent. Among the different 
categories of taxes, customs and excise duties as a proportion of GDP 
declined sharply from 3.9 per cent to 2.6 per cent and from 4.6 per cent 
to 3.3 per cent respectively during the period in reference. However, there 
was an improvement in terms of direct tax to GDP ratio. Between 
1990-91 and 1999-2000 yield of personal income tax and corporation tax 
as a percentage of GDP increased from 1.0 per cent to 1.4 per cent and 
from 1.0 per cent to 1.6 per cent respectively. This is the reason why even 
though the direct tax/GDP ratio increased during this period, growth in 
total tax revenue could not keep pace with the rate of growth of GDP. The 
analysis of the movement of tax rates and income elasticities of various 
taxes shows that generally reduction in tax rate cannot make a tax more 
buoyant instantly. There is a time lag involved. Average income elasticity 
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of total tax revenue declined from 0.91 during the period of 1991-92 to 
1995-96 to 0.73 during 1996-97 to 1998-99. If the tax level in the pre-
reform years is to be achieved, tax revenues have to grow with a rapid pace 
as compared to GDP. To be realistic, if the centre's revenue is to grow 
faster the pick up has to come from union excise and custom duties. 
It becomes clear from examination of the data that total 
expenditure of the central government declined from an average of 19.66 
percent of GDP in 1990-91 to 15.73 per cent in 1999-2000. While capital 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP have fallen sharply from 5.9 
percent during 1980-81 to 1991-92 to 2.7 per cent during 1992-93 to 
1999-2000 and revenue expenditures have marginally increased form 
11.7 per cent to 12.2 per cent during the period in reference. Our analysis 
also shows that during the nineties plan expenditures have declined 
sharply as compared to non-plan expenditures. Interest payments now 
constitute the single largest component of expenditure of the central 
government. Our analysis suggests that rising expenditure on interest 
payments has dampened the pace of expenditure compression. 
A few distinct trends have been drawn from the analysis of the 
effects of the reforms in public sector undertaking's". In 1991-92 profit 
after tax to net worth in 237 central PSUs, was only 3.9 per cent, which 
rose to 8.9 per cent in 1998-99. Disinvestment in PSUs have fallen short 
of expectations during the reform period. It is also clear that reforms in 
the PSUs have not helped much in the reduction of fiscal deficit. 
As far as financing of the government's deficit is concerned, till 
the early nineties a considerable part of the deficit was financed with 
borrowing from the central bank. The interest rates on such borrowing 
were much lower than the interest rate on borrowing from the open market. 
Later, a gradual shift away from borrowing from the central bank to open 
market borrowing, resulting in a sharp rise in the explicit interest cost of 
the fiscal deficit. During the period between 1980-81 to 1991-92 share of 
market borrowing in financing of the gross fiscal deficit was 26.2 per 
cent, which rose to 49.7 per cent during the period of 1992-93 to 
1999-2000. The study makes it clear that even putting an end to the 
practice of monetising the deficit has hardly affected the fiscal situation. 
Fiscal deficits remain high, though they are now financed by high interest 
open market borrowings. The only result is that the interest burden of the 
government tends to shoot up. Interest payments as a percentage of GDP 
have risen from 3.4 per cent during 1985-90 to 4.6 per cent during 1995-
99. As a result revenue deficit of the central government has increased 
from 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 3.9 per cent of GDP in 
1998-99. 
To sum up, we can say that fiscal correction measures have not 
delivered the fiscal results as expected. In the recent past the budgets of 
the central government were out of balance. There was not only a wide gap 
between revenue and expenditure but the composition of expenditure was 
also quite out of line. Revenue structure needs to be altered to make it 
more broad based and equitable. The key objective of future's fiscal 
reform has to be a reduction in debt service payments. This has to be 
achieved by a progressive reduction in public debt and through higher 
revenues. Higher tax revenues can be achieved only through buoyancy and 
expansion of the tax base . The share of interest payment in total 
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expenditure may be brought down by retiring some of the debt. Through 
the sale of seized gold and some of government lands and through 
disinvestment in public sector undertakings, a sizeable amount could be 
raised and used for the retirement of the debt. Ensuring long-term fiscal 
health of the economy requires higher buoyancy in tax revenues and 
compression of non-essential expenditures. Apart from this the key 
solutions to India's fiscal predicaments are bold programmes for imposing 
user charges on all public services amenable to such charges, and the 
implementation of crash programme of privatisation. The fiscal health of 
the economy may improve swiftly, if this correction is made. 
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PREFACE 
During late seventies and early eighties many developing 
countries experienced the problem of fiscal imbalance. Alongwith high 
fiscal deficit, deficit on balance of payments accounts, high inflation and 
indebtedness have turned the problem into a severe crisis. In India, 
problem of fiscal stabilization incepted in the early eighties and reached 
to a crisis proportion by the end of the decade. There is wide agreement 
among economists that stagnant revenue receipts as a ratio to GDP 
coupled with rapidly growing public expenditure and excessive 
borrowings were important factors responsible for the problem of fiscal 
imbalance. Government of India under the guidance of IMF and World 
Bank introduced fiscal adjustment/stabilization measures in 1991-92, 
which states that government should discourage wasteful public 
expenditure and conspicuous consumption and reform tax structure to 
increase the buoyancy of the taxes. These measures have been considered 
necessary to ensure viable and sustainable fiscal stability. 
With this background, this study attempts to evaluate the 
factors responsible for the fiscal imbalance in India. Fiscal correction 
measures and its impact have also been reviewed and analysed. The 
analytical approach in this thesis affirms that growing mismatch between 
revenue receipts and expenditure alongwith non-performance of public 
sector undertakings, collectively aggravated the fiscal crisis. Analysis of 
the effect of fiscal stabilization measures reveals that government 
succeeded partially in the restoration of fiscal stabilization. Though, the 
growth of expenditure has been compressed marginally, the tax revenue as 
l i 
a ratio to GDP declined after the introduction of reforms. By the end of 
nineties, due to government's reluctance for deficit financing, inflation has 
been brought down at its lowest level whereas the revenue deficit 
increased sharply as a result of interest payments becoming single largest 
component of expenditure, which was due to greater reliance on market 
borrowings for the financing of the fiscal deficit. 
Finally, it may be concluded that, the fiscal corrective 
measures already initiated by the government, needs more time in order 
to ensure sustainable fiscal stability. 
(MOHD. AZAM KHAN) 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONCEPT OF FISCAL POLICY 
There are two major types of policies which the government can 
adopt to influence the level of economic activity : fiscal policy and 
monetary policy. Fiscal policy refers to changes in government spending 
and taxation including debt-management. Monetary policy is mainly 
conducted through measures designed to influence the money supply or 
the level of interest rates. There is considerable overlap between the two 
policies. A change in fiscal policy affects the monetary side of the 
economy and this in turn affects the results of the original change in fiscal 
policy. 
Before we proceed our discussion further, it would be rewarding 
to have a brief background of the evolution of the idea and philosophy of 
fiscal policy. 
Though the concept of fiscal policy emerged only after the 
Keynesian revolution in economics, its basic philosophy can be traced to 
the eighteenth century. However, the scope of government economic 
activity widened substantially only during and after the Great Depression 
of 1930s. During this period, the role of the government in maintaining 
economic stability came to be theoretically as well as politically justified 
and this role was found to be in harmony with achieving growth of national 
output and reduction of economic inequalities. During the post war years, 
the scope of the role of government further widened particularly in the 
developing countries in the context of the need for government economic 
planning for achieving rapid economic development. As a result of all 
these additional responsibilities, the governments in the developing 
countries have been called upon to defend their borders, maintain law and 
order, provide necessary social and economic infrastructure facilities, 
maintain economic stability, promote economic development, effect 
redistribution of income and wealth, function as entrepreneurs and 
promote consequential social objectives. 
'The fiscal operations of the government for promoting the 
economic development of the less developed countries are as an investor, 
as a stabiliser, as a saver and as an income redistributor'.^ 
Thus, it may be observed that fiscal policy which emerged as a 
branch of applied economics under the name of macro-economic analysis 
has grown in its coverage. And today it is very difficult to say that fiscal 
policy covers only macro-economic policy at least with reference to a 
developing economy like India. Fiscal policy in developing countries 
involves a judicious mixture of macro-economic policies of the 
government to achieve multiple objectives. 
The government in modern democracies discharges the above 
mentioned various and varied socio-economic responsibilities mostly 
through the instrumentality of its budget. The budget includes an annual 
estimate of expenditure to be incurred, expected revenue, borrowing and 
debt repayment with a view to achieving explicit objectives of the 
government. In order to be effective in achieving these objectives, the 
budgetary instruments namely, taxation, borrowing, lending, spending and 
transfer payments should influence the national economy through the 
major economic variables such as levels and rate of growth of income, 
consumption, prices, balance of payments etc. both at aggregate and 
sectoral and micro levels. When these economic variables are influenced 
by the national budget, they in turn influence various components of the 
budget through the change in their levels, rates of growth and direction. 
The influence of the budget on the national economy is mainly deliberate 
as various budget instruments are altered so as to alter significant 
variables. However, a well designed fiscal policy may also influence the 
economy automatically during the interval between two budget periods or 
policy decisions. This is known as the 'built-in-flexibility' of fiscal 
measures. Similarly, the economy after being influenced by the budgetary 
policies experiences significant changes in terms of major economic 
variables of the economy such as income, consumption, price, etc., but 
also gets the automatic responses through the level of expenditure, etc. In 
this way the national fiscal policy and the national economy interact 
mutually. But the main objective of fiscal policy is to influence national 
economy in the desired direction rather than being influenced by it. 
Fiscal policies are required if society desires to alter the 
distribution of output between government and private uses. This is a 
special case of the general choice between consumption, private 
investment and government expenditure. The problem of dividing output 
correctly for final use is a matter of efficient allocation of resources and 
the* solution depends on the preferences of society. Fiscal policies are 
also required to promote equity in the distribution of income and wealth. 
Volatile disturbances distribute the income and capital losses from 
inflation or unemployment in a haphazard manner which is contrary to 
society's expenditures are the only feasible methods available for 
mitigating the haphazard incidence of misfortune. Efficiency and equity 
considerations require that fiscal policies form an important role in the 
formulation of economic policies. 
1.2 PROBLEM OF FISCAL STABILIZATION 
As we have explained earlier, the role of the government has to 
be extended to a vast variety of fields and today the objectives of fiscal 
policy have multiplied. For example, during the days of Laissez-faire 
philosophy when the government was confined to the limited area, the 
main objective of taxation was to raise revenue adequate enough to meet 
the minimum requirements the 'police state' functions. But subsequently 
when the role of government got extended to economic development, the 
role of taxation has to be identified with raising resources or diversion of 
increased income from the private sector to the public sector for 
increasing total savings. Similarly, the role of public expenditure which 
was confined only to providing essential public service has been extended 
to the sphere of social security, old age pension and the like plus public 
sector investment for maintaining eocnomic stability as well as promoting 
economic development in developing countries. Public debt policy which 
was intended to be used in emergencies like war has come to be justified 
for the purpose of maintaining economic stability and subsequently it has 
been extended to the area of economic development. These consequential 
extensions and expansions in the field of taxation, public expenditure and 
public borrowing have caused the size of the government budget in the 
democracy to increase very fast. Adolf Wagner hypothesized that as 
economic development proceeds in a smooth linear line, the demand for 
'public goods' will increase and as a result the government expenditure 
will increase faster than the national output. But the government 
expenditure has increased even during the period of economic stagnation. 
Now, we can say that these trends led the economy towards fiscal 
imbalance. 
During the past two decades stagnant revenues along with 
difficulties in compressing public expenditures, resulted in high deficit in 
many developing countries. With foreign borrowings fore-closed, 
government were left with no choice except domestic soruce of financing 
or market borrowings. The ensuing increase in money supply could only 
result in runaway inflation. Excessive reliance on borrowings have pushed 
a number of economies into debt-trap. Problem of fiscal stabilization 
further worsened due to all these factors, and a vicious circle of fiscal 
imbalance has emerged. 
1.3 NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN INDIAN ECONOMY 
It is now widely agreed that the Indian economy was undergoing 
a severe crisis by the end of the 1980s. The crisis was possibly the 
severest that the country has had to face in the post-independence era. The 
fiscal sector of the economy was possibly in the throes of its most 
stringent test ever. The foreign trade sector of the economy was in great 
trouble. In the fiscal sector government expenditures were outpacing 
revenues in the current account for more than a decade leading the 
government to resort to substantial borrowings. The public debt had 
reached to such a level that interest payments constitute the largest single 
expenditure head of the central government. Non-essential expenditure 
continues to grow unabated, the explanation for which can not be confined 
to strictly economic factors. 
All of the trends noted above have been the wages of a soft state 
where government expenditures have bloated way out of proportion to tax 
and non-tax revenues. Faced with a resource crunch, when budgetary 
allocations have had to be trimmed, it has invariably been capital that has 
had to be axed, while revenue expenditure has gone on expanding. 
Powerful vested interests have emerged to keep the fiscal economy 
running in this manner. 
The implications of the above trends on the monetary sector 
were immediate. Alongwith the large revenue deficits the central 
government has had large budget deficits averaging about 2.5 per cent of 
GDP during the seventh plan period. This in turn has contributed to a large 
monetised deficit. It is this which determines the growth of money supply. 
Money supply grew at an average annual rate of over 17 per cent during 
the seventh plan period, causing a substantial liquidity overhang in the 
economy. This contributed in a large measure to the double digit increase 
in the inflation that the economy went through during 1990-91. 
The fiscal situation, which had been under mounting pressure 
throughout 1980s, assumed crisis proportions by the begining of the 
1991-92. The gulf war exacerbated the already precarious fiscal situation. 
At a macro-economic level, fiscal deficits, besides contributing to 
inflationary pressures, have also been seriously spilling into balance of 
payments. 
Throughout the eighties, all the important indicators of fiscal 
imbalance were on the rise. These are the budgetary deficit, the revenue 
deficit, the monetised deficit and gross fiscal deficit. Such a fiscal 
situation has become unsustainable. Evidently, a stabilization programme 
reversing the growth in the budget deficit and tightening monetary policy 
was called for. 
1.4 PROBLEMS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF FISCAL IMBALANCE 
The correct measurement of the fiscal imbalance is fraught with 
formidable difficulties.' These difficulties have been often ignored by 
economists. The commonly used measures of the fiscal deficit can be 
highly inadequate. They may not be comparable over time. And they are 
often imprecise gauges for determining the size of the needed fiscal 
correction. The difficulties are several. 
The first difficulty is connected with the quality of the data. With 
few exceptions, governments have not given a high priority to the 
gathering and provision of reliable and up-to-date statistics. In fact, 
governments have shown little interest in improving the quality of the 
fiscal data. 
The second issue concerns the comprehensiveness of the 
available fiscal data. The central government, which is often the main actor 
and the centre of attention in stabilization programmes, represents in many 
countries, only a limited part of the public sector. The whole public sector 
is compartmentalized into the central government, state governments and 
municipilities, public enterprises, the central bank, stabilization funds, 
various forms of extra budgetary accounts including social security, and 
so forth. These compartments are often interconnected and some sort of 
implicit transfer prices are used to determine the scope of financial or 
resource flows among them. These transfer prices often do not reflect 
market prices. The public enterprises may sell services to the central 
government at below market prices or they can borrow to reduce transfers 
form the central government. All these examples mean that in many cases 
the fiscal deficit can be 'parked' in compartments of the public sector 
where it can be least embarrassing politically or where it can be financed 
most easily in the short run." 
To avoid this problem, the data on which the fiscal stabilization 
should be based must be comprehensive enough to encompass the whole 
or much of the public sector. But this is extremely difficult or may even 
prove impossible because the information required is often not available, 
or if it is available, it is not up-to-date. This limitation may create serious 
difficulties in the conduct of fiscal policy. For example, a programme that 
emphasized a reduction in the fiscal deficit of the central government 
might encourage maneuvers to push the deficit out of the central 
government into the state governments etc. 
Some of these problems often arise out of the fact that the fiscal 
deficit, as conventionally measured (i.e. total expenditure less ordinary 
revenues), is highly sensitive to the rate of inflation and to the exchange 
rate. 
In the presence of domestic debt, inflation can bring about 
dramatic changes in the size of the fiscal deficit by increasing nominal 
interest rates and thus nominal interest payments. In such situations it 
ceases to provide useful measure of the size of the fiscal correction 
needed by the stabilization programme. Other definitions of the fiscal 
deficit have been introduced in recent years and are often used in 
stabilization programmes. One such concept is the operational deficit 
which seeks to remove from total expenditure the part of interest 
payments, that is considered a 'monetary correction'. The practical 
measurement of the operational deficit is very difficult and its theoretical 
underpinnings are controversial."' Therefore, this concept, though useful, 
must be treated with caution. 
The primary deficit which excludes all interest payments from 
the measurement of the deficit, is a tool more useful in assessing the size 
of an adjustment. The primary deficit or rather the primary surplus is 
useful in providing an indication of the amount of current resources 
available to a government to service its public debt. It has limited value in 
indicating what the fiscal correction should be. 
Timing issues also create difficulties. A deficit can be measured 
on the basis of cash flows (i.e. actual cash receipts and payments) or it 
can be measured on a commitment basis for expenditure and on an actual 
basis for revenues. When arrears are increasing, an adjustment programme 
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which employs the cash concept may miss the pressures on resources and 
on demand associated with expenditures made but not yet paid for. 
1.5 FISCAL AND BUDGETARY DEFICITS : SOME DEFINITION 
AND ISSUES 
In recent years the official documents have listed the following 
concepts of deficits in the government accounts. 
(1) RD (Revenue Deficit) = Revenue Expenditure - Revenue Receipts. 
(2) BD (Budget Deficit) = Total expenditure - Total Receipts (excluding 
net sale of treasury bills). 
(3) DF (Deficit Financing) = Increase in net RBI credit to the 
government. 
(4) FD (Fiscal Deficit) = Total expenditure - (Revenue receipts + 
Recovery of loans + Receipts from the sale of assets). 
(5) DCA (Deficit on Capital Account) = Capital Expenditure - Capital 
Receipts (excluding net sale of treasury bills). 
(6) PD (Primary Deficit) = Fiscal Deficit - Interest Payments 
RD is the deficit generated through current transactions in the 
budget and denotes the dissaving of government administration and 
defence. BD as noted in (2), indicates the amount of government 
expenditure financed through net sale of treasury bills during the financial 
year (irrespective of who buys these bills). DF gives the net increase in 
the RBI holding of treasury bills plus other government securities less 
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increase in government deposits with the Reserve Bank. FD constitutes 
the increase in gross indebtedness of government administration and 
defence to the rest of the economy (or the world). It follows from the 
earlier relations that DCA is the sum of net sale of treasury bills less the 
revenue deficit of the government. PD stands for gross borrowings of the 
government required to meet all expenditure less interest payments. 
The relevance or the usefulness of these various concepts of 
deficits depends on the purpose at hand and on the extent they can be 
manipulated by the government for attaining its eocnomic objectives. 
From the viewpoint of economic analysis and policy prescription, our 
focus has to be on the significance of these deficits for the generation of 
aggregate demand or inflationary pressures; for the over all saving ratio or 
economic growth, for the transfer of resources between the private and 
the public sectors, and for the sustainability of public debt or the solvency 
of the government. 
1.6 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Before embarking upon a research project it is absolutely 
essential to review the literature on the same or similar subject. Keeping 
this in mind an effort has been made here to review some of the existing 
literature on fiscal stabilization. 
Chelliah, R.J. (1969)^ in his study of fiscal policy in less 
developed countries attempts to analyse the fundamental problems of 
fiscal policy in less developed countries, the basic structure of public 
finance with emphasis on tax structure and fiscal policies, against the 
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background of planned eocnomic development. The greater part of his 
work is carried on with special reference to India. He has also observed 
that the fiscal policy appropriate for a country will depend, apart from 
many other factors, on the stage of its development and on the social 
grounds. 
Musgrave, R.A. (1969)^ in his study of fiscal systems has 
examined the essential characteristics of fiscal systems in the context of 
certain key features of economic life. His study deals with the adaptation 
of fiscal systems to the requirements of centrally planned and 
decentralized or market economies. He also examined the interaction 
between fiscal systems and economic development and compared the tax 
structure of a number of highly developed countries. In his study he also 
raised the issues like fiscal centralization versus decentralization, the 
formulation of the budget plan, the impact of governmental forms on 
fiscal behaviour, social security and transfer systems, and the structure 
and management of public debt. 
Gowda, K.V. (1987)'* in his work has criticized the long term 
fiscal policy (LTFP) that it has placed exclusfive reliance not on fiscal 
policy with all its various segments. For it does not touch on expenditure 
policy, monetary policy, debt management and international economic 
policy but on tax policy. In his study he explains how fiscal policy 
instruments are to be integrated with all other instruments of macro-
economic policy in order to realise the desired results and underlines the 
complications of pursuing fiscal policy in isolation. 
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Singh, S.K. (1988)^ has examined the nature of the fiscal crisis 
in India and evaluated long term fiscal policy as a response to this crisis. 
The study explains that since 1975-76, the tax ratio has not kept pace with 
the expenditure ratio resulting in the long-term imbalance between 
government revenues and expenditures. This gap which widened during the 
sixth plan became much larger during the seventh plan. Thus the central 
government has to borrow even to meet its current expenditure. His 
analysis indicates that the LTFP, as a response to the challenging problem 
of fiscal crisis, has failed to offer any clear direction in two vital areas, 
namely, (i) how to restrain the increase in non-plan expenditure on revenue 
account, and (ii) how to augment the surpluses of PSUs. Finally, he has 
warned that without proper advance in these areas the fiscal crisis will 
persist. 
Rakshit, M. (1991)^ in his work has studied the fiscal roots of 
macro-economic imbalance in India, and found that during 1980s, fiscal 
imbalance assumed alarming proportions due to widening gap between 
revenue and expenditure. In his work he has discussed macro-economic 
adjustment programme introduced by the government to resolve the fiscal 
crisis. Finally, he raises a number of important issues regarding viability 
of fiscal management. 
Mundle, S. and M. Govinda Rao (1992)^ have analysed the nature 
of fiscal crisis in India in 1990 and related issues in the growth and 
composition of public expenditure, the tax system and mobilisation of tax 
revenues and non-tax revenues. They have shown that the fiscal imbalance 
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was mainly a reflection of the increasing gap between revenue receipts 
and revenue expenditure. There was a spurt in spending mainly on account 
of interest payments, subsidies, plan and non-plan grants to state 
governments, defence and failure of public sector undertakings etc., on 
the other hand, the growth of tax and non-tax revenues was stagnated. 
Finally, they have endorses the fiscal stabilization measures initiated in 
1991. 
Chhibber, A. and Mansoor Dailami (1993)^ argues for a need for 
a broader approach to the relationship between fiscal policy and private 
investment in developing countries. Such an approach needs to emphasize 
the role of fiscal policy and stabilization, the competitiveness between 
public and private investment and the taxation of income from capital. 
While these issues have long been recognised in the literature in the 
context of both developed and developing countries, they have assumed 
particular urgency and importance in the context of the ongoing 
liberalization and privatization trends evident in most developing 
countries. 
Comia, G.A. and F. Stewart (1993)^ reviews changes in the fiscal 
policy of developing countries undergoing economic adjustment during 
the 1980s. Macro-choices in the areas of overall taxation, government 
expenditure and fiscal deficit are first examined. It appears that although a 
few countries managed to combine raising government expenditure per 
head and a falling budget deficit thanks to increases in tax ratio and/or to 
overall growth, in the majority of the countries analysed, traditional fiscal 
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policy emphasizing rapid reductions in budget deficits through expenditure 
reductions compounded the negative effects of falling incomes on the 
welfare of the poor. Finally, they conclude that the main elements of fiscal 
policy approach are aiming at protecting the poor during adjustment. 
de Melo, Martha (1993)'° has proposed the use of a sustainable 
deficit concept to estimate the minimum fiscal adjustment required in a 
high debt country. The sustainable deficit is defined to be compatible with 
a sustainable debt, which the borrower is willing and able to service. His 
work provides impirical estimates of the need for fiscal adjustment in a 
small group of high debt countries in the mid 1980s. Their experience is 
compared to that of a small group of low debt countries, to distinguish the 
differences in the adjustment requirement and its determinants during this 
period. The results illustrate the extent to which the appropriate size of 
the fiscal deficit depends on the macroeconomic context. 
Faini, Riccardo and Jaime de Melo (1993)" takes a look at the 
evidence of fiscal adjustment in developing countries. They found that, 
while on an average, developing countries were successful after 1985 in 
cutting their primary deficits, rising interest costs and stagnant fiscal 
revenues implied limited progress towards reducing fiscal imbalances. 
Most of the improvement on the fiscal front was achieved by cuts in 
capital expenditures. Then they have focussed on issues such as the size of 
fiscal adjustment, the macroeconomic impact of deficit reduction and the 
choice between expenditure cuts and tax increases. 
Gulati, I.S. (1993)'^ has dealt with some questions concerning 
the growing burden of internal public debt in India. These questions that 
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have lately been raised with a stridency not noticed before focus on 
reducing the fiscal deficit, a term that hardly ever figured in the lexicon 
of fiscal policy in India. 
Kapila, U. (1993)'^ in her analysis of public finances of India 
has shown that the fiscal situation which was under strain throughout the 
1980s, reached a critical situation in 1990-91. Throughout the eighties, 
all the indicators of fiscal imbalance were on the rise. The unabated 
growth of non-plan expenditure and poor returns from investments made 
in the public sector have been the main contributory factor in the fiscal 
crisis. Government initiated the fiscal stabilization and intended to 
continue it. She has also suggested that for the realisation of the fiscal 
stabilization, it is imperative to restrain the rise of expenditures. Fiscal 
discipline is also necessary on the part of PSEs to hasten the process of 
fiscal correction. 
Mookherjee, D. (1993)^'' has analysed the fiscal stabilization 
reforms in the Indian economy. In this work he has highlighted that at the 
turn of the eighties into the nineties, serious action on the fiscal front was 
urgently needed to correct the macro-economic imbalances. The principle 
instruments of fiscal stabilization in 1991-92 were plan expenditure and 
subsidies on exports and fertilisers. Disinvestment of equity holding in 
central public sector enterprises also provided a cushion. Initially 
government succeeded in its determined effort at fiscal stabilization and 
brought the fiscal deficit down. 
Mundle, S. and Hiranya Mukhopadhyay (1993)'^ in their study 
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have analysed the impact of alternative fiscal policies on macro-economic 
performance of the Indian economy. The most important lesson emerged 
from their work is that in reducing the deficit, greater revenue 
mobilisation would be preferable to expenditure compression. This should 
be attempted through tax reforms rather than raising rates. There are, 
however, limits to how far tax reforms can raise the buoyancy of tax 
revenue.'Hence fiscal correction will have to depend in part on public 
expenditure compression. They have shown that in the post reform period 
public expenditure on almost all items except interest payments have been 
cut in real terms. However, the sharpest cuts have fallen on those items of 
expenditure which ought to be protected. 
Tanzi, V. (1993)"^ has observed that fiscal reform, has proven 
difficult to implement for political, institutional and conceptual reasons. 
In his work he has discussed the determination of the correct size of the 
fiscal adjustment needed, the problems in measuring fiscal disequilibrium, 
the desired fiscal measures and the sequencing of the required fiscal 
reforms. Finally, he argues that fiscal reform require time to be 
successful. 
Taylor, L. (1993)'^ has attempted to study fiscal policy issues 
that arise during macroeconomic stabilization in developing countries. His 
work is based on the study of stabilization episodes in eighteen countries. 
He has observed that the effects of fiscal stabilization and adjustment on 
income distribution are less clear cut and stabilization programmes should 
take into account specific country conditions. 
Thirsk, W.R. (1993)^^ has observed that many countries have 
18 
overhauled their tax systems during the past decade. His work reviews the 
profile of a typical developing country tax system prior to the recent wave 
of reforms. A detailed description of tax reforms in several developing 
countries is presented. Comparison across countries indicate an emerging 
consensus on the desirable characteristics of a tax system : neutrality and 
the adoption of a more uniform system of taxation, the progressive 
abandonment of special tax distinctions and exemptions and simpler tax 
designs. 
Shand, Ric and K.P. Kalirajan (1994)^^ in their study indicated 
that the reforms implemented in India since 1991-92 have been yielding 
the anticipated positive results. Though the reform process has been 
gradual, it is becoming increasingly clear that sustainability is not in 
question. The study concludes that Indian economy may be evolving a new 
paradigm of growth which could be relevant to other developing countries 
with similar structural linkages. 
Bhattacharya, B.B. (1995)^° in his work has evaluated the factors 
responsible for fiscal imbalance in 1990 and analysed the performance of 
fiscal stabilization measures. He has shown that the basic problem of the 
fiscal stabilization in India was that the government expenditure was rising 
faster than the government income. As a result all the measures of deficit 
such as fiscal deficit, revenue deficit, primary deficit etc. have rising 
trends. Finally, he suggested that the fiscal deficit should be reduced by 
slowing down growth of non-plan and wasteful expenditures on the one 
hand and improving direct tax revenue and surplus of public enterprises on 
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the other. 
Datta, R. and R.K. Sen (1995)2' j^ ^ve shown in their study that in 
India, the budgetary and fiscal deficits of the central government had been 
growing significantly during the sixth and seventh plan periods. They have 
cautioned that in the process of enforcing fiscal discipline and aiming at 
fiscal stabilization. Contrary steps should be avoided not only in the policy 
packages but also in the measures adopted at the central and state levels. 
Ghosh, A. and R.K. Sen (1995)^^ have observed in their study 
that during 1980s not only the revenue receipts have been rather inelastic 
but the expenditure accounts particularly of the non-plan outlays have also 
gone up quite rapidly. This has been termed by them as the main cause of 
the fiscal imbalance. They have also suggested that it requires to be 
attended with policies to reduce the non-plan expenditure drastically. 
Nayak, P.B. (1995)^^ in his work has revealed that in the fiscal 
sector, government expenditure had been far outpacing revenues for more 
than a decade, leading the government to resort to substantial borrowings, 
both internal and external. As a result interest payments become largest 
expenditure head of the central government budget. Non-essential 
expenditure continues to grow unabated. He has also observed that the tax 
to GDP ratio is already reasonably high and the prospect of having it 
increased further appears to be limited at least in the short-run. So, there 
is not much choice left and expenditures have to be cut in several vital 
areas. 
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Rao, M.G., Tapas, K. Sen and M. Ghosh (1995)24 have analysed 
in their study that after 1980-81, expenditure growth was higher than that 
of revenue receipts. Within total expenditure, revenue expenditure grew at 
rates higher than that of capital expenditure. Growth of revenue 
expenditure was particularly sharp in the case of interest payments, 
subsidies, wages and salaries, while those on maintenance of capital assets 
lagged behind. So fiscal imbalance becomes inevitable by the end of 
1980s, The analysis also points towards the difficulty in achieving fiscal 
equilibrium in the short and medium term context. So long as the interest 
groups succeed in securing a large and increasing share of expenditures 
on categories beneficial to them, compression of fiscal deficit become 
difficult. 
Chakraborty, P. (1997)^^ has attempted to examine whether the 
lowering the rates of direct and indirect taxes in recent years has resulted 
in higher tax mobilisation. The study concludes that compared to indirect 
taxes, direct taxes were more buoyant during the post-reform period. It 
has been observed by the author that generally reduction in tax rate cannot 
make a tax more buoyant instantly. There is a time lag involved. 
Shome, P. (1998)^^ attempts to assess the state of fiscal 
stabilization in the post-reform period. He has shown that after an initial 
improvement in the fiscal deficit, the government faced difficulty in 
controlling the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio. The tax/GDP ratio also declined 
and the central government passed down certain expenditure 
repsonsibilities to state governments, thereby managing to reduce the 
expenditure/GDP ratio to some extent. His work focusses on the 
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performance of the fiscal sector and the direction for future policy 
imperatives. 
Mohan, R. (2000)^'^ has analysed trends in state and central 
government revenues and expenditures and suggested ways to climb out of 
debt trap. He has observed that rapid economic growth is the only solution 
to the problem of poverty and such growth is not possible without 
significant fiscal correction. The key objective of fiscal reform has to be 
a reduction in public debt service payments. 
Kopits, G. (2001)^^ assesses the potential usefulness of fiscal 
policy rules for India, in the light of rapidly growing international 
experience in this area. As part of his assessment, he explores various 
design options and institutional arrangements that seem relevant for India 
in the context of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill. 
He also outlines preparatory steps for successful implementation. 
After reviewing the literature, we can say that there is wide 
agreement among economists that the problem of fiscal imbalance in many 
developing countries and particularly in India has emerged in the 1980s. 
And the factors responsible for the worsening of fiscal crisis were almost 
same in all of the developing countries. For example run-away expenditure 
coupled with stagnant revenues (along with lower share of direct taxes) 
and growing public debt with rising amount of interest payments. 
1.7 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of this study are : 
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(i) to study the conceptual framework and the basic issues involved in 
the problem of fiscal stabilization, 
(ii) to examine the background and causes of the inception of the 
problem, 
(iii) to study the measures undertaken by the government for the 
restoration of fiscal stabilization, 
(iv) to review the impact of the fiscal stabilization measures in the 
different dimensions, and 
(v) to identify areas for further reform to restore sustainable fiscal 
stability. 
1.8 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The choice of the seventh plan or 1985-86 as starting point of 
the present study, is basically because problem of fiscal imbalance started 
worsening from this period. In the Indian economy a number of events 
took place during eighties and by the end of eighties the problem of fiscal 
stabilization reached to a dangerous level. This situation compelled the 
government of India to take some bold steps to restore fiscal stability in 
the economy. These events generated interest among the students of public 
finance to study the whole problem with a new approach. 
It may be noted that 'Problem of fiscal stabilization' constitute a 
vast and dynamic field of the study. Scope of any study specially in social 
sciences is always limited and our work is not an exception. We have tried 
not to capture each and every factor rather concentrated on few selected 
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factors. Therefore, despite all efforts to make this study up-to-date, 
comprehensive and analytical deficiencies are bound to remain. 
1.9 DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
Our study is based exclusively on secondary data which are 
published mainly by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, other 
departments/offices of the government of India and RBI. Thus, most of the 
relevant data have been taken from various issues of Indian Public Finance 
Statistics', 'Economic Survey', 'National Accounts Statistics', 'Budget at a 
Glance', and 'Report on Currency and Finance'. Besides these sources we 
have also taken data from 'Public Finance Statistics' published by CMIE, 
Mumbai and 'Economic Development in India - A country report, published 
by the World Bank. 
The methodology used here in order to identify and analyse the 
important factors which have contributed to the occurrance of the fiscal 
instability, does not go beyond simple statistical methods. 
1.10 PLAN OF THE STUDY 
The study is divided into six sections : In section I, we have 
dealt with the Introduction of the study. This chapter covers the concept 
of fiscal policy and nature of the problem of fiscal stabilization. After 
that, survey of relevant literature has been undertaken. Second section is 
devoted to the conceptual framework and basic issues in fiscal 
stabilization. Causes of the problem, size of the deficit and quality of the 
fiscal stabilization measures have been discussed in this chapter. Section 
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three covers problem of fiscal stabilization during the seventh plan period. 
Various tools of fiscal policy have been analysed in this chapter in order 
to identify the factors responsible for fiscal instability in the Indian 
economy. Section four attempts to review fiscal stabilization measures 
introduced by the government of India since 1991. In section five, effect 
of fiscal stabilization measures on the performance of various fiscal tools 
have been analysed. Finally, in section six, conclusions drawn from the 
study are made and some suggestions have also been put forward. 
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NOTES 
i) For discussion of fiscal measurement issues, see Tanzi, V. et al. 
(1987) : "Inflation and the Measuring of Fiscal Deficits", Staff 
Papers, I.M.F., 34, pp. 711-738. 
ii) Shifts of the deficit among different sections of the public sector 
can create difficulties in assessing the progress of fiscal 
stabilization programmes through the monitoring of fiscal 
ceilings. 
iii) It requires a full estimate of domestic debt, a precise measurement 
of the rate of inflation, the assumption that expected inflation is 
equal to measured inflation and so forth. 
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BASIC ISSUES IN FISCAL STABILIZATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dealing with fiscal deficit remains one of the most vexing 
problem for the majority of developing countries. For many, growing 
fiscal deficits led to money creation as the main source of financing 
followed by rising inflation, an erosion of tax base, and even larger fiscal 
imbalances. 
While the need for fiscal reform is now widely recognised, the 
experience of many countries indicates that fiscal reform is very difficult. 
The difficulties are partly political, partly institutional, and partly 
conceptual. Unfortunately, a not rare outcome is that countries often 
pursue fiscal reforms that are ad-hoc and inadequate, after some initial 
success, the situation relapses to a position at times more serious than the 
one that had prevailed before the adjustment. 
Many of the issues that arise in pursuing fiscal stabilization can 
be conveniently discussed under five headings : (i) Fiscal trends - a look 
at the evidence, (ii) The Fiscal deficits, (iii) Effects of specific policy 
moves, (A) Fiscal effects of Devaluation, (B) Expenditure cuts, (C) Tax 
increases, (D) The Role of Domestic Debt, (iv) The quality of fiscal 
stabilization, and (v) The sequencing of fiscal reforms. 
2.2 FISCAL TRENDS : A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 
The immediate origins of the fiscal crisis was the assumption by 
governments of privately contracted debt. Governments also faced internal 
pressures caused by the effects of short-run adjustment (stabilization) 
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policies involving sharp devaluations required to raise foreign exchange to 
service the external debt. The ensuing sharp depreciations of the real 
exchange rate helped to generate the needed foreign exchange but resulted 
in capital losses for foreign denominated debt holders.' As a result the 
external debt problem became first and foremost a fiscal problem. 
Turning to fiscal revenues, they too have been insensitive to the 
fiscal crisis. Since the onset of the crisis, neither low income countries 
nor middle income countries have been able to significantly raise fiscal 
revenues. Moreover, both groups have registered a declining share of 
income taxes in total revenues. Direct taxes being typically the most 
progressive and buoyant component of the tax system, this trend may 
signal both, efficiency loss, and equity deterioration. For low income 
countries, trade tax revenues continue to be the most important source of 
tax revenue. With import growth effectively constrained by foreign 
exchange earnings, the reliance on trade taxes further reduces the 
buoyancy of the tax system for this group of countries. At the same time, 
the role of foreign grants in helping alleviate the crisis has been relatively 
small even for low income countries. 
Stagnant revenues coupled with difficulties in compressing 
expenditures, implies limited progress towards reducing fiscal imbalances. 
With foreign borrowing foreclosed, this meant that governments had to 
rely on domestic sources of financing. For countries with relatively 
underdeveloped capital markets, borrowing from the central bank was the 
only remaining option. The ensuing increase in liquidity could only result 
either in run away inflation, or in capital flight, or a combination of both.-^  
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The debt and fiscal crisis combined to force many countries to 
undertake adjustment programmes. Fiscal policy came to be an essential 
component of adjustment programmes. On the one hand the recovery of 
fiscal discipline was viewed as a pre-requisite for fiscal stabilization. On 
the other hand, the reform of existing fiscal incentives. 
2.3 THE FISCAL DEFICITS 
Fiscal difficulty is conventionally defined as a large and/or 
increasing public sector deficit. To start with, how does a government get 
into fiscal difficulty has to be understood. Three views predominate in 
the literature. They can be labelled as political deficit, the structural 
deficit, and the inflation tax approaches respectively. 
Blaming political forces for fiscal expansion is an old tradition 
in economics, shared by conservatives such as Schumpeter^ and radicals 
like O'Connor"* at different places and times. The general view is that to 
maintain its political legitimacy, the state is forced toward taxing too little 
or spending too much, both to pay off specific interest groups and to 
sustain the level of employment via aggregate demand. This policy bias 
leads ultimately to increasing external deficits and/or inflation, requiring 
stabilization through deficit reduction sometimes in long run. 
In one example of this line of thought, the Mexican crisis after 
1982 is attributed by some analysts to politically driven expansion by a 
government which overestimated its spending power from the oil and 
foreign borrowing booms of the nineteen seventies. Inflation did not 
accelerate dramatically until after 1982, but before that unsustainable 
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levels of imports were said to be the result. Finally, politically directed 
redistribution plus expansionary fiscal policy in the stagnationist economy 
of Chile stimulated output to the point at which capacity limits bound, 
triggering inflation and external imbalance. 
Structuralist economists are by no means opposed to invoking 
politics to explain deficits, hut also suggest other reasons for them to 
exist. One is an external shock-falling terms of trade, an export supply 
shortfall, or an interest rate excrusion on external debt. Such shocks are 
contractionary most government try to offset them in the short-run by 
fiscal means. Casuality runs from the external to internal deficit leads to 
reversal of the usual political link.^ 
Besides external shocks, other structural factors may force 
fiscal expansion. They include natural disasters, financial turmoil, ongoing 
inflation with government debt, and foreign payments obligations. 
The disaster scenario is familiar. It requires little comment 
beyond the observation that relief efforts have both a supply and demand 
dimension. Not only must commodities be supplied to victims, they must 
also be in demand. For example A.K. Sen^ attributes famine largely to a 
demand collapse induced by rising food prices in the face of fixed nominal 
incomes. Restoring demand involves fiscal deficit spending to transfer 
income to the groups hit hardest by the price increases. 
Financial collapse lies at the root of many stabilizations. The 
typical scenario begins with a surge in speculation involving shares and/or 
real estate. A bubble is most likely to blow itself up when potential saving 
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is high, productive investment outlets do not seem to be available, and 
when deregulation of the financial system opens possibilities for 
manipulation. This situation reminds us of recent experiences in East 
Asian countries. 
The collapse leaves firms and banks with badly compromised 
balance sheet positions. The subsequent bail-out involves fiscal outlays 
and heavy rediscounting by the central bank of commercial bank loans. The 
government may also issue its internal obligations in exchange for the 
private sector's foreign debt, and may have direct problems with the 
balance sheets of public enterprises. Finally, disruption in local financial 
markets provoks capital flight. It tends to be more serious under 
deregulated financial regimes in which exchange controls have been 
weakened or removed. Most of these interventions increase the state's 
deficit. 
The next structural case of a fiscal deficit is monetary 
indexation under continuing inflation. Structural inflation theory argues 
more from the side of costs than demand, emphasizing distributional 
conflict and indexation mechanisms. An initial price excrusion say from a 
supply shock, a period of forced saving in response to expansionary policy 
or an increase in local spending power as from an export price increase, 
or a cost shock such as devaluation, reduce some income flows in real 
terms. The shock marks the first stage of inflation. 
If inflation is structural, it steadily erodes the real value of the 
money supply, the inflation tax begins the bite. One way to avoid this 
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problem is to index money by paying interest on all state obligations. In 
principle, such a policy is fiscally neutral. The inflation tax cuts demand 
and interest payments on government debt offset the tax. However, when 
inflation reaches triple digits, nominal government outlays for interest 
payments soar. 
2.4 EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC POLICY MOVES : 
The above discussion suggests that fiscal deficits have numerous 
causes; not all deficits are irrational, and not all add to aggregate demand. 
Nonetheless, deficit reduction is the main objective of orthodox 
stabilization packages of the type usually proposed by the World Bank and 
IMF. How does such austerity affect the economy's chances of achieving 
normal policy goals ? 
Most governments share at least four eocnomic targets : 
* to maintain socially acceptable levels of capacity utilization and 
growth, especially in sectors and regions dominated by their 
political base, 
* to keep inflation down to a rate tolerable in terms of the country's 
own history of price increases, 
* to alter wealth and income distributions in line with the regime's 
ideological predilections and political constraints, and 
* to maintain a degree of self-reliance in trade and external financial 
relationships.^ 
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The question at hand regards the likely effects of fiscal and 
other measures under such circumstances. There are several relevant 
policy linkages; 
First, one must be aware of specific effects of different 
policies. As we have seen, cutting public investment may also lead private 
capital formation to decline. Increasing indirect taxes will drive up costs, 
possibly accelerating a structural inflation. Successful anti inflation 
policies are likely to lead to more efficient tax collection as the effects 
of payment lags on real revenues are reduced. Hence, more fiscal demand 
contraction may occur than had been planned. 
Second, inflation reduction will have other macro effects that 
have to be taken into consideration. Monetary correction was never 
completely effective. As a consequence, dramatically slower inflation 
made velocity fall or money demand rise. Room was opened for money 
creation, either by fiscal deficit spending or reserve increases from 
capital inflows. Reducing inflation also got rid of the inflation tax. The 
fiscal restraint implicit in more effective direct and indirect tax collection 
was offset by the expansionary effect of undoing the erosion of real wealth 
by steadily rising prices. 
Third, prices charged or offered by public enterprises are an 
important component of fiscal policy in many countries. Changes in prices 
charged for essential services or food may have strong distributional 
repercussions. If public enterprises sell intermediate goods, then 
increasing their prices will have ambiguous effects on inflation. 
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Producer's costs will rise. They may well pass them along to final 
commodity prices, provoking structural inflation. On the other hand, the 
consolidated public sector deficit will be reduced, leading to less state 
borrowing from the central bank and money creation. The inflation rate 
may decline for monetarist reasons. 
Manipulations of consumer prices, for example, via food 
subsidies can also have important fiscal and balance of payments effects. 
With supply elasticities in the usual empirical range, for example, an 
increased subsidy rate on food purchases will create inflationary pressure 
unless stocks are run down or imports brought in to meet the additional 
demand the subsidy creats. If new supplies do not materialize, then prices 
will go up enough to offset both the direct demand increase and the fiscal 
injection it embodies.^ 
Fourth, the observation is that fiscal measures should not be 
undertaken independently of other policy moves. Devaluation, for 
example, may at times lead to output contraction in developing economies 
through well known channels.^ 
Fifth, fiscal measures may substitute for other policies. 
Devaluation stimulates, but so do favourable producer prices and/or 
subsidies. The latter, directed interventions do not share devaluation's 
unpleasant economy-wide effects and may well be the preferred option for 
the reason. 
Finally, the fiscal position will influence private actions in 
external capital market. Restrictive policy makes repatriation of flight 
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capital or emigrant remittances more likely by bidding up interest rates. 
On the other hand, financial incentives alone are not likely to draw 
external resources toward stagnant economy. 
2.4.1. Fiscal Effects of Devaluation 
Devaluation is also likely to have fiscal effects. First is the 
capital loss resulting from a real exchange rate depreciation. Consider the 
case of a small debtor country. Most of its foreign debt is in the hands of 
the public sector. This is a realistic feature of most highly indebted 
developing countries. The economy faces a double transfer problem, 
resources must be transfered abroad to service the foreign debt, but first 
the public sector must obtain the required foreign exchange from the 
private sector. A real depreciation, i.e. a fall in the relative price of non-
traded goods, will facilitate the external transfer, but may exacerbate the 
problem arising from the required internal transfer.^° Consider the case 
where non-traded goods are a net source of revenue for the government. A 
real djepreciation will then worsen the governments terms of trade with 
respect to the private sector. If the government relies at the margin on a 
distortionary tax to meet its revenue needs, it will need additional revenue 
with detrimental effects on the economy. Debt service therefore entails a 
"secondary burden", beyond the resource loss caused by transfering 
resources abroad, because of deteriorating internal terms of trade. 
2.4.2. Control of Public Expenditure 
Stagnant economic growth and the limited progress toward fiscal 
stabilization, in particular the inability to raise significantly government 
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revenues, brought to the forefront the need to introduce radical reforms in 
developing countries' fiscal systems, with the dual objectives of 
improving resource allocation and avoiding indiscriminate expenditure 
cuts. 
Widespread reforms could no longer escape the issue of which 
expenditures to cut and which taxes to raise. Public investment took the 
brunt of expenditure cuts. How to evaluate a reduction in capital 
expenditures is a difficult, and yet, largely unresolved issue. On the one 
hand, inefficient public enterprise investments can, and should be, cut. On 
the other hand, public sector investments that generate externalities and 
that are largely complementary with private sector investments should be 
maintained. 
Most experts agree that current expenditure should also share 
some of the cuts. They often disagree, however, on the distribution of 
these cuts across expenditure categories. Vito Tanzi^', for instance, agrees 
that cuts in public employment should be preferred to reduction in public 
wages. His argument is that the latter are not sustainable and will be soon 
reversed when the economic emergency subsides. Also, wage cuts may 
lead to loss of motivation and lower productivity. 
Comia and Stewart'^, on the other hand tackle the issue from an 
equity point of view. They argue that cuts in public wages will not have a 
regressive distributional impact to the extent that public employees belong 
to the upper middle income scale. Instead reductions in public 
employment are likely to reduce the provision of public services with a 
negative impact on the poor. 
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A further area of disagreement involves the extent to which 
consumers' subsidies should bear the consequences of fiscal restrains. 
Finally, all agree that military expenditure should not be spared. 
On the basis of empirical evidence, it is said that poverty 
alleviation and fiscal expenditure discipline are not incompatible. The 
issue arises at two levels. First, regarding the intersectoral allocation of 
public expenditure. Second, is the issue of the intersectoral allocation of 
public spending. 
In recent fiscal stabilization programmes expenditure reductions 
have been more significant than revenue increases. However, the approach 
followed in cutting expenditures has been far from efficient. 
If public sector wages are high in comparison of the private 
sector, their reduction could be part of a fiscal stabilization package. Real 
wages can obviously be reduced quickly and can, thus, result in rapid 
expenditure reductions. Over a longer period, however, it is the size of the 
public sector workforce that will be the major determinant of public 
expenditure for wages and salaries. The reduction of public employment is 
difficult and may even be financially costly in the short-term, but it must 
be pursued vigorously if a durable stabilization is to be achieved. Over the 
long run, this effort will pay off. 
The second important category of public expenditure that must 
receive early attention is the investment budget. A close evaluation of all 
the planned as well as the ongoing projects is necessary. Projects planned 
for the period ahead but not yet initiated, should be carefully scrutinized 
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regar(Jless of whether they have foreign financing or not. Only if their 
expected rate of return is very high they should be retained. ^ ^ For the 
ongoing projects, considerations of sunk costs will be important as well 
as costs associated with the process of stopping these projects and 
restarting them at a later time. In some cases this stop go can be very 
costly. 
The third obvious expenditure area for close scrutiny and quick 
expenditure reduction is subsidies. Some subsidies may be very important 
to the poorest groups and must be retained. Others could be important in 
subsidising activities that generate significant positive externalities. When 
subsidies are of a general nature and especially when they encourage the 
consumption of a traded good the existence of inefficient enterprises, 
they must be cut.^ "* 
Obviously, the defence budget must not escape close scrutiny 
Unfortunately, this expenditure has been very resilient during stabilization 
programmes so that one should not be excessively optimistic. But the 
government should attempt to put downward pressure on this spending. 
In most countries there are many activities which for historical 
or political reasons have been taken over by the government, perhaps for 
reasons that appeared legitimate at the time. Vested interests and pressure 
groups will argue for the status quo but a determined government with a 
clear sense of direction can show the absurdities of many regulations and 
governmental activities and can make a concerted effort to get rid of many 
of them. 
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2.4.3. Tax Reforms 
Equity and efficiency issues arise also in the design of taxation 
reform. Usually the stimulas for tax reforms came from large and 
unsustainable fiscal deficits. Tax system in many developing countries was 
heavily influenced by their colonial legacy. This influence was reflected 
in a very complex tax structure with emphasis on progressive income 
taxes. Other major features of typical tax systems included : a cascaded 
structure of indirect taxes; a schedular system for direct taxes; and, a 
proliferation of exceptions and exemptions. The resulting system were 
much too complex for the administrative capabilities of developing 
countries. They encouraged too many arbitages which eroded the tax base. 
A lack of constituency in favour of tax reforms and the existence of 
powerful vested interests in support of the status quo perpetuated the 
existing system untill large fiscal deficits provided the required stimulus 
for tax reforms. 
Recent experience of a number of developing countries shows 
how tax reforms were typically designed to minimise the incentive for tax 
avoiding resource shifts. They did so by applying the company tax to all 
forms of business organization, by aligning personal and corporate tax 
rates, by broadening the personal and corporate tax bases, and by 
mitigating the tax bias in favour of debt finance.'^ Other major features of 
the reformed systems included the lowering of direct tax rates, the 
introduction of a value added tax and extensive inflation adjustment 
measures. 
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A perhaps more fundamental issue is the basic inspiration behind 
tax reforms. Optimal taxation theory concludes in favour of non-uniform 
tax rates. Also, equity motive may clash with the desired for simplicity. 
An equitable system may indeed require sophisticated distinctions. Again 
the issue is difficult to settle, in so far as complex tax systems tend to 
offer a wide set of opportunities for tax evasion that benefit rich people. 
Yet, a larger weight to the equity motive in the design of tax reforms 
seems warranted. 
A measure that can be introduced relatively quickly and can have 
several beneficial effects in addition to providing additional revenue is an 
increase in public utility tariffs. However, it is important, to take steps 
that prevent the benefits from the increase form being dissipated in higher 
salaries, higher employment or in unnecessary investments by the public 
enterprises. If the central government is unable to control the behaviour 
of the public enterprises, only their privatization might reduce the fiscal 
disequilibrium. Provided that the spending by the public enterprises can be 
controlled, the tariff increase can be larger than it would be necessary if 
other measures were in place. For a while, the government can exploit the 
monopoly power of these enterprises to raise needed revenue.'^ 
If the government is able to legislate the needed changes quickly, 
on the revenue potential of particular excises should be fully exploited. 
Increases in taxes on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and a few other 
commodities can be justified on various efficiency grounds. But once 
again the initial increases must be protected against the eroding influence 
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of future inflation. Once again untill the fundamental reforms are in place, 
these excises can be made to generate more revenue than might be desired 
over the long run. On the basis of information as to the demand elasticity 
of these products, taxes that would maximise their revenue generation 
could be imposed. 
Some administrative changes for raising tax revenue in the short-
run can also be considered. For example, in situations of high inflation, 
collection lags can be shortened administratively. This reduction can raise 
revenue by significant amounts.'^ Tax evasion can be reduced by the 
judicious use of penalities. Postponement in tax payments can be 
discouraged by raising steeply, to a high positive level, the interest 
charges on delayed payments. 
The introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) with the widest base 
and with possibly one rate should be a central element of a fundamental 
reform. Studies on the estimation of the size of the potential VATbase will 
be necessary in order to determine the rate required to raise the desired 
revenue. The introduction or the broadening the scope of the VAT will 
often have beneficial effects on revenue from other taxes and especially 
from the income taxes. 
The reform of income taxes (personal and corporate) will also 
require time but less than the introduction of a VAT. Most developing 
countries already have income taxes so that it will be mainly a matter of 
modifying the existing structure. For the personal income tax, the main 
policy changes will concern : (a) a reduction in the often very high level 
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of personal exemptions; (b) the elimination of many deductions and 
special treatments of particular income; (c) a change in the rate structure 
probably by raising the first rate at least 10 per cent if it is lower, and 
reducing the highest rates to perhaps the 30-40 per cent range after 
careful analysis; (d) the forceful use of presumptive taxation in 
connection with hard-to-tax activities. A serious effort should also be 
made to improve the administration of these taxes by relying on all the 
information available to the government to reach potential tax payers and 
to determine their income. 
Changes in corporate income taxes can also be introduced 
relatively quickly although as for taxes on the income of individuals, the 
revenue effects may not be felt for perhaps two years. The basic changes 
relate' to wipe out the tax base; the lowering of the rate; and better 
administration. In some recent reforms, these minimum taxes have been 
based on (a) the imports of corporations; (b) their turnover; and (c) their 
gross assets. 
Changes in import taxation can also be made relatively quickly 
once the legislation is approved. The most important and quick change 
would be the imposition of a minimum tax on all imports. This change 
would also improve the efficiency of the economy by reducing the 
dispersion in effective protection. 
2.4.4. Public Debt 
The fiscal deficit constitutes most important link between fiscal 
policy and indebtedness. It was suggested that the existing debt level is 
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sustainable if it is being fully serviced. Whereas this rationale is an over-
simplification of the concept of sustainability and in particular does not 
identify Ponzi financed debt as unsustainable, it does imply that countries 
receiving external debt relief are in a situation of 'excess' debt.** That is, 
the current debt level is higher than the sustainable one. Relief on external 
debt is typically provided in the face of a balance of payments crisis, and 
so the existence of excess external debt can be identified with the lack of 
foreign exchange for debt servicing. A sustainable foreign debt level would 
be one that could be financed within a realistic balance of payment 
scenario. 
A determination of excess domestic debt is more tricky. The 
definition of sustainable debt as freely marketed government debt is 
appealing but would imply unrealistically low domestic debt ratios for 
most countries in the medium term. An alternative is to include 
sustainable domestic debt that is mobilised by long standing institutional 
arrangements with domestic financial institutions. Government doemstic 
debt that results from exceptional financing schemes, such as arrears or 
domestic loan counterparts to IMF credits, would be excluded and 
considered excess debt. 
Once a 'sustainable' deficit has been achieved and the 'excess' 
debt has been paid off, a country may want to move toward a 'desirable' 
debt, which would be lower, and a compatible 'desirable' deficit. Criteria 
for setting the desirable debt level might include primary reliance on 
voluntary placement of government debt at moderate real interest rates and 
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limits on foreign debt servicing as a percentage of exports and/or 
government revenues.*^ 
The cost of a 'desirable' deficit would be higher taxes or lower 
expenditure during the stabilization period. The rewards would be : (i) a 
more comfortable budgetary debt service burden, (ii) less pressure on the 
balance of payments and the exchange rate, as a result of the lower 
external debt burden, and (iii) lower domestic interest rates and/or more 
credit available for private sector investment. 
On average, the estimated sustainable deficits were higher for 
the high-debt countries than for the low-debt countries. Thus, although 
substantial fiscal adjustment was undertaken in both groups, low debt 
countries exceeded their sustainable deficits during this period by more 
than high debt countries. Their fiscal position contributed, in turn, to their 
relatively faster accumulation of total foreign debt. 
In some respects, the similarities between the two groups are as 
interesting as the differences. Both groups faced similar real interest 
rates on foreign debt. And both groups experienced similar growth rates in 
real GDP - a factor that can be at least partly explained by the stimulating 
effect on GDP of the export drive in several countries included in the 
high-debt group and the depressing effect on GDP of the export slump in 
several low-debt countries. The favourable export drive in the high debt 
countries helped to offset the depressing of debt overhang and high real 
costs of foreign borrowing. Meanwhile, the poor export performance in 
the low debt countries was partly offset by the stimulating effects of 
foreign capital inflow. 
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2.5 THE QUALITY OF FISCAL STABILIZATION 
The focus of this section will be upon the kind of fiscal 
stabilization that a country should introduce. In recent years we have 
become progressively more aware of the fact that a given reduction in the 
fiscal deficit may be genuine and of good quality or of a largely cosmetic 
kind and of poor quality. The economic effects of the two are likely to be 
widely divergent. Unfortunately, cosmetic changes are often easier and 
politically less costly to make. This fact, coupled with the realization that 
the time horizon that is most important to policy makers often leads to a 
preference for cosmetic over genuine adjustment. Policy makers tend to 
follow the line of least resistance. 
A reduction of certain magnitude in the fiscal deficit is in most 
cases, not the result of a single policy decision as would be, say, a 
devaluation or an increase in interest rates but the summation of many 
specific policy decisions, both on the revenue side and on the expenditure 
side.20 
A high quality fiscal stabilization must .be associated with 
measures that individually are efficient, durable, and equitable. In other 
words, these measures must not introduce avoidable distortions; they must 
not self-destruct in the near future; and they must not eliminate 
expenditures that are important for economic or social reasons when 
alternatives are available. The public spending to be reduced must be the 
one that contributes the least to the efficiency and the fairness of the 
economic system. 
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On the revenue side, and broadly in order of preference but not 
in order of facility of introduction, the following measures could be 
chosen : First, the broadening or the introduction of a general 
consumption tax, possibly one with characteristics of a value-added tax. 
Value added taxes are now important sources of revenue in a relatively 
efficient way and with relatively short lags. 
Second, the government should fully explore the revenue 
possibility of excise taxes. These excises should be imposed on 
commodities with inelastic demand, or on those whose consumption 
generates substantial negative externalities. Third, important changes can 
be introduced to the personal income tax. Personal income taxes 
contribute still very little to total revenue in developing countries. If basic 
changes are made, the threshold of the tax can remain generous, and high 
marginal tax rates can be cut, without much revenue loss and with potential 
gains in work effort and tax payers' compliance. 
For taxes on corporations, similar considerations apply. 
Corporate income taxes are often eroded by excessive incentives and 
complex laws. In particular circumstances, and especially when the rate of 
inflation is high, alternative forms of taxing corporations may need to be 
introduced. 
The next measure, which especially in the short run can be very 
important from a revenue point of view, is the raising of public utility 
prices and the introduction of user charges for particular services 
provided by the public sector, such as higher education and health. The 
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real prices at which electricity, water, telephone, transportation and other 
public sector services are sold normally fall, at times quite drastically, 
during inflationary periods. This fall increases the demand for these 
services. Because of losses experienced by the public enterprises, it 
becomes difficult to expand capacity. Enterprises have also difficulties in 
providing the funds necessary for operation and maintenance, especially 
in view of the more intensive utilization of their plants. Thus, capacity 
will decline and the quality of the service will deteriorate. The greater is 
the fall in the real tariffs charged by the public enterprises, and the greater 
is the demand response to that fall, the greater will appear to be the need 
to expand investment in those activities. Thus, an artificial justification 
for capacity expansion will be created especially at a time when the 
resources to satisfy that expansion are sharply reduced.^^ 
A correction of these prices will thus : (i) generate more 
revenue; (ii) reduce the need for additional investment to expand capacity 
by lowering demand; and (iii) by reducing overuse, it will reduce 
maintenance costs. Finally, imports can be made to generate larger 
revenues either by dismantling quotas and other quantitative restrictions 
and replacing them by import duties or by removing the excessive erosion 
of the import tax base created by incentives and special exemptions, and 
by introducing a minimum tax on all imports. In both cases the additional 
revenue would be accompanied by improved efficiency. On the expenditure 
side, a variety of steps can be taken : 
First, and most importantly, unproductive investment projects 
must be eliminated. The argument often heard that investment must be 
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protected during adjustment is simply misguided. While productive 
investment is an important source of growth and must be protected, 
unproductive investment especially if associated with imported machinery 
and capital equipment, is a major burden on the economy. In most 
developing countries the investment budget is padded with many 
politically motivated and unproductive investments which can, and should 
be eliminated. Unlike consumption expenditure, it may contribute little to 
the welfare of the country's citizens.^^ 
Furthermore, if it is obtained with foreign credit, it becomes a 
long-term drag on the economy. Hence, unproductive investment must be 
the first area where cuts should be made. Some of the saving from this 
source could be allocated to operations and maintenance expenditure, 
which would increase the efficiency of the existing capital structure and 
would permit that structure to support a higher level of income. 
A second area where reductions could be made is in the wage 
bill of the public sector. During stabilization many countries have in fact, 
attempted to reduce the wage bill of the public sector. However, policy 
makers have generally preferred to reduce real wages rather than public 
employment. There is evidence, from some countries, that cuts in real 
wages have been even accompanied by expansions in public sector 
employment. Since the marginal cost of hiring extra workers falls with the 
fall in real wages and since adjustment often increases unemployment in 
the short-run, pressure is put on the government to be the employer of last 
resort. Such a policy does not have much chance for success in reducing 
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the wage bill over the long run and it is likely to increase the inefficiency 
of public sector employees, especially at a time when the public sector is 
expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy. The cut in real 
wages, unless they were high to start with, almost guarantees that the 
efficiency of the public sector will fall. Furthermore, a drastic fall in real 
wages guarantees that they will bounce back as soon as the government is 
no longer able to withstand the pressure of public sector unions.^^ In other 
words, excessive reduction in real wages will increase fiscal tension. The 
reduction in real wages, at a time of high unemployment, will generate 
pressures on the government to increase its employment. In many 
developing countries the public sector is clearly overstaffed. Therefore, 
fiscal stabilization that hopes to reduce the wage bill permanently must 
reduce in some cases quite considerably, the number of public employees. 
This may require privatising some activities. 
The third important area for reduction, although a politically 
difficult one, is defence expenditure. Defence expenditure remains 
excessive in developing countries. Unfortunately, this spending has been 
able s.o far to withstand the downward pressures in public expenditure that 
accompany stabilization programmes.^ "* 
Fourth, many countries engage in various forms of unproductive 
expenditure, from the building of monuments to the subsidization of 
unnecessary activities. In many developing countries, for example, a large 
number of public cars (often expensive ones) are purchased. In many of 
these countries the enforcement of useless regulations also requires 
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substantial public sector resoruces. Reducing some regulations will 
reduce public spending. In conclusion, in most countries there is scope 
for pruning the budget of many of these activities. Subsidies must be 
closely scrutinized. Those which are essential, because of social 
objectives, or because of significant externalities, should be protected. 
But generalised subsidies, provided through the artificial reduction in the 
prices of products of general consumption, should be eliminated. Many 
subsidies, even when defended on the grounds that they protect the poor, 
just subsidise the middle classes. 
2.6 THE SEQUENCING OF FISCAL REFORMS 
A fundamental and common conflict that arises in adjustment 
programmes is the one between the need to achieve quick results and the 
time necessary to develop, legislate, and implement sound policies. The 
need for quick results is often promoted by : (a) the precariousness of the 
economic situation; (b) the fear that if changes are not made immediately, 
they will not be made; and (c) by arrangements with international 
institutions which are often time constrained. 
While changes in interest rates, in exchange rates, and in other 
areas of economic policy can be made relatively quickly and often do not 
require legislative approval, good fiscal reforms, that include tax reform, 
public sector reorganizations including privatization, reform of public 
expenditure programmes, and so forth, require time and, in many 
countries, must be legislated. As a consequence, countries have often gone 
for 'quick fixes' that is for fiscal reforms that reduce the fiscal deficit in 
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the period immediately ahead with policy changes that are neither durable 
nor efficient. Common elements of these 'quick fix' solutions have been : 
(a) sharp reductions in public sector real wages to levels below their 
likely long-run equilibrium; (b) sharp and indiscriminate cuts in 
investment expenditure without much assurance that the projects that are 
eliminated are least productive; (c) sharp cuts in expenditures on operation 
and maintenance leading to a faster deterioration of the existing capital 
infrastructure and to reduce capacity utilization; (d) emergency tax 
legislation, including the temporary introduction of very distortionary 
taxes such as those on exports and financial instruments, and of temporary 
surtaxes on import duties, income taxes, and others; (e) excessive 
increases in some excises; (f) anticipation of tax payments, sometimes by 
providing discounts for anticipated payments to tax payers, thus reducing 
further tax collection; (g) tax amnesties; (h) quick sales of some assets; 
(i) delay in making payments, (j) various imaginative maneuvers aimed at 
'parking' the deficit in parts of the public sector not covered by the 
programme. 
Most of the above measures are either self-destructing, or of 
questionable quality, or both. They are not the kind of measures that one 
would want in a good programme or that will result in durable stabilization. 
They will cause a rise in fiscal tension, increasing uncertainty and sending 
negative signals to investors, thus discouraging capital repatriation, or 
encouraging capital flight. Given the measured fiscal deficit, the expected 
rate of return on private investment is likely to be negatively related to 
the degree of fiscal tension while private investment is positively related 
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to the expected rate of return. Therefore, a deficit reduction acheived 
through these means should not be expected to bring about an improvement 
in economic conditions. Such a reduction can only be justified if it is 
clearly announced and believed to be a transitory step toward a more 
durable and higher quality package. Unfortunately, these measures often 
exhaust the political will of the government to make the more basic 
reforms or are seen as the only way to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
Sustainable fiscal policy requires, almost by definition, 
measures that will survive the test of time and that will not put additional 
impediments on the efficient allocation of resources. It must involve good 
macroeconomists working in close cooperation with public finance 
specialists experienced in both policy and administration. 
This chapter has surveyed some major issues that arise in trying 
to bring the fiscal situation of countries under control. It emphasised the 
much greater complexities and difficulties that arise in the fiscal area as 
compared to other areas of economic policy. In recent years there has 
been a lively discussion among economists and policy makers on whether 
countries should go for shock therapy or for gradualism. This, however, is 
not a meaningful debate if applied to fiscal policy since as argued above, 
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PROBLEM OF FISCAL STABILIZATION IN INDIAN 
ECONOMY DURING SEVENTH PLAN PERIOD 
(1985-86 to 1989-90) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The fiscal situation which was under strain throughout the 1980s, 
reached a critical situation in 1990-91. The unabated growth of non-plan 
expenditure and poor returns from investments made in the public sector 
have been the main contributory factors in the fiscal crisis. There has been 
a steady decline in the share of capital formation in the central 
government expenditure. The gross savings of the government which 
turned negative for the first time in 1984-85, continued to remain so. The 
fiscal imbalance also manifested in a sharp increase in internal debt and 
resultant increase in interest payments. 
The fiscal situation which had been under mounting pressure 
throughout 1980s assumed crisis proportions by the begining of the fiscal 
year 1991-92. The Gulf Crisis of 1990 added fuel to the fire. Throughout 
the eighties, all important indicators of fiscal imbalance were on the rise. 
These are the conventional budgetary deficit, the revenue deficit, the 
monetised deficit and gross fiscal deficit. Such a fiscal situation has 
become unsustainable. 
This chapter addresses the problem of fiscal stabilizaiton in 
Indian economy in a practical way. In part II, it highlights the trends in 
revenue reciepts. Part III examines the growth of expenditure. Part IV 
deals with the contribution of public sector enterprises in the worsening 
of the fiscal situation. Finally, it highlights the emergence of fiscal 
imbalance. 
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3.2 TRENDS IN REVENUE RECEIPTS 
3.2.1 Performance of Taxes 
The objectives of the fiscal policy and tax structure should be 
based on the foundation of "equality, certainty, convenience and eocnomy". 
These old maxims of taxation are well accepted standards for a tax system. 
If a tax system is not properly structured and administered on the above 
standards it either causes undue hardship to the public or discrimination in 
the tax burdens or uncertainty in the revenue receipts.' 
A brief review of the Indian fiscal policy during the past 5 
decades clearly indicates the attempts for obtaining more tax revenue to 
the exchequer. By a process of both widening and deepening of the tax 
base, the combined tax revenue of the centre, states and union territories 
increased during this period. The tax revenue/GDP ratio went up. The 
combined revenue receipts (tax revenue plus non tax revenue) have also 
witnessed a similar increase (Table A-1). 
But with this impressive increase in tax and non-tax revenues, 
some important features accompanying this rise should also be noted 
which are rather disconcerting : 
(1) There has been a continuous decline in the share of direct taxes in the 
total tax revenue till mid nineties. It is certainly a very unhealthy 
development. This suggests how inequitable our tax system has become 
over the years. 
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distortionary effects. The share of indirect taxes in the total tax revenue is 
much higher than that of industrialised countries and also appreciably 
higher than the average share for most developing countries. Our indirect 
tax system has not evolved as an integrated system as in developed 
countries. In a scramble for revenue, all types of products; raw materials, 
intermediate products and final products, that is, inputs as well as outputs 
have been brought under the direct tax net. Further, the various indirect 
levies fall mostly on the very same products. This has resulted in 
cascading effect causing an escalation of costs and profits at each stage. 
(3) There is rampant tax evasion of both direct and indirect taxes leading 
to the generation of black money. It is often said that tax evasion is neither 
a new phenomenon nor a peculiar Indian problem. The Taxation Enquiry 
Committee, the Kaldor Report on Indian Tax Reform, the Wanchoo 
Committee and the NIPFP have attempted to quantify the extent of evasion 
and the magnitude of black money. The Wanchoo Committee states that 
the high rates of taxation under direct tax laws are the first and foremost 
reason for tax evasion in India. In the words of the committee : "An 
overwhelming majority of persons have voiced the opinion that tax evasion 
is dependent on the rates of taxation and rises with increases in the rates. 
Most of the economists have also subscribed to this view. Even those who 
did not concede that high rates led to evasion admitted.... that high rates 
did make tax evasion much more attractive and profitable".^ 
Gupta and Gupta also come to a similar conclusion. They state 
that, "rising average tax rates are associated with an increasing relative size 
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of the underground economy. For instance, when average tax rates,.... 
increase by 1 per cent, the size of the unofficial economy relative to 
official economy increases by 3.16 per cent".^ The unsanctioned economy 
has grown due to high taxes not only on income but also on 
commodities.... high income and corporation taxes create incentives to 
evade and avoid them. With high excise and sales taxes, incentive exists to 
produce and sell outside the purview of the official market. 
(4) It is improtant to note that the growth of revenue from any tax may be 
viewed in two ways. One is the increase in tax receipts as a result of every 
increase in national income without any change either in the tax rates or in 
its coverage. It is known as the built-in-flexibility of the tax or simply the 
income elasticity of the tax. In the second case, changes in rates and 
coverage of the tax are also taken into account. In this case the growth in 
tax revenue is the result of a process of both widening and deepening of 
the tax. The two together account for the total increase in the tax yield and 
is known as the buoyancy of the tax. 
The overall elasticity of the Indian tax system was 0.833 
recorded by Sahota^ for the period 1950-51 to 1957-58. It was 0.827 
according to the estimates of V.G. Rao^ during 1960-61 to 1973-74. These 
figures suggest that the income elasticity of Indian taxation has remained 
almost constant from 1950-51 to 1973-74. There are some indications to 
suggest that there has been a further decline in the responsiveness of our 
tax system. One such indicator is the estimates of buoyancy and elasticity 
of major indirect taxes recorded by M.M. Sury.^  According to Sury, the 
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buoyancy coefficient of union excise revenue was 3.02 during 1950-51 to 
1964-65. It declined to 1.31 during 1963-64 to 1974-75. The elasticity 
coefficient reflects a lack of inherent response of excise revenue to 
changes in national income. If this is the case with the fastest growing 
central tax, it can very well be imagined what must have happened with 
other taxes, particularly, the direct taxes whose elasticity has always been 
the lowest. 
3.2.2 Tax Structure and Revenue Productivity 
The revenue yielding capacity of a tax structure is measured in 
terms of tax buoyancy and built in revenue flexibility. Tax buoyancy 
measures the total increase in tax revenue with respect to national income 
as a result of discretionary measures like increase in tax rates, introducing 
new taxes or increasing coverage of a particular tax etc. Tax buoyancy is 
also indicated by tax income ratio the part of national income which 
is taken by taxes. 
3.2.3 Tax Buoyancy 
Tax buoyancy which is measured by tax-income ratio depends 
upon so many factors but the per capita income of the country is its main 
determinant. Tax-income ratio in India is much lower than in the 
economically advanced countries like USA, U.K. and Denmark etc., where 
it ranges from about 25 per cent to 45 per cent considering the fact that 
per capita income in India is much lower in comparison to these countries 
but such a high tax-income ratio may not be expected in India. In view of 
the increasing financial requirements for the planned economic 
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development in the country tax-income ratio should at least range between 
20-25 per cent of national income. 
3.2.4 Trends 
A feature of India's tax structure during the sixth and seventh plan 
period was the preponderance of indirect taxes. As Table (A-2 & Figure a-i) 
shows, the proportion of indirect taxes in the tax revenue collected by the 
centre has increased steadily over the years, from 77.26 per cent in 1980-81 
to 80.28 per cent in 1984-85 and 82.1 per cent in 1987-88. Indirect taxes 
increased on an average from 77.4 per cent of total tax revenue during the 
sixth plan period to 80.95 per cent during the seventh plan period. The 
proportion of direct taxes has declined correspondingly from 22.6 per cent 
during the sixth plan period to 19.05 per cent during the seventh plan period. 
Among the direct taxes, the share of non-corporate, that is personal 
income tax has remained stagnant, it started out at 9.1 per cent during the 
sixth plan period, and reached to 9.56 per cent during the seventh plan period-^^ 
(Table A-2 & Figure a-i) while that of corporation tax registered a decline 
from 11.6 per cent during the sixth plan to 9.04 per cent during the seventh 
plan period. The decline in the share of direct taxes has occurred during this 
period despite high rates of tax. 
Among indirect taxes, the proportion of union excise has come 
down from an average of 47.6 per cent during sixth plan to 43.72 per cent 
during seventh plan period (Table A-2 & Figure a-i) and that of customs has 
increased from 27.8 per cent to 35 per cent during the period under 
reference. During the same period the share of direct taxes to indirect taxes 
has declined from 27 per cent to 25 per cent (Table A-4 & Figure a-ii). 
67 
TABLE : A-2 
COMPOSITION OF TAX REVENUE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
1980-81 to 1990-91 (Per cent of Gross Tax Revenue) 
Year Direct Tax Personal Corporation Indirect Custom Excise 
Incomelax Tax Tax Duty. Duty. 
1980-81 22.74 11.4 
1984-85 19.71 10.89 
1985-86 19.40 10.00 
1986-87 19.00 9.62 
1987-88 17.90 9.11 
1988-89 19.75 9.91 
1989-90 19.22 9.16 
1990-91 19.10 9.30 
Sixth Plan Average 
1980-81to 20.78 11.63 
1984-85 
Seventh Plan Average 
1985-86to 19.05 9.56 
1989-90 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget Documents 
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In the realm of tax revenue, the tax to GDP ratio has moved up 
steadily during the decade of 1980s. From about 9.69 per cent in 1980-81 to 
11.30 per cent in 1989-90 (Table A-3 & Figure a-ii). A major problem with 
the tax system is that the share of direct taxes has virtually stagnated during 
the period; it started out at 2.20 per cent of GDP in 1980-81, but after 
touching 2.37 in 1981-82, it had gone down to 2.06 per cent of GDP in 
1990-91 (Table A-3 & Figure a-iii). During the sixth plan period the average 
direct tax GDP ratio was 2.23 per cent, which declined to 2.14 per cent of 
GDP during the seventh plan period (Table A-3 & Figure a-iii). Thus the 
entire increase in the tax to GDP ratio has been brought about by exploiting 
indirect taxes. Indirect taxes increased from 7.71 per cent of GDP during the 
sixth plan to 9.05 per cent of GDP during the seventh plan period. Among 
indirect taxes, the ratio of excise has increased from an average of 4.74 per 
cent of GDP to 4.89 per cent of GDP, and that of customs has increased from 
2.76 per cent of GDP to 3.92 per cent of GDP during the period under 
reference. 
As far as growth of tax revenue of the central government is 
concerned, it increased from 14.47 per cent during the sixth plan period to 
17.11 per cent during the seventh plan period (Table A-5 & Figure a-iv). The 
intersting thing is that the growth rate of direct tax increased from 10.37 per 
cent during 1980-85 to 13.23 per cent during 1985-90, against this the 
growth rate of indirect tax has declined slightly; from 19.01 per cent to 18.57 
per cent during the period under reference (Table A-5 & Figure a-iv). 
While indirect taxes continue to be the mainstay of the tax system, 
there is little to suggest that there is infact any well defined rationale in 
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Table : A-3 
TAX REVENUE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
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Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget Documents 
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Table : A-4 
DIRECT TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF INDIRECT TAXES 












Sixth Plan Average 27 
(1980-81 to 1984-85) 
Seventh Plan Average 25 
(1985-86 to 1980-90) 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Documents, Various Issues. 
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Table : A-5 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE TAX REVENUE OF THE 
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Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget Documents 
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raising revenues on this score. Almost 70 per cent of the revenue from excise 
duties are relaised from inputs and intermediates. There was also an 
incredible multiplicity in the rates of tax. Both these factors make for a lack 
of transparency in the incidence of these taxes and their economic effects. 
While a system of modified value added tax, introduced in 1986, has been 
instrumental in imparting a certain rationale to the excise tax system, its 
coverage was partial, and the overall impact of excise taxes was one of 
escalation of industrial costs via the cascading effect. 
After analysing the tax structure and its productivity during the 
seventh plan period, we can say that, there is heavy reliance on indirect 
taxation. While the predominance of indirect taxes in the present situation is 
unavoidable, it cannot be said that a certain balance has to be maintained 
between direct and indirect taxes. Taxes like the personal income tax have an 
important role in the tax structure and cannot be substituted by taxes on 
commodities. 
The lack of buoyancy in income-tax revenues is another feature, 
which is attributable to several factors, including narrow coverage of the 
working population, numerous exemptions and deductions and widespread 
evasion. 
The indirect taxes as a whole have displayed better growth and 
buoyancy but among them customs have grown faster than excise. As a result, 
the share of customs in the taxes collected by the centre has gone up. The 
contribution of excise, though still the largest, has undergone a decline. The 
buoyancy of excise has suffered because of a variety of factors including 
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numerous exemptions and concessions which have given rise to substantial 
administrative and legal complexities. 
Thus, we can say that during the seventh plan period tax revenue 
collected by the centre was not sufficient to match the growing expenditure 
of a developing country like India. At that time the long-term task of the 
fiscal policy in the area of taxation was to bring about a structural reform in 
the system, which should ensure that revenues go up automatically and 
commensurately as incomes and prices rise. 
3.2.5 Non-Tax Revenue 
Non-tax revenue is an important component of the revenue receipts 
of Government of India and accounts for about l/4th of the total. We may 
specifically note the following main features of non-tax revenue of 
Government of India. 
* administrative receipts have always been a small proportion of the total 
non-tax revenue receipts. 
* net contribution by public undertakings in the form of dividends has 
been always a marginal amount. While some undertaking do make 
reasonably good profit, most other incur losses only. In some cases, 
the accumulated losses exceed even their share capital. This is a matter 
of grave concern particularly because of massive investment that has 
gone into these undertakings. 
* Salient feature of non-tax revenue of the Government of India is the 
' ^—' 
steadily iit^r^ing interest receipts. The government advances sizeable 
: : , ' . / •-. • \ 
Ace. K. \4vq^5^5!2^ 
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loans to state governments, public undertakings, and other parties eveiy 
•year and as a result the interest receipts are going up. As table A-1 
shows, the proportion of interest receipts in the non-tax revenue of the 
central government has increased over the years barring some 
fluctuations, from 62.48 per cent in 1983-84 to 72.89 per cent in 
1990-91. 
During the seventh plan period, transport enterprises and other 
departmental undertakings, which have had historically low returns, have 
affected the performance of non-tax revenue negatively. 
As it is evident in table A-1 that non-tax revenue as a proportion of 
total revenue receipts declined from 26.49 per cent in 1986-87 to 21.79 per 
cent in 1990-91. Wrong pricing policies, inefficient public enterprise 
operations and other difficulties have all contributed to this situation of low 
returns. 
3.3 GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE : AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE TRENDS BETWEEN SIXTH AND SEVENTH PLAN 
PERIOD 
In India, as is well known, the commanding role of the state in 
allocative decisions was the direct consequence of the state dominated heavy 
industry based import substituting development strategy. In such a framework 
the government had to play the roles of a catalyst as well as a direct 
participant in economic activity. The public expenditure policy, in particular, 
has had to play a crucial role in this policy of state accumulation.^ 
The economic crisis in 1990 which was triggered off by fiscal 
imbalances led to a reconsideration of the role of the state and brought public 
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expenditure policy into sharper focus. Fiscal imbalances in India, which had 
assumed serious proportions by the mid-eighties, had two important facets. 
First, the outpacing of the rate of growth of revenue receipts by the 
expenditure growth considerably reduced the resources available for public 
investment in the economy. The increasing use of borrowed funds to meet 
current, expenditures rendered the latter self propelling. Second, the 
increasing diversion of household savings to meet public consumption 
requirements not only resulted in the expansion of public debt to 
unsustainable levels, but also reduced the resources available for private 
investment'.^ In addition to the usual allocative distortions arising from the 
crowding out of private sector investments, the poor performances of public 
sector enterprises caused further decline in productivity in the Indian 
economy. These fiscal developments have had adverse macro-economic 
repercussions as well. A portion of the excess demand generated by the 
expansionary fiscal policy spilled over into higher imports and consequently, 
aggravated the balance of payments problem. 
3.3.1 Trends in Government Expenditure in India 
During our reference period of a decade (1980-90), aggregate 
govenmient expenditure in India showed a substantial increase. The aggregate 
expenditure (at current prices) of the Government of India increased by over 
4.8 times from Rs. 22056 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 105298 crore in 1990-91 
(Table A-6). During this period the average annual growth rate of total 
expenditure of the Government of India was 17.6 per cent (Table A-8). The 
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As revenue expenditures grew faster than revenue receipts, governmental dis-
savings increased considerably over time. By 1990-91, revenue deficits 
formed almost 3.5 per cent of GDP. Second, the rate of expenditure growth 
was substantially higher than the growth of non-tax revenues signifying the 
increasing volume of implicit subsidies in the provision of public services. 
The differences between cost of providing social and economic services and 
cost recoveries as a proportion of GDP increased during the reference 
period.^ 
The trends in government expenditures as percentage of GDP and 
as total expenditure shown in Figures a-v & vi. Both the figures clearly shows 
rising share of non-plan expenditure and declining share of plan expenditure. 
This confirms the hypothesis that governments by and large unable to contiol 
the fast growing non-plan expenditures, particularly interest payments (Table 
A-8 & figure a-vii). The analysis of government expenditure trends as a 
proportion of GDP, as a proportion of total expenditure, and growth of 
expenditure bring out two distinct phases. During the first phase (1980-81 to 
1985-86) the expenditure - GDP ratio increased from 16.2 per cent in 
1980-81 to 20.1 per cent in 1985-86, and it grew at around 20 per cent per 
year. In the second phase (1986-87 to 1990-91), the growth rate declined to 
15.9 per cent per year. As a ratio of GDP, government expenditure remained 
nearly stagnant and hovered around 20 per cent during this period (Table A-7 
& Figure a-v). 
The two phases of expenditure growth noted above can be explained 
by the state of the economy. The first phase (1980-81 to 1985-86) marked 
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by a significant fluctuation (but overall acceleration) in the rate of growth of 
expenditures. During the period, the government revenues increased at 
considerably higher rates. The reform of the tax system and the replacement 
of physical restrictions on imports with tariffs mainly contributed to revenue 
buoyancy. Given the relatively stable political environment and buoyant 
revenues in the first phase, the growth of government expenditures showed a 
significant acceleration with fluctuation. This was further fuelled by the 
emergence of significant revenue deficits since 1982-83 and their feedback 
in terms of increased interest payments. This phase can be easily 
characterized as the period of fiscal expansion. 
In the second phase, the share of expenditure in GDP actually 
showed a marginal decline. This analysis bring out an interesting feature, that 
is, the steep growth of non-plan expenditure both as a ratio of GDP and as a 
percentage of total expenditure. During the second phase when on the one 
hand, expenditure as a ratio of GDP marginally declines and overall growth of 
expenditure also declined, on the other hand non plan expenditure grew 
rapidly in both terms, as a proportion of GDP and as a share of total 
expenditure (Table A-7 & Figure a-v & a-vi). 
Interestingly, a major part of the increase in government 
expenditure share in GDP in the 1980s was due to the phenomenal expansion 
in revenue expenditures (Table A-7). However, capital expenditures showed a 
decline. As a proportion of GDP, capital expenditures declined from 7.2 per 
cent in 1985-86 to 5.9 per cent in 1990-91. Consequently, capital 
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1985-86 declined to about 30 per cent by 1990-91 (Table A-7 & Figures a-v 
and a-vi). 
The largest increase in the share of revenue expenditures over the 
period came about on account of increase in interest payments. The 
expenditure on interest payments as a proportion of GDP increased from 2.3 
per cent in 1981-82 to 4.7 per cent in 1990-91, and as a proportion of total 
expenditure, it increased from 9.6 per cent to 16.4 per cent during the same 
period (Table A-11). The increase in interest payment was particularly marked 
in the eighties. This was due to increase in both the volume of indebtedness 
of the government and in the aggregate effective rate of interest on 
govenrment borrowings. Table A-9 shows that the outstanding debt of centre 
and states together as a proportion of the GDP rose almost continuously from 
49 per cent in 1979-80 to 65.7 per cent in 1990-91. It may be noted that the 
proportion of external debt actually fell from 8.7 per cent to 5.9 per cent of 
GDP during this period, and the rise in indebtedness is entirely attributable to 
the rise in internal debt and other liabilities of the government. Table A-10 
shows that the average effective rate of interest on government borrowing in 
India has risen substantially from 4.4 per cent in 1980-81 to 7.2 per cent in 
1990-91. An important reason for this trend has been a shift in the 
composition of outstanding debt in favour of more costly ones. 
An important source of government expenditure growth was 
significant increase in the emoluments of government employees. The central 
and state government employees formed just about 1.2 per cent of population 
in 1989-90, but the share of wages and salaries received by them constituted 
6.3 per cent of GDP. ^ '^  
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TABLE A-9 
OUTSTANDING DEBT OF THE CENTRAL AND STATE 
GOVERNMENTS (As Percentage of GDP) 
A- Centre 
1- Internal debt 
2- External debt 
3- Other liabilities 
of which 
a -Small Savings 







































* Excludes Loans from the Central Government. 
Source: 1. R.B.L, Report on Currency & Finance, Various Issues. 
2. Govenrnment of India, Ministry of Finance, Indian Public 
Finance Statistics, Various Issues. 
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TABLE : A-10 
COST OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN INDIA 



























Amount of Outstanding 



























Source : 1 RBI, Report on Currency & Finance, Various Issues. 
2 Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Indian Public 
Finance Statistics, Various Issues. 
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The steep rise in wages and salaries was not the only source of high 
growth of current expenditure even during the period of fiscal restraint. 
Expenditure on subsidies increased at an average annual rate of 21 per cent 
during 1980-81 to 1990-91. The increase in subsidies was mainly under food, 
fertiliser and irrigation heads which it is believed accrue largely to the rich 
farmers.'^ 
3.3.2 Expenditure Trends by Functional Categories 
i. Administrative Services 
Expenditure on administrative services as proportion of GDP and 
as a proportion of total expenditure increased from 5.4 per cent and 22.0 per 
cent respectively in 1981-82 to 6.9 per cent and 22.7 per cent in 1986-87. 
However, the growth rate decelerated thereafter and their share declined to 
6.2 per cent of GDP and 21.7 per cent of total expenditure in 1990-91 (Table 
A-11 & Figure a-viii). An interesting point to be noted relates to the trends 
observed with regard to expenditures on defence. While the growth of 
revenue expenditures under defence has been relatively small for the whole 
period in reference, capital expenditures have shot up in the eighties. 
ii. Social and community services 
Expenditures on social services formed 6.4 per cent of GDP and 
about 22.5 per cent of total expenditures in 1990-91 (Table A-11 & Figure 
a-ix). As these services are employment-intensive, wage cost predominated 
and almost 94 per cent of the expenditure on these items was of current 
nature. As was seen in the case of aggregate expenditures, the growth of 
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during the first phase (1981-82 to 1986-87) and thereafter declined 
marginally. As a proportion of GDP, after a steady increase from 5.4 per cent 
in 1981-82 to 6.8 per cent in 1986-87, expenditure on these services 
marginally declined to 6.4 per cent in 1990-91 (Table A-11 and figure a-ix). 
The growth rate of expenditure in social services accelerated 
significantly during the first phase, but declined thereafter. This is 
attributable mainly to the trends in capital expenditure. On the contrary, 
revenue expenditure, overwhelmingly wages and salaries, accelerated in the 
first phase and continued to grow at a high rate even during the second period. 
iii. Economic Services 
Expenditure on economic services formed about one third of total 
expenditure and this share marginally declined during the refened period. As 
a proportion of GDP, the expenditure on economic services increased 
appreciably in the first phase and declined thereafter. The expenditure GDP 
ratio increased from 8.6 per cent in 1981-82 to 9.8 per cent in 1986-87. It 
subsequently declined to 8.7 per cent in 1990-91 (Table A-11 & Figure a-x). 
The decline was mainly due to cutbacks in capital expenditure. The trend in 
expenditure on economic services differed from the trends in other 
categories, the growth rate of expenditure on economic services showed a 
continuous decline throughout the period. The analysis of government 
expenditures on economic services reveals that major sources of high growth 
of cuiTent expenditures on economic services were subsidies and other 
transfers. The share of these items in total expenditure on economic services 
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The analysis of government expenditure trends since early eighties 
and particularly during the seventh plan highlights the sharp increases on 
expenditures on quasi-public goods, subsidies, transfer payments and interest 
payments. This sharp rise of expenditures on these items points towards the 
inevitability of a fiscal crisis. The analysis also points towards the difficulty 
in achieving fiscal equilibrium in the short and medium term context until 
expenditures on these items remain large and rising. In other words, we can 
say that the overall trends in government expenditures clearly indicate 
towards an inevitable fiscal crisis. 
3.4 PROBLEM OF FISCAL STABILIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
ENTERPRISES 
The public sector was originally conceived as holding the 
commanding heights of the economy and leading technological advance. It 
was also intended to generate investible surpluses and become an engine for 
self-reliant growth. The public sector has contributed significantly to the 
diversification of India's industrial structure. But its contribution in terms of 
generating internal resources for further expansion has fallen short of 
expectations, and its inability to do so contributed in the worsening of the 
fiscal situation during the entire seventh plan period. 
In the present context, inability of public sector enterprises to 
generate a reasonable rate of return on capital invested is widely perceived as 
an important cause for the serious and growing fiscal imbalance in the 
eighties. Commenting on the poor financial performance of public sector 
enterprises, Bimal Jalan said : 
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" as far as public enteiprises are concerned, the after-tax profit 
of ceiitral government commercial enterprises as a ratio of capital employed 
was 4.5 per cent in 1989-90. The performance of state level PSEs has been 
even worse. These enterprises had net losses of Rs. 1928 crores in 1990".'^ 
Vaidyanathan identifies their unsatisfactory resource generation 
record as an important failure of planning in India : 
"Subsidies, both implicit and explicit, are also part of reason for 
low return to investment in public enterprises. The inability of public 
enterprises to generate surpluses for reinvestment and to become a 
progressively more important source of both aggregate savings and finances 
for public investment has been a major failure of our planning".'^ 
While there could be considerable merit in these arguments, it is 
perhaps important to assess empirically, whether such a trend can be 
considered an important, cause for the growing fiscal imbalance in the 
eighties. 
3.4.1 Performance of Central Government's Public Sector Enterprises 
There were 246 central government public enterprises as on March 
31, 1991, out of which 236 enterprises were in operation. Net profits of 
these enterprises declined from Rs. 3789 crore in 1989-90 to Rs. 2368 crore 
in 1990-91 (Table A-12). The rate of return, as measured by the ratio of net 
profits to capital employed, declined from 4.5 per cent in 1989-90 to 2.3 per 
cent in 1990-91, the lowest since 1984-85. As in the previous years, the 
petroleum sector accounted for the bulk of the net profit, Rs. 2299 crore out 
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of both petroleum and non-petroleum sectors. The fall in the net profit during 
1990-91 is marked in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Bharat 
Cooking Coal Ltd., Export Credit Guarantee Corporation and Mahanagar 
Telephone Nigam Ltd., Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. had incurred a net loss of 
Rs. 478 crore in 1990-91, the very first year of its operation. National 
Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Indian Railway Finance Corporation 
had improved their net profits by Rs. 164 crore and Rs. 98 crore respectively 
in 1990-91. During the year 1990-91, 146 central public enterprises 
generated gross internal resources to the extent of Rs. 11372 crore 
(Table A-12). 
The working results of departmentally run commercial undertakings 
of states and union territories have continued to be poor of all departmentally 
run enterprises, only forest and mines have been generating net surpluses. 
While the profits from forest and mines registered a modest increase 
between 1985-86 and 1991-92, non-profit making enterprises registered 
losses more than double during the period. The unsustainable nature of the 
operations of these enterprises is mainly attributable to uneconomic pricing. 
The two major non-departmental undertakings, viz., the State Electricity 
Boards and the State Road Transport Corporations continued to incur 
substantial losses in their operations. The overall losses of all SEBs taken 
together amounted to Rs. 4104 crore in 1989-90 and Rs. 4169 crore in 
1990-91. The performance in terms of rate of return on capital (after 
depreciation and interest) was negative, being -16.4 per cent in 1989-90 and 
-13.8 per cent in 1990-91. An important factor contributing to the high level 
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of commercial losses of SEBs is the requirement to supply electricity to the 
rural agricultural sector at lower tariff.^ "* 
3.4.2 Financing of Public Expenditure and Investment 
How have the increasing public expenditure and investment been 
financed ? Total taxes (direct plus indirect taxes minus subsidies) as a 
proportion of the sum of government final consumption expenditure and 
public sector gross domestic capital formation at cunent prices has increased 
since 1984-85. Contribution of gross saving of public sector declined 
steadily since mid seventies. Therefore, an increasingly large share of public 
sector expenditure and investment is being financed by borrowing. However, 
it is interesting to discover that while the share of public sector as a whole in 
financing of public expenditure and investment has declined, the contribution 
of non-departmental enterprises has, infact, steadily increased since 
1980-81. Correspondingly, the share of saving of administrative departments 
declined sharply since 1981-82 and turning negative since 1984-85. The 
foregoing evidence seems to suggest that the problem of declining saving 
rate of public sector as a whole is on account of the growing expenditure and 
subsidies of administrative departments relative to their revenue receipts. 
After the above analysis we can say that public sector enterprises 
contributed very much to the problem of fiscal stabilization. In 1990-91, 
when there was a severe fiscal crisis in the economy, public sector 
enterprises have played very important role in the inception of that crisis. 
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3.5 EMERGENCE OF FISCAL IMBALANCE 
The fiscal crisis in 1990 was not a coincidence. The fiscal situation 
had deteriorated throughout the 1980s due to growing burden of non-plan 
expenditure and non-performance of public sector enterprises. Throughout 
the eighties, all the major indicators of fiscal imbalance reflected that it was 
on the rise. The indicators which are often considered to assess the fiscal 
imbalance are the conventional budgetary deficit, the revenue deficit, the 
gross fiscal deficit and the primary deficit. The budgetaiy deficit denotes the 
difference between all receipts and expenditure, both revenue and capital. The 
revenue deficit refers to the difference between revenue receipts and revenue 
expenditure. The budgetary deficit and the revenue deficit are known as the 
conventional measures of fiscal imbalance. They do not completely reflect 
the structural imbalance in the fiscal operations of the government and can 
not be considered as appropriate measures of the resource gap. They indicate 
only a part of the gap which is mainly financed by the issue of treasury bills. 
A large portion of the gap in resources is financed by market borrowings, 
small savings, provident funds, external borrowings etc. and this does not get 
reflected in the conventional indicators of fiscal imbalance. In contrast, the 
concept of fiscal deficit is a more complete measure of fiscal imbalance. 
The fiscal deficit reflects the total resource gap which equals the excess of 
total government expenditure over government revenue and grants. The fiscal 
deficit thus fully indicates the indebtedness of the government. The primary 
deficit is the fiscal deficit less interest payments.'"• 
The trends in vairous indicators of fiscal imbalance since 1980-81 
are given in Table A-13 and diagramatically shown in Figure a-xi, from the 
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TABLE : A-13 
VARIOUS MEASURES OF DEFICIT IN THE CENTRAL 
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Table A-13 and the Figure a-xi it is evident that between 1980-81 and 1990-
91 the two conventional indicators of fiscal imbalance have risen 
substantially. The budgetaiy deficit increased from 1.9 per cent in 1980-81 
to 2.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. The revenue deficit rose from 1.5 per 
cent in 1980-81 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. These facts suggest that 
the fiscal situation had been under mounting pressure throughout the eighties. 
In this period the gross fiscal deficit rose alarmingly from 6.2 per cent in 
1980-81 to 8.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. Similarly primaiy deficit which 
was 3.8 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 rose to 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. 
Interest payments on accumulated debts constituted about 28 per 
cent of the total revenue expenditure of the central government. In fact, in 
1990-91 interest payments had eaten up 36.6 per cent of the total revenue 
collections of the central government. The fiscal crisis of 1990-91 had been 
mainly caused by unchecked growth of non-plan revenue expenditure, 
particularly on defence, interest payments and food and fertiliser subsidies 
during the eighties. This was obviously the outcome of indiscreet policy 
measures and indulgence in populism at the government level. 
3.5.1 Deepening of the Fiscal Crisis 
On the whole it is widely agreed that the Indian economy had faced 
a severe economic crisis. The crisis was possibly the severest in the post-
independence era. The fiscal sector of the economy was possibly in the throes 
of its most stringent test ever. The foreign trade sector of the economy had 
been in great trouble. 
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In the fiscal sector, government expenditure had been outpacing 
revenues for more than a decade, leading the government to resort to 
substantial borrowings. The national debt reached such a level that interest 
payments constitute the largest single expenditure head of the central 
government. Non-essential expenditure increased unabated. If one were to 
focus attention on the central government budget, it is seen immediately that 
especially during the eighties the revenue acocunt has systematically been 
showing a deficit (Table A-12). This has meant that the centre has had to 
repeatedly borrow in the capital market to provide for current expenditure 
especially non-plan expenditure that yields no return. One immediate 
consequence of this was that interest liabilities have moved up appreciably. 
For 1990-91 interest payments formed 16.4 per cent of total expenditure of 
the central government, as against 9.6 per cent in 1981-82 (Table A-11). A 
perusal of the economic survey reveals that, gross capital formation out of 
budgetary resources which comprised 40.1 per cent of total expenditure in 
1980-81, had steadily gone down to 32.7 per cent by 1990-91. Two other 
features need to be mentioned in this context. First, gross capital formation 
out of budgetary resources which grew at an average rate of 18.8% in the 
early eighties, appears to have started of decelerating from 1986-87. 
Secondly, the rate of increase in gross capital formation turned negative (-1.4 
per cent) for the first time in 1990-91. In the mean time the gross savings of 
the government had turned negative for the first time in 1984-85, and 
dissaving has been growing over the years, amounting to nearly 1.5 per cent 
of GDP in 1990-91.^ 6 
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All the trends noted above indicates that the government 
expenditure have bloated way out of proportion to tax and non-tax revenues. 
The size of the government had grown, and there had been mindless 
profligacy in sundry projects like loan melas and the loan waivers. The 
implications of the above trends on the monetary sectors were immediate. 
Along with the large revenue deficits, the central government has had large 
budget deficits, averaging about 2.1 per cent of GDP during the seventh plan 
period (Table A-13). This in turn had contributed to a large monetised deficit 
which is the total of the net increase in the holdings of treasury bills by the 
RBI and its contribution to the market borrowing of the government. It is this 
which" determines the growth of money supply. During the seventh plan period 
the monetised deficit was averaged around 2.3 per cent of GDP. Money 
supply grew at an average annual rate of about 17 per cent during the first 
four years of the seventh plan, and wentup by 19.7 per cent during the final 
year of the plan. This contributed to the double digit increase in the consumer 
price index inflation during 1990-91. 
A major problem with the tax system was that the share of direct 
taxes had virtually stagnated during the period in reference; it started out at 
2.20 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 and averaged around 2.19 per cent of GDP 
in 1988-89 (Table A-3). Thus, the entire increase in the tax to GDP ratio has 
been brought about by exploiting indirect taxes. 
In financing the seventh plan, the share of domestic borrowings and 
budgetary deficit far exceeded the targets. Causatively, non plan revenue 
expenditure, particularly on defence, interest payments and food and 
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fertilizer subsidies rose sliarply and exceeded the target. 
Thus, we can say that by 1990-91, a severe problem of fiscal 
stabilization emerged. It was evident that the economy needs substantial fiscal 
reforms if the crisis was to be fully overcome. 
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FISCAL STABILIZATION REFORMS IN INDIAN 
ECONOMY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Indian fiscal crisis was precipitated mainly by the growth of 
the public spending throughout the eighties that increased the budget 
deficit as a proportion of our G.D.P. At the turn of the decade into the 
nineties, serious action on the fiscal front was urgently needed to correct 
the fiscal imbalances. In the event, worsening fiscal deficits and Gulf War 
of 1990 brought the nation to the brink of international default. An 
increasing erosion of confidence in the government's ability to manage 
the economy led to a drying up of the market for external commercial 
loans in 1990-91. The period from August 1990 to May 1991 also saw a 
series of steep reductions in the international credit rating of India which 
had a flawless record of credit worthiness until then. 
The state of our public finance had indeed reached crisis 
proportions by the end of the eighties. The public debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased through the eighties, going up to over 50 per cent at the end of 
the decade. As is now well known, the proximate reasons for this situation 
were the failure of the public sector to generate investible resources and 
the explosive growth of governmental current spending. 
The two OPEC shocks of 1973 and 1979 hurt, but did not have a 
sustained impact on the budget deficit. The external shocks administered 
by the loss of remittances and the expenditures incuiTed to rescue workers 
in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 certainly 
accentuated the fiscal crisis at the end. But the crisis was certainly 'home 
made'.' 
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This was the context in which a newly elected government took 
office in June 1991 and set about the ardous task of launching a 
programme of economic reforms. To some extent the urgency was derived 
from the gravity of the crisis because the day of reckoning could not be 
postponed any further. There was also the performance record of the 
eighties which clearly pointed towards hastening the pace of structural 
reforms while setting the fiscal house in order without any loss of time. 
Fiscal stabilization was begun with a view to bringing about macro-
economic stabilization. The regular budget for 1991-92 took a bold step 
in the direction of correcting the fiscal imbalance. It envisaged a 
reduction in the fiscal deficit by nearly two percentage points of GDP, 
from 8.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 6.5 per cent in 1991-92. This magnitude 
of fiscal correction can be considered unprecedented in as much as only 
eight months of the current fiscal year remained to accomplish the task. 
The budget laid stress on fiscal stabilization being supported by essential 
reforms in economic policy and management. While it contained 
proposals for raising additional revenue, most of the reduction in fiscal 
deficit was sought to be achieved through reduction in non-plan 
expenditure. 
Part 11 of this chapter reviews tax reform measures taken by the 
government. Part 111 examines steps taken by the government to control 
unabated growth of expenditure. Part IV covers measures for reforms in 
public sector enterprises. Final part deals with management of monetary 
policy. 
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4.2 TAX REFORM MEASURES 
Over the decades since the 1950s, the Indian taxation system 
became unduly complex, economically unjustifiable and unsatisfactory in 
many respects. Special exemptions and preferences abounded, nominal 
rates were high, evasion was widespread, and the burden across tax payers 
was often unfair.^  
Revenue mobilisation has been high in India by developing 
country standards, and the tax/GDP ratio continued to rise in 1980s. 
However, tax increases were narrowly based and distortionary, mainly 
involving custom duties and union excise duties. Direct taxes contributed 
nothing to the increases, and personal taxes fell significantly as a share of 
GDP. 
Customs duties are easy to collect, so there is an administrative 
factor involved, and same is true of excise duties. Many indirect taxes are 
set at a specific amount rather than as a percentage to avoid valuation 
problems. The personal income tax base has been kept narrow by pressure 
form organised sector employees for increases in the exemption level, 
together with difficulties in assessment and collection. Farmers have 
prevented any serious taxation of agricultural incomes by the states and 
the land tax has sharply declined as a source of revenue. 
The thrust of fiscal management in 1991-92 was to meet the 
challenges posed by the unparalleled fiscal being faced by the country. 
Measures in the field of direct taxes were targeted at reversing the 
declining trend in the share of these taxes in total tax revenues and as a 
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proportion of GDP. The objectives of changes in indirect tax regime 
were : reducing excessive reliance on custom duties for additional 
resource mobilisation, ensuring price stability for essential commodities 
and goods improving the competitiveness of the industrial sector, 
particularly the export-oriented industries.^ 
The budget also emphasised the need for rationalisation of the 
tax system including, reduction in the plethora of concessions, and also 
the need to bring the rates of income tax at various slabs of income to 
more appropriate levels. 
Broadly, tax reforms are envisaged to : 
* make excise rates more uniform, 
* introduce a form of VAT, 
* avoid high indirect taxes on capital goods because they are a serious 
obstacle to international competitiveness and should be lowered 
drastically, 
* strengthen personal income tax by holding exemption limits constant 
in nominal terms to widen tax base, 
* raise taxes on fringe benefits, housing and vehicles, 
* rely more on income tax deduction at the source where appropriate, 
and 
* broaden the tax base and increase revenue mobilisation at the state 
level. 
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Fiscal stabilization requires a reduction in the fiscal deficit. 
While some of this can be achieved by reducing low priority expenditure, 
much of the improvement has to come from higher tax collections. These 
are best achieved not by high taxation rates which encourage evasion, but 
by systems that are simple to administer, are set at moderate rates and 
have a broad base. 
In its report the Chelliah committee' has recommended far 
reaching changes in the tax system to remove loopholes besides making it 
more efficient from revenue raising point of view. The Chelliah committee 
recommended extensive reform in its Interim Report in August 1992. The 
government took several steps in this direction in the 1992/93 budget, 
accepting the approach and the broad lines of reform advocated in the 
Committee's Interim Report (1991a)'' and agreeing with the 
recommendations in the Committee's Final Report (1992a)^ The 1994/95 
Budget proposals closely followed the recommendations of the 
committee, emphasising tax reforms aimed at simplifying the structure 
and continuing the process of shifting to moderate rates of taxation. 
In respect of particular taxes the Chelliah committee has, 
recommended the following : 
* In order to make the country's direct tax system more effective it is 
necessary that the income tax regime has lower rates of taxation with 
a narrower spread between the entry rate and maximum marginal rate, 




The system of subjecting the income of both partnership firms as well 
as the partners to taxation amounted to double taxation and this 
should be avoided. 
Corporation tax rate for domestic companies being high should be 
lowered to 40 per cent and the surcharge should be abolished. Tax 
rates for foreign companies should also be lowered and the 
differential between the tax rates on domestic and foreign companies 
should be around 7.5 percentage points and in no case to exceed 10 
percentage points. 
* The present tax treatment of long-term capital gains is not correct 
because the deductions allowed in computing taxable gain is not 
related to the period of time for which the assets have been held. 
* For levying wealth tax, distinction is to be made between productive 
and non-productive assets. By exempting productive assets such as 
shares, securities, bonds, bank deposits etc. from wealth tax the 
government can encourage investment in them. 
* The Chelliah Committee, which was asked to look into all aspects of 
customs duties, has recommended reduction in the general level of 
tariffs, a reduction in the dispersion of the tariff rates and a 
rationalisation of the system with abolition of numerous end use 
exemptions and concessions. It also suggested that the process of 
reform should be gradual, so as to moderate the impact of the 
adjustment both in terms of possible revenue loss and the pace at 
which industry is exposed to competition. 
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* At pressent excise duty is levied on advalorem bases on some 
commodities and at specific rates on others. Over the years for 
administrative reasons, ad valorem duties have been steadily replaced 
by specific rates. Advalorem duties are preferable to specific duties 
as they ensure buoyancy in revenue. Underlining this fact the 
committee has recommended switching over to advalorem rates for a 
number of commodities. 
The government has decided to implement the recommendations 
of the Chelliah Committee in a phased manner. 
4.2.1 Indirect Taxes 
Customs duties are to be further lowered to make key imported 
raw materials and capital goods available to Indian industry at reasonable 
cost and to reduce the high levels of protection to domestic industry. 
Reforms to the excise tax structure aim to promote growth of 
manufacturing output and employment; simplify tax administration and 
reduce the scope for misclassification, evasion and disputes; increase 
revenue elasticity; and pave the way for an eventual VAT. 
4.2.2 Direct Taxes 
The 1994-95 budget followed the basic approach to tax reform : 
simplify the system, apply moderate rates, place much greater reliance on 
broadening the base and improve administration. 
4.2.3 Rate Reductions 
Reductions in the peak rates of major taxes between 1990-91 
and 2000-2001 are setout in Table B-1. It can be seen that among all these 
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TABLE : B-1 
PEAK RATES OF DIFFERENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
TAXES DURING ; 1990-91 to 2000-2001 
Year Income tax Corporate Tax Custom Duty 
Basic Surchage Basic Surcharge (Peak rate) 
1990-91 50 8 40 8 200 
1991-92 50 12 40 15 150 
1992-93 40 12 45 15 110 
1993-94 40 12 45 15 85 





1999-2000 30 10 35 10 40 
2000-2001 30 15 35 10 35 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget 













taxes, the decline in the peak rate of customs duty has been phenomenal. It 
decline from 200 percent in 1990-91 to 35 percent in 2000-2001. The 
peak rate of income tax has also declined from 50 to 30 per cent. 
Including the surcharge on income tax, the effective rate of reduction has 
been from 54 per cent to 34.5 per cent. The effective rate of income tax 
increased to 56 percent in 1991-92 due to the increase in surcharge from 
per cent in 1990-91 to 12 per cent in the next year. In respect of corporate 
tax, the effective reduction has been from around 43 per cent in 1990-91 
to 38.5 per cent in 2000-2001. 
Even though the peak rate of income tax and corporation tax have 
declined substantially between 1990-91 and 2000-2001, decline in rates 
has been done in a phased manner. In the case of the income tax rate, 
reduction has taken place in four different time parts. First in 1992-93, 
when it was reduced from 50 per cent to 40 per cent. Second phase began 
in 1994-95 with the removal of surcharge which reduced the effective rate 
of tax even though the basic rate of 40 per cent continued till 1996-97. 
Third in 1997-98, when it was reduced from 40 per cent to 30 per cent, 
fourth phase began in 1999-2000 with the reintroduction of surcharge 
over the basic rate of 30 per cent which resulted in the increased effective 
tax rate, and the same has been continued in 2000-2001 with nominal 
increase in surcharge. In the case of corporate tax, the peak rate declined 
from 40 per cent to 35 per cent between 1990-91 and 2000-2001. In 
between there was an increase in the peak rate from 40 per cent in 1991-
92 to 45 per cent in 1992-93 and this rate of 45 per cent remained till 
1993-94 alongwith surcharge of 15 percent. Between 1994-95 and 1995-
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96, corporate tax remained at 40 per cent with a surcharge of 15 per cent. 
In the subsequent two years there has been year-to-year reduction in the 
rate of corporate tax below 40 per cent (due to the reduction in surcharge 
to 7.5 per cent) and 35 per cent respectively. However, with the 
reintroduction of surcharge in 1999-2000, effective rate of corporate tax 
increased, which has been continued in 2000-2001. 
Recent Reforms 
Reform of the tax system has been an important element of 
structural reforms. The strategy has aimed at moving towards a simpler 
system of taxation with moderate rates, few exemptions and a wider tax 
base. The 1994-95 budget has continued to rely on these principles in 
direct taxes and undertaken major structural reform of indirect taxation. 
In regard to both excise and customs, there has been a drastic 
cut in the number of end use notifications, which will greatly reduce the 
possibility of disputes and scope for discretion. Besides, the number of 
rate categories was sharply reduced, the peak rates were brought down and 
a significant switch over was effected from specific to advalorem duties 
to strengthen built revenue elasticity. The system of credit for taxes paid 
on inputs, called MODVAT, was extended to cover petroleum and capital 
goods.^ 
* 
These changes in commodity taxation have brought MODVAT 
closer to a VAT type system, and will facilitate the introduction of a full 
fledged Value Added Tax. A modest beginning was also made in extending 
indirect taxation to services such as, telephones, non-life insurance and 
stock brokers. 
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In the budget of 1996-97, an effort has been made to tackle the 
phenomenon of zero tax companies having substantial book profits by 
bringing such companies under Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT)"'. 
However, the companies in power and infrastructure sector or a sick 
industrial company or companies located in backward areas entitled to 
exemption under section 80 lA, have been kept out of the purview of MAT. 
The tax under MAT would in reality workout to about 12 per cent only. 
MAT has been now reduced to 7.5 per cent in the budget of 2000-2001. 
The budget 1997-98 proposes two major innovations in the 
direct tax proposals i.e. (i) amendment of section 139 A of the Income 
Tax Act and (ii) the introduction of Voluntary Disclosure Scheme (VDS) 
to tap black money. Amendment of section 139 A proposes to widen the 
tax base by bringing the residents of larger metropolitan cities within the 
tax net on the basis of their lifestyle '^ . To tap black money, under VDS, it 
is proposed that the disclosed amount either in the form of cash, 
securities or assets, whether in India or abroad, would be charged at the 
revised highest rate (30 per cent) of tax without any interest, penalty and 
action under the income tax, wealth tax and Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act. 
Regarding excise duty, the finance minister has proposed a 
gradual movement towards a mean rate of 18 per cent in order to reduce 
dispersion in excise rate in the budget of 1997-98 with this objective, 
three new rates have been introduced, namely, 8 per cent, 13 per cent and 
18 per cent compared to the previous rates of 20 per cent and 10 per cent 
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(except in the case of some petroleum products). The 1999-2000 budget 
undertook a major overhaul of indirect taxes by reducing the multiplicity 
of rates, rationalising the rate structure and drastically curtailing the 
scope for discretion by abolishing the power to grant ad-hoc duty 
exemptions. It reduced number of duty rates for excise from 11 to 3. The 
cap on MODVAT credit of 95 per cent of the admissible amount was lifted 
and restored to 100 per cent. Further, it also indicated government's 
intention to move towards a single rate and a full-fledged VAT in the 
medium term. In the budget of 2000-2001, the major measure on the tax 
side is the introduction of the single rate Central VAT (CENVAT). This has 
merged the prevailing three advalorem rates of 8, 16, and 24 per cent into 
a single rate of 16 per cent. At the same time special excise duty (SED) at 
three rates, which are not MODVATable has been introduced. 
On customs, the peak rate has been reduced by five points. As 
far as personal income tax is concerned, there was no change in the rate 
except minimal increase in the surcharge. On these tax measures M. 
Govinda Rao argues that, "while there can be no dispute about the direction 
of reforms, this can not be considered significant to initiate the second 
phase of reforms. On the issue of personal income taxes, no change cannot 
be considered as a good policy always. It was possible to simplify the 
personal income tax system by abolishing surcharge and rationalise 
savings incentives.^ 
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4.3 MEASURES TO CONTROL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
Government expenditure has risen faster than GDP all over the 
world during the last several decades. Basically there are three reasons 
for this : (a) advent of socialism, and mixed economy; (b) rise of welfare 
state, and (c) predominance of keynesian stabilization Policy. 
In pure socialist countries the government does all the key 
economic activities. The share of government expenditure tends to grow 
with the degree of socialism in a mixed economy. In the welfare state the 
state takes the responsibility to provide education, health services, basic 
social infrastructure and social security. Keynesian stabilization policy 
with government expenditure as a key regulator of aggregate demand and 
supply provided the third impetus to the growth of public expenditure, 
especially in the industrial countries. 
In the five decades of economic planning in India the share of 
government expenditure in GDP has increased from 10 per cent to about 
35 percent. The growth has been more or less uniform in all decades. The 
share of government expenditure in GDP in India is five percentage points 
above the average of low-income countries.^ 
There had been an unsustainable increase in government 
expenditure. Budgetary subsidies, with questionable social and economic 
impact, have been allowed to grow to an alarming extent. The increasing 
difference between the income and expenditure of the government has led 
to a widening of the gap between the income and expenditure of the 
economy as a whole. This resulted in a huge fiscal deficit, which was 
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financed by the borrowing. As a result, internal public debt accumulated to 
about 55 per cent of GDP by 1990-91. The burden of servicing this debt 
also increased rapidly. Interest payments alone were about 4 per cent of 
GDP and constituted almost 20 per cent of the total expenditure of the 
central government. 
The Budget for 1991-92 took some major steps to control the 
rapidly growing expenditure: 
(i) Reduction in the Fertilizer subsidy by increasing the average prices 
of fertilizer by 30 per cent. 
(ii) Abolition of subsidy on sugar distributed through the Public 
Distribution System (PDS). 
(iii) Abolition of Cash Compensatory support for exports. 
(iv) A 20 per cent increase in the prices of motor spirit, domestic LPG 
and aviation turbine fuel for domestic use. 
After the budget for 1991-92 was passed, the government also 
imposed a 5 per cent cut on the expenditure provisions contained in the 
sanctioned budget estimates for 1991-92 of all ministries/departments. 
4.3.1 Cutting Non-Plan Expenditure 
Concept of Non-Plan expenditure as explained in the expenditure 
Budget is as follows: 
"Non-plan expenditure is a generic term used to cover all 
expenditure of government not included in the Plan. It includes both 
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developmental and non-developmental expenditure. Part of the expenditure 
is obligatory in nature e.g. interest payments, pensionary charges and 
statutors to states. Part of the expenditure is an essential obligation of a 
state e.g. defence and internal security. Then, there are special 
responsibilities of the centre like external affairs, and currency and mint, 
and cooperation with other developing countries. Expenditure on 
maintaining the assets created in previous plans is also treated as non-plan 
expenditure. Similarly, expenditure on continuing services and activities 
at levels already reached in a Plan period is shifted to Non-Plan in the 
next Plan e.g. educational and health facilities, continuing research 
projects and operating expenses of power stations. Thus as more plans are 
completed a large amount of expenditure on operation and maintenance of 
facilities and services created gets added to Non-Plan expenditure, besides 
the interest on borrowings to finance the Plan"^ 
4.3.2 Interest Payments 
Interest payments which contributed most to the fiscal imbalance 
have continued to rise. According to Raja J. Chelliah, "The net interest 
payments by the government can be reduced by bringing down the gross 
interest payments or by increasing the income form the government's 
investments. It does not seem feasible to increase the latter. It is, 
therefore, necessary to find ways of reducing the gross interest payments 
by the government.""^ 
As a proportion of GDP, the central government's outstanding 
internal debt^ rose from 35.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 53.3 per cent in 
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1990-91. During the same period, gross interest payments on internal 
debt, as a proportion of GDP, more than doubled, as they rose from 1.7 
per cent to 3.7 per cent. Other measures of growth in gross liabilities 
show more or less similar increase. As can be seen from Table: B-2, as a 
proportion of the centre's total expenditure, these payments showed an 
escalation from 10.5 per cent to 18.7 per cent during the same period; as 
a proportion of the revenue account expenditure from 15.4 per cent to 
26.1 per cent; as a proportion of revenue receipts from 18.1 per cent to 
34.6 per cent and as a proportion of tax revenues from 24.6 per cent to 
45.7 per cent. All funds borrowed by government need not be and are not 
actually, deployed in investments, physical or financial. But the portion so 
deployed, particularly that made in financial investments, does yield 
returns, and that too directly in the form of interest receipts, dividends 
and profits. In 1980-81 as much as 84.3 per cent of the interest paid on 
the total public debt of the centre was recovered as interest receipts, 
dividends and profits.^' Compared to that, the amount recovered in 1990-
91 worked out to 44.5 per cent. Thus, while the centre's debt mounted and 
its gross interest obligations increased, correspondingly its recoveries 
declined, which resulted in a greater burden on the general budget. 
Between 1980-81 and 1990-91 the central government's revenue receipts, 
as a proportion of GDP increased from 9.4 per cent to 10.7 per cent and 
tax receipts from 6.9 per cent to 8.1 per cent During the same period, 
annual growth registered in GDP was of the order of 5.5 per cent whereas 
net borrowing (including borrowing from RBI) of the central government 
increased from 6.6 percent to 8.6 per cent and gross interest obligations 
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TABLE : B-2 
GROSS INTEREST PAYMENTS BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Gross Interest as percentage of 
1- GDP 
2- Total Government Expenditure 
3- Revenue Expenditure 
4- Current Revenues 













Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 
1992-93. 
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increased from 1.9 per cent to 4 per cent of GDP. Obviously, the increase 
in the central government's receipts as well as in its tax receipts has been 
far below the increase in its gross interest obligations. 
By targeting the fiscal deficit, government have sought to focus 
attention on containing public borrowing regardless of not only whether it 
takes the form of borrowing from households, or from banks or from the 
RBI but also what the funds raised in public borrowing could have been 
used for by the government. Strictly speaking when the proponents of the 
concept speak of the fiscal deficit, no distinction is drawn between 
covering the fiscal deficit through external public borrowing and through 
internal public borrowing. We shall, however assume for over purpose that 
the fiscal deficit, whatever be its magnitude, is covered through internal 
public borrowing. To emphasize reduction in public borrowing in order to 
reduce the fiscal deficit amounts to shifting the accent of fiscal policy 
from the mobilisation of current revenue receipts and the productive 
deployment of government expenditure. One can not rule out the 
possibility that a stage may arrive when blanket reduction in government 
spending may be called for. 
Government has no other option except to effect reduction in 
the existing stock of debt. Since it is not possible to create a surplus in 
the account of balance of payments for reducing external debt, debt 
reduction has to confined to internal debt. The resources for this purpose 
can be raised by disinvesting in public sector enterprises and selling a part 
of vast real estate that the government owns in the country. 
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It will be appropriate at this point to refer to the paper written 
by E.D. Domar in 1944. This paper was no doubt, written in the context of 
the post-world war II fiscal policy in the US, but it is relevant to the 
current discussion in our country on fiscal policy. In this paper Domar 
argued that : 
"When post-war fiscal policy is discussed, the public debt and 
its burden loom in the eyes of many economists and layman as the greatest 
obstacle to all good things on earth. The remedy is always the reduction of 
the absolute size of the debt or atleast the prevention of its further 
growth. If all the people and organisations who work and study,write 
articles and make speeches, worry and spend sleepless nights - all for fear 
of the debt - could forget about it for a while and spend even half their 
efforts trying to find ways of achieving a growing national income their 
contribution to the benefit and welfare of humanity and to the solution of 
the debt problem would be far greater".^^ 
4.3.3 Other Non-Plan Expenditures 
In India, there is not much scope for raising tax revenue. 
Chelliah argued that 'neither it is feasible nor desirable to plan for a 
buoyancy in tax revenues of more than 1.1 or so'.^^ Therefore, if fiscal 
deficit is to be brought down the growth of all the major categories of 
non-interest expenditure has to be slowed down considerably. In some 
cases it is both desirable and feasible to effect reduction in the 
expenditure. From this point of view subsidies, capital assistance to non-
viable and inefficient enterprises, government's and defence expenditure 
have been specially mentioned. 
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The second largest component of non-plan expenditure is the 
allocation for the defence sector. No attempt at containing non-plan 
expenditure can succeed if defence is to be excluded. Containment of the 
growth of defence expenditure involves some security risk. Nonetheless, 
it is generally agreed that there is considerable scope to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of the defence expenditure. In case this task is undertaken 
earnestly, then there is no reason why at least in the short-run, defence 
expenditure on revenue account can not be kept constant in real terms. 
Defence revenue expenditures have been more or less contained in 
1999-92 over 1990-91. In this regard then Finance Minsiter Dr. 
Manmohan Singh in his first budget speech stated that : 
"it is absolutely essential to ensure that a quest for economy in 
expenditure does not in any way compromise national security. We must, 
therefore, seek to limit expenditure without diluting the efficiency and 
effectiveness of our defence services".'^ 
Unfortunately, the volume of subsidies has been accelerating 
with time mainly because of vested political interests. Over-protection 
through subsidies has prevented the potential competitiveness of the 
system from being realised. Beyond a point, however, the fiscal system 
cannot absorb such subsidies. In principle though the government decided 
to cut down subsidies, in practice it failed to do that. The government has 
reduced the export subsidy but is finding it difficult to cut down the 
fertiliser and food subsidies due to resistance from the big farmers' lobby. 
As far as food subsidy is concerned, it should be drastically pruned and in 
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any case should be provided to the lower strata of the society only. Export 
subsidies have been abolished with effect from 3 July 1991. The export 
sector is being adequately compensated through the adjustments in the 
exchange rate and the expansion of the Replenishment Licensing System^" 
which were implemented at the beginning of July 1991./So far as fertiliser 
subsidies are concerned, there was an increase of 40 per cent, on an 
average, in the price of all fertilisers except low analysis fertilisers such 
as calcium ammonium nitrate, ammonium chloride, ammonium sulphate 
and sulphate of potash were made free from price and movement controls 
in the budget of 1991-92. The sugar subsidy which was costing the 
exchequer about Rs. 350 crore per annum was indeed an aberration, which 
crept into the system from January 1990, when the increase in the levy 
price paid to producers was not matched by a simultaneous increase in the 
issue price for consumers in the public distribution system, government 
has decided that this subsidy should be abolished forthwith. Consequently, 
the issue price of sugar under the PDS was increased by 85 paise per kg. 
with effect from 24 July 1991. Subsidies on food distributed through PDS 
were reduced in recent budgets. Prices of petroleum products for 
domestic consumers also raised. The price of motor spirit, domestic LPG 
and aviation turbine fuel for doemstic use was raised by 20 per cent. The 
price of other petroleum products, excluding diesel and kerosene for non 
industrial use was raised by 10 per cent. 
In his budget speech of 1991 Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan 
Singh addressed the matter of cut in non-plan expenditure in this way : 
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"As a result of the major adjustments in the sphere of 
expenditure, which I have outlined in my speech, the budget estimate for 
total non-plan expenditure in 1991-92 stands at Rs. 79,697 crore. It is 
simply not possible to reduce interest payments in the short term. The 
provision for non-plan expenditure, excluding interest payments, in the 
current year represents a reduction of 4.9 per cent compared with the 
provisions in the revised estimates for 1990-91, and a reduction of almost 
15 per cent in relation to what we would have had to provide this year, but 
for the specific correctives that are being introduced".^'' 
As a part of the government's policy to supplement fiscal 
stabilization by structural reforms in economic policy and management, 
the government initiated steps to prioritise the activities and schemes both 
on plan and non-plan side to identify those which could be eliminated or 
reduced in size. In September, 1991 the government had also imposed a 5 
per cent cut on the expenditure provisions contained in the sancitoned 
budget estimates for 1991-92 of all Ministries/Departments. Only a few 
items of expenditure, such as, statutory grants to state governments, block 
grants and loans for state plan schemes, interest payments and pension 
payments were exempted from the expenditure cut. The then Finance 
Minister had indicated on number of times that the burden of achieving 
reduction in fiscal deficit would fall heavily on expenditure side. 
4.4 REFORMS OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES ^ 
The state dominated heavy industries based on Nehru-
Mahalanobis strategy of protected industrialisation which India has 
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pursued since the mid-fifties, required not only a high rate of domestic 
savings and investment but also a large share for the public sector in total 
investment. However, the public sector's own savings performance has 
been quite disappointing. Though public sector savings have been less than 
public investment throughout the planning period, this gap widened 
considerably during the eighties. The share of public sector in gross 
domestic savings declined from over 20 per cent at the beginning of the 
decade to only 8 per cent by 1989-90. In plan financing, while the sixth 
plan (1980-81 to 1984-85) envisaged that over 46 per cent of the public 
sector plan outlay would be financed by own resources of the public 
sector, the actual contribution turned out to be only 37 per cent. Similarly, 
during the seventh plan (1985-86 to 1989-90) only 27 per cent of the 
public sector plan outlay was financed from own resources as against a 
target of over 41 per cent. 
There were 246 central government public enterprises as on 
March 31, 1991, out of which 236 enterprises were in operation. These 
236 enterprises yielded a net profit of Rs. 2368 crore in 1990-91, 
implying a rate of return of only 2.3 per cent on Rs. 101,797 crore capital 
employed. Of this, only 69 crores came from all the non-oil public 
enterprises put together. The record of the state level enterprises is worse. 
The departmental commercial undertakings of all states and union 
territories together reported a net loss of Rs. 1885 crore in 1990-91. Of 
the two major types of non-departmental undertakings, the State 
Electricity Boards reported a combined loss of Rs. 4169 crore while the 
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State Road Transport Corporation reported a loss of Rs. 470 crore. Thus, 
instead of generating a surplus, all public enterprises put together 
generated a net loss of some Rs. 4176 crore (Table A-12). 
'Pervasive inefficiencies and poor financial performance in 
public sector enterprises have remained a major obstacle to industrial 
development and international competitiveness. Inefficiency and lack of 
dynamism have resulted from cost-plus pricing and distribution controls. 
Many public sector enterprises have been de facto monopolies, protected 
from competition. A soft budget constraint - easy access to budget funds 
and/or credit from the financial sector - has allowed sick PSEs to survive. 
Ambiguous relationships with government supervisory authorities were not 
conducive to efficiency. These enterprises have also been constrained by 
multiple objectives, lack of managerial autonomy and overstaffing 
pressures in relation to operational needs. They have constituted a serious 
drain on government resources'.'^ 
Reformists argue for a far more concrete exit policy and for 
reforms to be undertaken at the state level where public enterprises are 
even less efficient and less profitable than at the national level, and where 
the effect on limited resources is more serious. The reforms aim to 
increase efficiency and reduce the losses that so many public enterprises 
impose on the government budget. It is recognised that the budget not only 
should not support sick enterprises but it should not even provide the 
funds for their expansion. Rather, these should come from their own funds 
or from the capital market. 
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The 20th December 1991 speech by the Prime Minister 
elaborated policy on the public sector following the July 1991 new 
industrial policy. 
'The mixed economy will continue but no further nationalisation 
will be resorted to; there will be no budgetary support to sick or 
potentially sick PSEs, with a view to eliminating it as soon as possible, 
but with 'sickness', hardship will be alleviated with the National Renewal 
Fund'.'^ 
The demand for reform of public sector enterprises seems to be 
more on pragmatic than ideological grounds. As the economic 
environment is being made more conducive to cost and quality 
considerations and attempts are being made to foster competition, 
pressures on performance orientation in the public sector are also 
mounting. The policy response in the form of public sector reforms by the 
central government, however, has been slow. Under structural reforms the 
government has decided to give greater managerial autonomy to public 
enterprises to enable them to work efficiently. In addition to this, two 
other key elements of the government's strategy for public enterprise 
reform are the promotion of increased private sector competition in areas 
where social considerations are not paramount and partial disinvestment 
of equity in selected enterprises. 
In the area of public sector enterprises following steps were 
taken by the the government. 
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* The system of monitoring has been strengthened with Memorandums 
of Understanding. The MOUs are being claimed in official circles as 
major instruments of the rollback of state involvement in the running 
of the public enterprises by citing statistics such as the following : 
'During 1990-91, 23 public enterprises signed MOUs with their 
administrative ministries, of which 14 were evaluated as excellent, 8 
as good and 1 as poor. In 1991-92, 71 enterprises signed MOUs, 
while in 1992-93, 120 enterprises were identified for this 
purpose'.'^ A more objective assessment of the situation, therefore, 
calls for a cleaner break with the old traditional culture of running 
the PSEs through back seat driving. The experience with the MOUs 
in the past has not been very positive. A change of attitude in the 
new era of liberalization may lead to some improvement in results in 
the years to come, but much more is needed than MOUs to distance 
the government from the actual running of the PSEs. 
* Some steps have been taken towards the marketisation of the PSEs. 
An important aspect of'Marketisation' is corporatisation.^*" A major 
example of corporatisation can be seen in the telecommunications 
sector. A beginning was made in 1986 by setting up a new corporate 
entity, i.e. the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL). The 
company made a profit of Rs. 1.4 billion in the very first year of its 
operation. This has now raised expectations. 
The loss making sick PSEs have been brought under the ambit of 
Board for Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR) which was already 
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facing numerous problems dealing with the sick private sector units. The 
government policy of marginal disinvestment of the equity of public 
sector enterprises has been dominantly governed by the compulsions of 
financing the fiscal deficits. The whole disinvestment approach is so 
incremental and so thinly spread that it fails to address the basic issue of 
how to improve the very low returns on the capital invested in the public 
sector. Not much has been done to bring about effective changes in the 
functioning of these enterprises. The approach of disinvestment is based 
on the assumption that the induction of private shareholders will alter the 
corporate culture in these enterprises and provide them a stronger 
commercial orientation in response to normal shareholder expectations. 
This is a tall assumption indeed. 
The 1991-92 budget earmarked $ 67 million for the National 
Renewal Fund. The International Development Agency promised over $ 
166 million during 1992-93 and the same amount in 1993-94. The NRF is 
expected to provide assistance to firms undertaking modernisation and 
technological upgrading of existing capacities to cover the costs of 
retraining and redeployment of employees. The fund would also provide 
compensation to employees affected by restructuring or closure of 
industrial units in both the private and public sectors. A social safety net 
would be provided for workers through allocating funds to finance 
employment generation schemes in the organised and unorganised sectors. 
The willingness of the government to form strategic alliances 
has been demonstrated in the case of Maruti Udyog Ltd. an automobile 
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joint venture with Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan. This unit was 
originally set up in the early eighties with Suzuki having a 40 per cent 
stake and the Government of India the remaining 60 per cent. Later, as part 
of the policy of encouraging foreign investors to increase their 
shareholding, Suzuki was allowed to increase its share holding to 50 per 
cent by purchase of fresh equity and also to acquire greater management 
control. 
* On the whole the reforms of PSUs including privatization and phasing 
out of unviable units have not gathered as much momentum as had been 
hoped for. Disinvestment has been piecemeal and the funds so raised 
are being used to reduce budget deficits, rather than strengthen the 
PSUs. As Bimal Jalan points out : 
'The sale of public sector enterprises would be of little help 
unless macroeconomic environment is improved and it is quite probable 
that if macroeconomic stabilization is successful, disinvestment of equity 
in public sector enterprises may not be necessary'.^^ 
Along with this, labour problems, political and bureaucratic 
interference have not been effectively reduced. Since it is not possible to 
privatise a large component of the public sector, it would be advisable to 
reform it. 
4.5 FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS 
We are aware now that the economic reforms launched by the 
government in 1991 were designed to accelerate overall growth and help 
India realise its full productive potential. The experience of successful 
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developing countries indicates that rapid growth requires a sustained 
effort at mobilising savings and resources and deploying them in ways 
which encourage efficient production. Financial sector reform thus 
constitutes an important component of the programme of stabilization and 
structural reform. At the outset the government had recognised that 
financial sector reform was an integral part of the new economic policy. A 
high level committee headed by Mr. M.N. Narsimham was appointed to 
consider all relevant aspects of the structure, organisation, functions and 
procedures of the financial system. Following the committee's report in 
November 1991, the government embarked on a far reaching process of 
reform covering both the banking system and the capital market. 
4.5.1 Reforms in the Banking System 
At the time of the crisis in 1991, India had been successful in 
mobilising savings, but the financial system had been seriously weakened 
by government policies. Commercial banks operated at low margins due to 
obligations to provide credit at subsidised rates to government and priority 
sectors. Internal efficiency in commercial banks was low and 
administrative costs were high. Many of the problems stemmed from 
fiscal deficits and the RBI's attempts to counter the potential monetary 
effects of deficits by requiring commercial banks to hold extensive 
government debt at below market rates. Solutions depended to a large 
extent on regaining fiscal balance. 
'A basic constraint on the efficient functioning of the banks has 
been the preemption of large proportion of bank funds at low rates of 
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interest for financing the fiscal deficits through the Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio (SLR) has already begun in the budget of 1992-93 when the average 
SLR of 38.5 per cent was lowered to 36 per cent. The budget for 1993-94 
sets the goal of bringing it further down to 25 per cent at the end of three 
years but does not specify the phasing pattern'.^^ 
The process of fiscal stabilization is expected to reduce the 
government's demand for borrowed funds and will facilitate the process of 
lowering the SLR. The interest rate structure has also been simplified. 
One of the problems facing the banks in 1991 was that levels of statutory 
liquidity ratio and cash reserve ratio (CRR) had been progressively 
increased over the years : the SLR, because of the desire to mobilise 
increasing resources through so-called market borrowings to support the 
central and state budgets. In the case of the CRR, it was because of the 
need to counter the expansionary impact on the money supply of the large 
budget deficits. Together, the SLR and CRR stipulation directed a large 
proportion of bank resources into low income-earning assets, reducing 
bank profitability and pressuring banks to charge high interest rates on 
commercial sector advances. The SLR and CRR were in fact a tax on 
financial savings in the banking system encouraging distortionary flows in 
markets where this tax did not apply. The government decided to phase out 
this distortion. The SLR is to be reduced in stages from 38.5 per cent to 
25 per cent, and the CRR is to be reduced to a level below 10 per cent. 
The government initiated a number of short-term measures to 
improve the financial sector, and pave the way for future reforms : 
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* A high level committee, the Narsimham committee on financial 
sector Reforms (1991), reviewed the structure, organisation, 
functions and procedures of the financial system. 
* Interest rates on term loans and on the bulk of debt instruments in 
capital markets have been decontrolled, and deposit interest rates 
have been increased. 
* Full statutory powers were given to the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) to regulate, promote and monitor Stock 
Exchanges in India. 
* The private sector is now allowed to establish mutual funds. 
The central government has been strongly influenced by the 
findings and recommendations of the Narsimham committee on financial 
sector reforms (1991), and by the securities scam. The government has 
recognised the sector as being over-regulated and overgoverned. In this 
situation, the quality of the advances portfolio has deteriorated and a 
culture of non-recovery has developed in many parts of the banking 
system. A number of reform initiatives to cover bad debts and meet new 
capital adequacy norms were announced in 1994 and special arrangements 
are in train for the recovery of debt due to banks. 
4.5.2 Reforms of the Capital Markets 
In addition to banking system reform, it was also necessary to 
reform the capital market, a need which had been evident for some time. 
Stock exchanges, for example, are characterised by long delays, lack of 
142 
transparency in procedures, and vulnerability to price rigging and insider 
trading. To counter these problems the government moved to establish a 
Securities and Exchange Board of India in the 1987-88 budget. It was first 
established as a non-statutory board, with the intention of giving it 
statutory powers, but this did not happen until January 1992. 
Recommendations for reforms in the capital market were made 
by the Narsimham Committee (1991) and a series of initiatives were 
undertaken in 1991-92 and 1992-93. The reforms are moving capital 
markets away from direct government control over volume and pricing of 
issues to a market-determined system regulated by an independent 
authority. The government has recognised that the process of reform in 
the capital market has only begun'.^^ 
Further reform is necessary to bring about speedier conclusions 
of transactions, greater transparency in operations, improved services to 
investors, and greater investor protection, while encouraging the corporate 
sector to raise resources directly from the market at an increasing scale. 
Modernisation of the stock exchanges to bring them into line with world 
standards in terms of transparency and reliability is also necessary if 
foreign capital is to be attracted on any significant scale. A number of 
Indian companies have been successful recently in raising funds abroad 
through Euro-Equity issues and foreign currency convertible issues. 
Finally, we would like to stress here that nearly half of the gross 
fiscal deficit of the central government in 1990-91 was financed by the 
banking system (including the RBI). Through instruments such as the 
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mandatory cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio, the government 
has traditionally forced the commercial banks to hold a larger share of 
relatively low-yielding government liabilities in their asset portfolio than 
they would otherwise hold. In any event, the facts that important financial 
intermediaries such as the major commercial banks and the Life Insurance 
Corporation are in the public sector, and that the Reserve Bank of India 
does not have the autonomy of either the federal Reserve Bank of the 
United States or the Bundesbank of Germany, have meant that the central 
government has faced little external discipline to trim its fiscal scales for 
fear of being unable to finance its deficit at any inflationary cost. This 
means that the reform of the financial sector, including of the RBI, must 
be treated as an integral part of the fiscal reforms. 
The foregoing review has dealt with only urgent issues in fiscal 
stabilization reforms. Such as the deficit, expenditure control, reform of 
the tax system, banking and financial sector reform, subsidies and public 
sector reforms. In India, the fiscal instability has been mainly caused by 
sharp rise in public expenditure. Therefore, reduction in the fiscal deficit 
is to be brought about by containing public expenditure. Although for the 
purpose of fiscal stabilization containment of the government expenditure 
should receive priority, some effort at additional resource mobilisation 
through tax and non-tax sources may also be necessary. The planning 
commission has stated : 
The required additional revenues may have to be generated by a 
judicious mixture of broadening the tax base, rationalising the tax rates 
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• 21 and through non-tax sources 
An area where there is considerable scope for revenue 
mobilisation is public services. User charges on publicly provided 
utilities such as irrigation, electricity, water, road transport and higher 
education are much below their cost of provision. Hence, unrecovered 
costs of public utilities are large and a kind of subsidy to the users. The 
government can justifiably raise user charges on public utilities like 
electricity, irrigation, transportation and water. But it has to be said in 
conclusion that fiscal policy is more than the mere arithmetic of budgets 
or even the formal process of financial management in government. To 
lose sight of the underlying political power relations which drive fiscal 




i) A Tax Reforms Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship 
of R.J. Chelliah in 1991 to examine the tax structure in the 
country and make appropriate recommendations to reform it. 
ii) MODVAT was introduced with effect from 1.3.1986. Under the 
MODVAT scheme credit of duty is allowed on inputs which are 
used either for producing excisable finished products or 
intermediate products. 
iii) MAT applies where the total income of a company as counted 
under the Income Tax Act, after availing all eligible deductions, is 
less than 30 per cent of the book profit. The total income of such 
companies shall be deemed to be 30 per cent of the book profit 
and shall be charged to tax accordingly. 
iv) It has been proposed that residents of large metropolitan cities, 
who satisfy two of the economic criteria, namely ownership of a 
four wheeler vehicle, occupation of immovable property meeting 
certain prescribed criteria : ownership of a telephone and foreign 
travel in the previous year should fall within the taxable slab and 
should voluntarily file their tax return. 
v) The term 'internal debt' is used to cover the various liabilities of 
the Government which in official documents referred to as 
'internal liabilities' including what is narrowly called 'internal 
debt'. 
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vi) While interest payments are shown in the official documents 
separately for internal and external debt, interest receipts, 
dividends and profits are not so shown. The practice so far 
followed in the official documents is to put out also figures of 
total net outgo on account of interest payments. 
vii) In order to provide the export sector of the eocnomy with access 
to importable inputs that enter into export production, at 
international prices, the import policy allows special import 
facilities for registered exporters. 
viii) Corporatisation means creating institutions which are distinct 
from a government department and operate as separate entities 
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^^a^fiten. - 5 
EFFECT OF FISCAL REFORMS ON FISCAL 
STABILIZATION IN INDIAN ECONOMY 
(1991-92 to 1999-2000) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The most significant caveat of the economic reforms has been 
the management of the fiscal deficit during the 1990s. After an initial 
improvement in the fiscal deficit in 1991-92, the government faced 
difficulty in controlling the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio. The tax/GDP ratio 
also declined and the central government passed down certain expenditure 
responsibilities to state governments thereby managing to reduce the 
expenditure/GDP ratio to some extent. 
This chapter focusses on the effects of the fiscal stabilization 
measures on the performance of the fiscal sector and direction for future 
policy imperatives. On the expenditure side, the government has 
admitted that strong improvements and imperative in the area of 
expenditure control. The principal factors underlying India's fiscal 
imbalance are the runaway growth of public expenditure and poor 
performance of public enterprises. On the revenue side, between 1990-91 
to 1994-95 the tax/GDP ratio marginally declined. This happened in the 
context of a reform. It is certainly true that distortions prevailing in the 
earlier tax structure were reduced. The cascading effect of the taxes was 
reduced. The number and level of rates under each major tax were scaled 
back. But the reform measures were unable to eliminate distortions or the 
unequal treatment of taxpayers caused by the many remaining 
exemptions from the various taxes. The result was that the tax base 
remained narrow even as average tax rates were reduced across the board. 
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A tax package that reduces rates but fails to expand the base will 
have three results : 
1. It will be popular; 
2. The tax/GDP ratio will tend to be sluggish; and 
3. The tax administration will genuinely have to improve. 
All these results could be said to have followed a reduction in 
the tax contribution in terms of GDP would be acceptable if fiscal deficit/ 
GDP ratio was not high. Until 1995-96, government was clearly unable to 
meet its deficit objective. The weight of the correction then would have to 
be borne by an increased tax/GDP ratio of expenditure could not be 
controlled. But the reverse happened over a five-year period in the 1990s. 
Even short-term tax administration measures, however ardent, have failed 
to raise back the tax/GDP ratio back to historical levels, including the 
level prevailing at the beginning of the crisis period particularly in 1990-
91. 
In what follows, section II summarises revenue trends including 
tax reforms and their revenue implications. Section III presents a 
description of expenditure trends and needed improvements in the control 
and quality of expenditure. Section IV discusses the role of fiscal 
stabilization measures in the management of public debt. Section V 
evaluates the impact of public sector reforms on fiscal stabilization. 
Section VI makes concluding remarks on the overall state of the fiscal 
stabilization and on the agenda for future reform. 
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5.2 REVENUE : TRENDS AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS 
5.2.1 Tax Reforms and Their Revenue Implications 
The Process of fiscal stabilization initiated in 1991 as part of 
the structural adjustment programme advocated for reduction in fiscal 
deficit. Bringing down the fiscal deficit to the targeted level is backed 
by the expected high revenue buoyancy. This expectation is based on 
the assumption that the proposed lowering of the rates of income tax, 
corporate tax, and excise and customs duties would result in higher tax 
revenues and thereby help in reducing the fiscal deficit. 
The fiscal deficit reduction is considered as the precondition 
for higher economic growth. And when economic growth accelerates, it 
should result in higher tax revenues. To the extent this reasoning is 
valid, first fiscal deficit should come down and should reflect in terms 
of higher private investment. Then higher growth of income should 
generate larger tax revenues. This raises the question of time lag. If 
however, the tax rate reduction has to have an impact on current tax 
revenues without any time lag, the line of reasoning behind the expected 
buoyancy in revenues has to be different. Finance Ministry officials 
have justified the expected immediate buoyancy in central tax revenues 
on the belief that the Laffer curve' phenomenon starts to operate almost 
instantly. The rationale behind Laffer curve is that high tax rate adversely 
affects the growth of income and the fall in income would result in more 
than proportionate fall in tax revenue. Therefore, reduction in tax rate is 
essential for higher growth of income and tax revenue. This again raises 
the question of time lag. If, in the short period, the Laffer curve 
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phenomenon has to operate, there should be a negative functional 
relationship between the tax rate and the tax base. Increase in tax base 
should lead to better compliance. It means that there should be a negative 
rate elasticity, since better tax compliance is supposed to makeup for the 
loss in revenue on account of reduction in the rate of tax. However, if the 
tax base remains unaffected by the lowering of tax rate, total tax revenue 
would obviously fall. Earlier studies on this issue had shown that contrary 
to the popular belief, the Laffer curve phenomenon does not operate in 
the Indian context. Studies on direct taxes in India showed that lowering 
of tax rate did not result in higher tax mobilisation in the past. Bagchi and 
Rao' tested the validity of this relationship. In their analysis estimating 
the growth of assessed income without any change in the tax rate 
prevailing in the previous year and the assessed income, introducing the 
change in the tax rate, they found that revenue loss was not being 
compensated by better compliance because of the lowering of tax rate. 
Here, we attempt to examine whether in recent years the lowering of tax 
rates has actually resulted in higher tax mobilisation and what is our 
experience during the post reform period? 
What we do in this study is to show how tax collections have 
fared while GDP and Non-Agricultural GDP (NAGDP) changed over the 
years, as tax rates underwent alterations. 
5.2.2 Tax GDP Ratio 
If the reduction of tax rates is the appropriate measure to 
increase revenue collection, increased revenue buoyancy should have been 
reflected in higher tax GDP ratio. But as far as total central tax revenue to 
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TABLE : C-1 
VARIOUS TAX REVENUES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 







































































Note : Ratios to GDP at Current Market Prices for the period 
1990-91 to 1994-95 use old series (base 1980-81) and from 
1995-96 onwards use new series (base 1993-94) of National 
Accounts Statistics released by C.S.O. 
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GDP goes, it can be seen from Table C-1 & Figure c-i that between 1990-
91 and 1999-2000, when there were substantial tax rates reductions, the 
ratio of gross tax revenue to GDP declined from 10.8 to 9.2 per cent. 
Among different categories of taxes, customs and excise duty as a 
percentage of GDP declined sharply from 3.9 per cent to 2.6 per cent and 
from 4.6 per cent to 3.3 per cent respectively. 
With regard to the direct taxes however, there was an 
improvement in terms of tax-GDP ratio. Between 1990-91 and 1999-
2000 yield of personal income tax as a percentage of GDP increased 
from. 1.0 per cent to 1.4 per cent; the corresponding increase for 
corporate tax was from 1.0 per cent; to 1.6 per cent. The point to be noted 
here is that even though the direct tax-GDP ratio increased in the post-
reform period, it could not offset the loss in revenue due to the sharp 
reduction in customs and excise duty. Given the composition of the 
central tax revenue with around 65 per cent of the tax revenue coming 
from indirect taxes and only around 35 per cent coming form direct taxes 
(Table : C-5 & Figure c-viii), this is not surprising. Thus when both direct 
and indirect tax rates were reduced, the fall in indirect tax revenues was 
bound to be more than the increase in direct tax revenues. This is the 
reason why even though the direct tax-GDP ratio increased during this 
period, growth in total tax revenue could not keep pace with the rate of 
growth of GDP 
5.2.3 Tax NAGDP Ratio 
Since both direct as well as indirect taxes of the central 
government have mainly non-agricultural base, the ratio of central 
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TABLE : C-2 
VARIOUS TAX REVENUES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
AS PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL GDP (NAGDP) 
(1990-91 to 1999-2000) 
Year Income Corporation Custom Union Total Tax 
























































Note : R.E. (Revised Estimate) 
Source : 1. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 
Documents, Various Issues. 
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government tax revenues to NAGDP could be a better measure of tax 
buoyancy. Table C-2 and Figure c-ii presents the ratios of central tax 
revenues to NAGDP. 
It is clear that there is no significant difference in the trends in 
ratios measured in terms of NAGDP or overall GDP. While for income 
tax, and corporate tax the ratios of revenues to NAGDP improved between 
1990-91 and 1998-99, they declined for custom duty and excise duties. 
Likewise, the ratio for total tax revenue also declined during this period. 
The ratio of gross tax revenue to NAGDP declined from 17.46 per cent to 
12.56 per cent during the period (Table-C-2). As can be seen from Table 
C-2 and Figure c-ii, ratios of custom duty and union excise duties to 
NAGDP declined sharply from 6.26 and 7.43 per cent to 3.60 and 4.50 
per cent respectively. The ratio of direct taxes to NAGDP exhibited 
similar trend as with GDP. Ratio of income tax to NAGDP increased from 
1.63 per cent in 1990-91 to 2.61 per cent in 1997-98, which marginally 
declined to 1.81 per cent in 1998-99. Similarly the ratio of corporation 
tax to NAGDP increased from 1.62 perc ent in 1990-91 to 2.30 per cent 
in 1998-99. 
The rate of change of various ratios of central taxes to GDP and 
NAGDP is shown in Table C-3 and Figure c-iii. It can be seen that the rate 
of growth of these ratios with respect to both the bases have followed a 
similar pattern. Between 1991-92 and 1995-96, ratios of income tax 
revenue to GDP and NAGDP grew at a rate of 8.4 per cent and 4.72 
percent per annum respectively the ratio of corporate tax revenue to 
NAGDP also increased at a rate lower (6.87 per cent) than the ratio of its 
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TABLE : C-3 
COMPARISON OF SENSITIVITY OF TAX REVENUES WITH 






































Note : These estimates are the annual average rate of change of 
various central government taxes with respect to GDP and 
NAGDP. 
Source : 
1. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic survey, 
1996-97 & 1999-2000. 
2.CMIE, Report on Public Finance, 1999. 
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revenue to GDP (10.50 per cent) during 1991-92 to 1995-96, which is 
contrary to what was expected. Since corporate tax is levied on non-
agricultural profits of companies, the normal expectation is for the 
collection from this tax to be much more sensitive to changes in NAGDP. 
In the case of customs duty whose ratio with GDP as well as NAGDP 
declined at an annual average rate of around 3.0 per cent and 7.0 per cent 
respectively between 1991-92 and 1995-96. The ratio of excise revenue 
to GDP which declined at the annual rate of 5.0 percent during 1991-92 to 
1995-96, on the other hand the ratio of excise revenue to NAGDP 
declined at the annual rate of 8.66 per cent during the period in reference. 
The ratio of the total tax revenue to GDP and NAGDP too declined at the 
rate of 1.18 and 4.86 per cent during 1991-92 to 1995-96. 
Table C-3 & Figure c-iii showed slightly more grim picture in 
the second phase. Between 1996-97 to 1998-99, ratios of income tax to 
GDP and NAGDP grew at a rate of around 0.5 and 0.3 per cent 
respectively. This is crystal clear that the ratio of income tax revenue to 
GDP and NAGDP grew at a very low rate during second phase in 
comparison of first phase. The ratios of corporate tax to GDP and NAGDP 
grew at an annual rate of around 4.0 per cent during 1996-97 to 1998-99 
which is well below than in the first phase. The ratio of custom and excise 
duties to GDP and NAGDP declined at the annual rates of 8.0 and 4.5 
percent respectively between 1996-97 to 1998-99. As for as ratio of the 
total tax revenue to GDP and NAGDP is concerned during this period, the 
ratio to GDP declined at an average annual rate of 4.04 per cent which is 
higher than the previous period, as with NAGDP the rate of decline was 
slightly lower (-4.23 per cent) than the previous period (-4.86 per cent). 
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5.2.4 Problem of Time Lag 
Now, we turn to the question of time lag posed in the beginning. 
For this purpose we have measured the income elasticity of individual 
taxes of the central government with respect to GDP for 1991-92 to 
1998-99 and presented the result in Table C-4 and Figure c-iv. To start 
with income tax, it can be seen that income elasticity of income tax 
declined from 1.67 in 1991-92 to 1.19 in 1992-93. During this period, 
the rate of income tax declined form 50 per cent to 40 per cent, surcharge 
remaining constant at 12 per cent. Elasticity of income tax further 
declined to 1.06 in 1993-94, the year in which there was no change in the 
rate of tax and surcharge. In 1994-95, the elasticity of income tax 
increased to 1.79, the year in which surcharge on income tax was 
abolished. However, elasticity of income tax further increased to 1.95 in 
1995-96, income tax rate and surcharge did not undergo any alteration 
from the previous year. In 1996-97, the elasticity of income tax declined 
to 1.11. Surprisingly in 1997-98, there was huge increase in the income 
elasticity of the income tax, to 4.23. Again, there was a dramatic fall in 
the income elasticity of the income tax in 1998-99, it declined to -1.25. 
For corporation tax, income elasticity of revenue declined from 3.11 in 
1991-92 to 0.92 in 1992-93, with an increase in tax rate from 40 per cent 
to 45 pe rcent though corporate tax rate remained constant at 45 per cent 
till 1993-94, tax elasticity further declined to 0.89 but improved to 2.10 
in 1994-95. In 1995-96 tax elasticity declined to 1.27. In 1996-97, with 
the reduction in surcharge from 15 per cent to 7.5 per cent and consequent 
reduction in effective rate of tax, income elasticity declined to 0.83 while 
in 1997-98, elasticity of tax further declined to 0.70 but it increased to 
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TABLE : C-4 
INCOME ELASTICITY* OF DIFFERENT TAXES OF THE 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (1991-92 to 1998-99) 
Year Income Corporation Custom Union Total Tax 




































































in Tax Yield 
Proportionate Change in GDP 
Source : 1. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Survey, 1996- 97 & 1999-2000. 
2. CMIE, Report on Public Finance, 1999. 
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2.16 in 1998-99, perhaps this increase was due to reduction in the rate of 
corporation tax and abolition of surcharge in 1997-98. 
The analysis of year to year movement of income tax rate and 
collections brings out that rate reduction in particular year did not result 
in an improvement in elasticity in that year itself. In fact, elasticity 
seems to decline with rate reduction. If the improvement in elasticity is 
due to the reduction in tax rate, it is registered only after a time lag of at 
least one year. 
For both customs and excise, income elasticity during the first 
three years, from 1991-92 to 1993-94 was considerably below unity, for 
customs it was negative in 1993-94. The reduction in the peak customs 
duty during this period was from 150 per cent to 85 per cent. The peak 
rate was reduced further between 1994-95 and 1995-96 and was 50 per 
cent in 1995-96. The point to be noted here is that income elasticity of 
customs revenue increased to above unity in the period when the rate of 
reduction in duty was much lower. Between 1991-92 and 1993-94, the 
peak rate was reduced by 65 percentage points; between 1993-94 and 
1995-96, the reduction was 35 percentage points. During 1996-97 when 
the peak rate of customs duty remained constant at 50 per cent; income 
elasticity of customs revenue was significantly above unity, though lower 
than in the immediately preceding year, 1995-96. This also reflects the 
operation of time-lag. In 1997-98, income elasticity of customs revenue 
declined to -0.55 but improve marginally in 1998-99 to 0.37. 
As can be seen from Table C-4 and Figure c-iv, income elasticity 
of excise revenue was extremely low in 1993-94 and 1998-99 and below 
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unity in four out of eight years, between 1991-92 and 1998-99. While 
income elasticity has fluctuated during the period for various major 
sources of central tax revenue, the least one can safely say on the basis of 
the experience of the recent past is that time lag does operate for both 
direct and indirect taxes. 
The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that 
compared to indirect taxes, direct taxes were more buoyant during the 
post-reform period. Share of direct taxes in total tax revenue also 
increased rapidly during this period. As can be seen from Table C-5 and 
Figure c-v share of direct taxes in the total tax revenue increased form 
19.1 per cent in 1990-91 to 32.2 per cent in 1998-99 and was expected to 
grow 33.5 per cent in 1999-2000. On the other hand indirect taxes 
declined from 78.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 66.8 per cent in 1998-99, and 
was expected to decline further to 65.9 per cent in 1999-2000. Sharp 
decline in the buoyancy of indirect taxes was the reason why the rate of 
tax revenue fell well below the rate of growth of GDP during the period. 
The analysis of the movement of tax rates and income elasticities of 
various taxes showed that generally reduction in tax rate cannot make a tax 
more buoyant instantly. There is a time lag involved. 
Regarding the declining share of indirect tax to GDP during this 
period, Rakesh Mohan (2000) rightly stated : 
'the 1990s have witnessed a fall in the collection of indirect 
taxes when expressed as a proportion of GDP. With the opening up of 
the economy leading to large reductions in customs tariffs, revenue from 
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to come as these tariffs are brought down further. Buoyancy in indirect 
taxes can therefore only be achieved through increase in excise tax 
collections at the central level. The structural problem that exists in this 
regard is the constitutional provision which assigns excise tax to the 
central government and sales tax to state governments. As the share of 
agriculture falls with the overall development there should be an increase 
in revenue since agriculture is largely untaxed. Correspondingly, the share 
of the secondary and services sector increased. The long term scenario is 
that the share of agriculture will continue to fall and that of services in 
particular will continue to rise. Hence for tax revenues to increase as a 
share of GDP the imposition of indirect taxes on the service sector is 
imperative. This can essentially be achieved by the imposition of a 
widespread value added tax on all sectors of the economy. Levying such a 
tax will require an amendment to the constitution alongwith the 
achievement of consensus with the states so that it becomes feasible to do 
so. Thus long-term buoyancy in indirect tax revenues can be achieved only 
if this major structural change can be brought about'.^ 
5.2.5 Non-Tax Revenue 
The main area of controversy among non-tax revenue soruces 
is public sector units (PSUs). It is generally accepted that the 
government should discontinue operations in activities which can be 
equally or better provided by the private sector. The performance of PSUs 
has taken on added interest in this context and the privatisation of selected 
PSUs has become a reality. The state electricity boards, transport 
enterprises and other departmental undertakings, which have had 
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TABLE : C-6 
PROFILE OF NON-TAX REVENUE OF THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT (1990-91 to 1999-2000) 
Year Non-Tax Reve- Non-Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue 
nue (Percentage (As per cent (As per cent of 























































Note : B.E. (Budget Estimate), RE (Revised Estimate), 
(Average). 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Documents, Various Issues. 
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historically low returns, as well as irrigation and other utility rates which 
have not reflected costs of production by any imagination have come under 
scrutiny. Overall share of non-tax revenues has remained stagnant between 
2.6 per cent and 2.7 per cent as a proportion of GDP during 1990 to 1999. 
Thus,we can say higher investment has not provided higher returns. 
As it is evident from Table C-6 that there has been some 
improvement in non-tax revenue collections from 2.24 per cent as a ratio 
to GDP in 1990-91 to 2.96 per cent in 1998-99 and budgeted to slighty 
decline to 2.80 per cent in 1990-2000. As a share of total revenue receipts 
non-tax revenue collections increased from 21.77 per cent in 1990-91 to 
30.53 per cent in 1998-99, and was expected to slightly decline to 28 per 
cent in 1999-2000. As far as percentage change in non-tax revenue over 
the previous year is concerned, it is evident from Table C-6 that during the 
first five years of stabilization period, the average annual rate was 12.40 
per cent, which rose to 16.60 per cent during 1995-96 to 1999-2000. 
These trends clearly indicate the positive responsiveness of the non-tax 
revenues to the fiscal stabilization steps. Though overall performance of 
the non-tax revenue is still far from satisfactory. 
5.3 EFFECT OF EXPENDITURE COMPRESSION 
As it has been argued earlier that the main culprit behind the 
fiscal instability in Indian economy is ever-rising public expenditure. 
Similar sentiment has been also expressed by Parthasarthi Shome (1997) : 
'in recent Indian history, government expenditure was put on a 
high altar. That India had one of the highest incremental capital-output 
ratios in its public sector was widely judged to be proof of the efficacy 
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of the plan process. It has taken virtually five decades to make a visible 
dent in that economic philosophy, mainly as a result of the low 
productivity of public investment. Multiple objectives interfere with 
public enterprise decision-making, rendering it almost impossible for 
them to operate efficiently. The need for ever higher public investment 
has resulted in high priority being placed on the need to generate ever 
higher savings rates with little concern over the quality of use of those 
savings'.^ 
The 1991 economic crisis brought to sharper focus issues such 
as the role of the government and trends in its expenditure. In the 1990s 
the central government did pass on some current expenditure, mainly in 
the social sector, to the states. This reduced central government 
expenditure as a ratio to GDP during the post-reform period. Despite the 
reductions in the expenditure/GDP ratio, the central government recently 
recognized existing problems in expenditure control and management. 
5.3.1 Expenditure Trends in Stabilization Period 
In order to understand the current fiscal predicament of the 
central government it is necessary to examine the pattern of central 
government expenditure. As already mentioned above, the key threat to 
fiscal stabilization is the substantial decline in investment expenditures 
made by the government and fast growing non-plan expenditures. 
Here, we have tried to analyse the trends in expenditure of the 
central government in the post-reform period. The total expenditure of 
the central government during 1985-86 to 1990-91 was hovered around 
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1990-91 to 1994-95 and further declined to 16.35 per cent during 1995-
96 to 1999-2000 (Table C-7 and Figure c-vi). At the same time non plan 
expenditure has increased from 12.50 per cent to GDP in 1985-86 to 
14.37 per cent in 1990-91 and then marginally declined to 12.77 per 
cent during 1990-91 to 1994-95 and has further declined to 12.18 per 
cent between 1995-96 to 1999-2000. This decline in non-plan 
expenditures was due to decline in defence expenditure, subsidies 
(including food and fertilizer) and other non-plan expenditures. At the 
same time the most improtant item of non-plan expenditures i.e. interest 
payments increased during the post-reform period, even after ten years 
of the introduction of fiscal stabilization measures, interest payments 
are posing threat to fiscal stability. As it is clear from Table C-7 and 
Figure C-vi that interest payments increased from 4.01 per cent to GDP in 
1990-91 to 4.87 per cent in 1999-2000. During the first five years of 
stabilization period, interest payments as a ratio to GDP were 4.40 per 
cent which rose to 4.70 per cent during the 1995-96 to 1999-2000. On 
the other hand Defence expenditure, subsidies and other non-plan 
expenditure demonstrated a declining trend from 2.64, 1.78 and 3.95 per 
cent respectively during the first phase (1990-91 to 1994-95) to 2.47, 
1.35 and 3.60 per cent respectively during the second period in reference. 
Plan expenditures were kept high at about 6.0 per cent to 7.00 per cent of 
GDP throughout the 1980s. Correspondingly, capital expenditures of 
central government were sustained at levels of 6.00 per cent to 7.00 per 
cent of GDP during the same period. Now, both plan expenditures and 
capital expenditures of the central government have fallen to levels of 
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The non-sustainability of fiscal expansion is demonstrated by the 
sustained increase in interest payments. Interest payments now constitute 
the largest component of expenditure of the central government. At 
present it is around 31.00 per cent of the total expenditure as against 
around 20.00 per cent in 1990-91 (Table C-8 and Figure c-vii). Looking 
specifically at current expenditures, the lack of success with expenditure 
reduction becomes clear. There has been a steady increase in interest 
payments. It is clear that the compensation has come not only from 
decreases in other components of current expenditure such as subsidies, 
defence and general administration (including wages and salaries) but also 
capital and plan expenditures. The fifth pay commission is currently 
regarded as the villain of the piece in causing the current fiscal problems. 
Analysis of the data as documented here suggests that this is not the case 
at the central government level. The total cost of government salaries 
excluding defence and police (roughly corresponding to the item 'other 
non-plan expenditure') when expressed as a proportion of GDP, can be 
seen to be much lower now than it was throughout the 1980s. In other 
words, non-plan expenditure on government salaries and wages has not 
increased as fast as GDP over this period. Interest payments are now at 
least three times that of the non-plan government expenditure excluding 
the military and police. The key area for action in correcting this fiscal 
imbalance is related to rising debt servicing obligations of the central 
government. 
The analysis of government expenditure trends in per capita 





















^ *? s «^  




































































r~' 1 - H 
0\ 






















a\ ¥ - H 
O 
o 

















































































































































































































































































































o o /—- es 













































































4 »^ ^N CT\ ON >V 































PQ l i , 





• 4 — » • — 1 








• • • • 
0) 
a> i^ 1 1 
180 
are shown in Table C-9. During the entire period of ten years of 
stabilization (i.e. 1990-91 to 1999-2000) total expenditure of the central 
government in per capita terms increased from Rs. 1255.04 in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 3071.40 in 1999-2000. In the first five years of the period in 
reference, the average per capita total expenditure was Rs. 1465 which 
rose sharply to Rs. 2573 in the next period. Non-plan expenditure 
contributed very much to this increase. During 1990-91 to 1999-2000, 
per capita non-plan expenditure increased more than two times, i.e. from 
Rs. 917 to Rs. 2238.73. As described earlier, interest payments increased 
more than three times during the period in reference. On the other hand 
rising trend of per capita plan and capital expenditure was not as sharp as 
non-plan expenditure. 
Another analysis has been carried out with reference to the 
fiscal stabilization programme in India. Table C-10 and Figure c-viii 
present overall impact of expenditure management and control on the real 
growth of expenditure of the central government. It has to be said that in 
the first five years of the post economic reform period (since 1991-92), 
while almost all non-interest items of public expenditure have been 
reduced in real terms. During 1991-92 to 1995-96 average annual growth 
of total expenditure in real terms was only 1.00 per cent. During the same 
period non-plan expenditure grew negatively by -1.41 per cent, 
irrespective of the fact that interest payments grew at a rate of 3.60 per 
cent, but this was compensated by huge reduction in subsidies (-8.31 
per cent). Simultaneously, capital expenditure also declines rapidly 
during the period in reference, its real average annual growth rate was -
8.26 per cent. This means that during the first five years of the fiscal 
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Stabilization period, the main burden of expenditure compression in the 
fiscal adjustment has so far fallen on the redistributive package and 
items of capital expenditure. And this is not a good sign. As emphasised 
by S. Mundle, and M. Hiranaya (1993) that: 
The crowding out of public expenditure on the anti-poverty 
programmes, human resource development and capital formation must 
be viewed with concern because it is not just a temporary aberration but 
a continuation of a secular tendency which has been accentuated instead 
of being reversed in the current adjustment programme. India's poor 
record in the development of human capabilities and the construction and 
maintenance of essential infrastructure are as much a cause for India's 
poor international competitiveness as the over regulated and over 
protectionist policy regime. Continuing neglect of these areas of public 
action will compromise the long-term growth prospects of the economy 
apart from their negative impact on current welfare'."* 
On the other hand during 1996-97 to 1999-2000 real average 
annual growth rates of all the items of expenditure of the central 
government were positive. The disheartening feature of this analysis is 
that during this period growth rate of subsidies surpassed even that of 
interest rates. However, to some extent due to lower inflation rate in the 
second phase, there was a sharp increase in the real growth of all the 
components of expenditure as compared to first phase. This is very much 
evident in the case of nominal growth of expenditure. The gap in the 
nominal growth rates of all the components of expenditure between the 
two periods mentioned above is not as much wider as in case of real 
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growth rate. Thus, it is clear that during the post-reform period (since 
1991) public expenditure on almost all the items except interest payments 
have been cut in real terms. However the sharpest cuts have fallen on 
precisely those items of expenditure which ought to be protected, i.e., 
capital expenditure, human resource development and the redistributive 
package. Hopefully the next round of budgets at the centre will attempt to 
reverse this trend. 
5.3.2. Quality of Expenditure 
The quality of public expenditure also indirectly affects the 
quantity. Take poverty alleviation, anti-poverty programmes that are geared 
towards rural welfare, such as the Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP) or the National Rural Employment Programme 
(NREP), later renamed Jawahar Rozgar Yojna, have tended to lack funds, 
are spread rather thinly and are subject to leakage. Even the mid day meal 
programme that was announced in August 1995 and annually cost almost 
1/2 per cent of GDP has had its scope truncated as indicated above, mainly 
because of implementation problems." 
The incidence of politically motivated social programmes seems 
to have increased so much that unusual measures are now needed to 
control them. All redistribution policies and programmes should be 
formed as a package, with a clear beginning and a fixed termination. The 
party or parties in question that comprise the government of the day 
should be made legally responsible for a full explanation of the financing 
of such programmes rather than just receiving accolades for the mere 
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announcement of largesee. Such programmes may be founded only with 
identifiable sources of funds. 
Another area of declared preoccupation of the government is 
education. It has been discussed and declared as a fundamental right. There 
seems to be general agreement on the efficacy of expenditure on 
education. Another area worth mentioning is health. While public 
expenditure on primary health has been quite important, its objective has 
become intertwined with others such as population control which should 
be targeted independently. Even as the nation's population soars in the 
absence of a credible population policy, the exigencies of population 
growth have forced a switch in emphasis from primaiy health to population 
in many instances, rendering the provision of primary health care 
insufficient or less than intended while the size of the population tends to 
explode."' Prima facie it would seem that neither primary health care nor 
population control is adequately served under the prevailing arrangements. 
Other examples may also be provided to indicate the questionability in the 
nature and quality of expenditures. 
This discussion should point towards the need for putting in 
place appropriate mechanisms for honest adminsitration and 
implementation rather than quantitative increases in expenditure size that 
could safeguard the quality of such expenditures and check leakages more 
meaningfully than what continually emerging revelations regarding 
implementation in many states seems to indicate. While the increases in 
social expenditures in recent budgets may be well intentioned, such 
programmes should be increasingly tested on their end result after 
implementation, rather than on the announcement effect before it. 
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5.4 PERFORMANCE OF CENTRAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
UNDERTAKINGS DURING STABILIZATION PERIOD 
Jawaharlal Nehru's idea of the public sector was very different 
from the way it has evolved through the years. Nehru's conception for 
the public sector was for attaining the commanding heights of the 
economy and not its money demanding depths. Private sector enterprises 
were then seen to be inefficient and public sector enterprises were 
expected to induce a greater degree of efficiency in the economy. The 
assumption was that efficient public sector would be instrumental in the 
generation of large surpluses. The record has been the opposite. The 
original case for heavy reliance on public sector enterprises was spelt out 
in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. The Resolution stated : 
'the adoption of the socialist pattern of society as the national 
objective as well as the need for planned and rapid development, require 
that all industries of basic and strategic importance or the nature of public 
utility services, should be in the public sector. The state has therefore to 
assume direct responsibility for the future development of industries over 
a wider area'.^ 
However, we must recognise that public sector enterprises do 
dominate key sectors of the economy in the infrastructure and heavy 
industry areas. It is all the more necessary for the economy that these 
enterprises become more efficient. 
5.4.1 Trends 
From the late 1980s, the public sector began suffering from 
financial problems, stemming almost exclusively from a steady decline in 
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budgetary support. In 1985-86, budgetary resources were being provided 
to public enterprises to meet almost 50 per cent of their investment 
requirements. This share had fallen to less than 20 per cent by the mid-
1990s. Correspondingly, internal and extra-budgetary resources have 
increased from about 50 per cent to over 80 per cent to total investment. 
The share of direct borrowing within that increased from about 15 per 
cent to about 25 per cent. Above description illustrate the impact of the 
deteriorating fiscal situation the resources requirement of public sector 
enterprises. The government simply cannot afford to play an active role as 
an owner in sustaining these enterprises in the industrial sector in future 
without being extremely selective. The increasing exposure of the public 
sector enterprises to both domestic and external debt may also lead to 
problems of sickness in the future. If the government as the owner can no 
longer supply adequate volumes of equity in support of the financial 
requirements for new investment, there is little alternative to the sharing 
of equity outside the government. 
Bimal Jalan also expressed similar views, 'The most conspicuous 
failure of public sector enterprises has been in the financial area. An 
important shortcoming has been the relatively low level of capacity 
utilization in many enterprises. This has increased the capital output ratio, 
and reduced efficiency in the use of capital. The poor financial 
performance of several enterprises is traceable to a large extent to poor 
investment decisions. These are reflected in factors such as inappropriate 
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With the adoption of the economic reforms, a second look at the 
public sector became inevitable. The new strategy essentially involved 
refocussing - not curtailing state activity and channelising resources and 
effort in high priority areas. This crucial shift in priority needs to be 
viewed in the backdrop of not merely the trends of liberalization and 
globalisation but the performance of the public sector itself. 
Table C-11 and Figure c-ix highlights the performance of the 
public sector enterprises during the stabilization period. In 1991-92 pre-
tax profit to capital employed was 3.4 per cent and profit after tax to net 
worth was 3.9 per cent which rose to 7.6 per cent and 10.2 per cent 
respectively in 1997-98 though this shows an improvement in rate of 
return on capital employed in PSUs, but the rate is still very low. 
5.4.2 Disinvestment in Public Sector Undertakings ^ ^ 
An assessment of the strategies adopted by successive 
governments after 1991 gto initiate and carry forward the process of 
reforms in the public sector indicates three critical dimensions involved 
in the process : a) inter-sectoral dimension, b) efficiency dimension, and 
c) fiscal dimension. The inter-sectoral dimension of public sector reforms 
implies : the wider implications of these reforms on the financial sector 
on the one hand and the impact of the monetary and regulatory 
mechanisms that have developed in the fiscal sector on disinvestment in 
the public sector, on the other. The multi-track impact and influence of 
public sector disinvestment also needs to be taken into account. The 
efficiency dimension implies the stress on better and more professional 
management of public enterprises as one of the goals of disinvestment. 
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The fiscal dimension involves disinvestment in order to garner resources 
to bridge the budget deficit. All the three dimensions have influenced 
the disinvestment strategy of the government, with varying degrees of 
assertiveness. Issues relating to disinvestment revolve around three 
principal questions why, how and how much. The stress on disinvestment, 
as against privatisation is significant. Privatisation aim at shrinking the 
role of the state in economic activities. Disinvestment on the other hand, 
has a much wider connotation as it could either involve dilution of 
government stake to a level that result in a transfer of management or 
could also be limited to such levels which would permit the government to 
retain control over the organisation. 
Table C-12 and Figure c-x shows that during 1991-92, 
disinvestment yielded revenue of Rs. 3038 crore against the targetted 
Rs. 2500 crore. In the next year, though the budget projected Rs. 2500 
crore as the estimated earnings from disinvestment, the actual figures 
were much lower Rs. 1913 crore. For 1993-94, the budget made a 
provision for Rs. 3500 crore from disinvestment but the actual earnings 
from disinvestment were nil. The government held unfavourable market 
conditions as the main reason responsible for this lacklustre trend. 
However, in 1994-95 Rs. 4843 crore was realised through disinvestment 
as against the target of Rs. 4000 crore. Perhaps, this buoyant earning 
from disinvestment tempted the government to set an overambitious 
target for the year 1995-96 of Rs. 7000 crore. But the actual earnings 
from disinvestment were merely Rs. 362 crore. This trend continued till 
1997-98. In 1998-99, there was buoyancy in earnings through 
disinvestment, actual earnings were Rs. 5371 crore against Rs. 5000 crore 
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TABLE : C-12 
DISINVESTMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS 
(1991-92 to 1999-2000) 
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target. Again there was decline in 1999-2000 in eanrings through 
disinvestment. 
A few distinct trends can be discerned from the above analysis 
of the public sector reform. The spotlight of attention was very clearly on 
the process of disinvestment. 'In order to give thrust to the process of 
disinvestment in PSUs, a new Department of Disinvestment has been set 
up. The department is responsible for all matters related to disinvestment 
of central government equity in central public sector undertakings, 
implementation of disinvestment decisions and recommendations of the 
erstwhile Disinvestment Commission'.^ 
The government had categorically stated that the funds 
available for disinvestment would be used for infrastructure 
development, upgrading technology in the public sector, investing in the 
social sector and for the retirement of the public debt. In reality much of 
the government earning through disinvestment was used to bridge the 
budget deficit. Many did argue that if resources raised through 
disinvestment were utilised for retiring past debts it would result in the 
reduction of the interest burden of the government, thereby strengthening 
the fiscal stabilization process. Whatever limited progress has been 
achieved in initiating public sector reforms has largely been linked to the 
process of disinvestment. Here too, the goal has fallen short of 
expectations and the disinvestment strategy has itself been bogged down 
by controversies. As far as long-term fiscal stabilization is concerned 
higher rate of return from capital employed in public sector enterprises 
would have been more profitable than the use of disinvestment earnings. 
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During 2000-2001 non-tax revenue from dividends and profits from PSUs 
has exceeded the budget expectations. The shortfall in disinvestment 
proceeds has, thus been partly offset by the increase in non-tax revenue. If 
the last year's pattern was any indication, attempts to mobilise revneue 
from disinvestment would be crucial for significant reduction in fiscal 
deficit so that the growth in public debt can be reduced. 
5.5 FISCAL STABILIZATION AND PUBLIC DEBT 
The revenue and expenditure trends as explained earlier has been 
to render unmanageable size of the fiscal deficit. It is notable that the 
beginning of the deficit issue were in the early 1980s. Till then the 
revenue account had been in surplus with non-plan revenue receipts 
exceeding non-plan revenue expenditure.'^ This had enabled partial 
financing of capital expenditure from the revenue account. From early 
eighties, the revenue account surplus turned into deficit, but the non-plan 
account within the revenue account remained in surplus. This meant that 
the non-plan revenue surplus financed the plan revenue deficit. In the 
1990s, both the plan and non-plan components of the revenue account 
went into deficit. Today it is not only the centre, but important states 
are also habitually presenting budgets with a revenue deficit. Thus both 
the centre and the states are running into revenue deficits. There is no 
indication that this policy will be corrected in the near future. Hence there 
is a rapid build-up of the consolidated fiscal deficit of central government. 
In turn, the deficit problem has resulted in a quick growth in the size of 
the public debt. The government debt-internal and external liabilities 
comprised over half of GDP. This is a high figure whose servicing has 
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become difficult in as much as the interest burden of the central 
government comprises half of its total revenue. The RBI has indicated that 
there are likely to be steep jumps in future payments that would have to be 
made through increased borrowings. 
5.5.1 Growth of Public Debt 
Table C-13 and Figure c-xi shows values of internal debt, 
external debt and other liabilities of government of India at the end of 
each financial year from 1990-91 to 1999-2000. The table shows that the 
total liabilities of Government of India has increased more than three 
times between 1990-91 and 1999-2000, and most of the increase is on 
account of internal liabilities. The share of external debt in total liabilities 
has actually declined from 10.02 per cent in 1990-91 to 5.6 per cent in 
1999-2000. The table also shows that external debt as a ratio to GDP at 
current market prices has also declined almost steadily from 5.5 per cent 
in 1990-91 to 2.9 per cent in 1999-2000. The ratio of internal liabilities 
to GDP has fluctuated around 48 per cent during the entire nineties and at 
the end of 1999-2000 it stands at 49.73 per cent. But total liabilities as a 
ratio to GDP has declined during this period, from 55.30 per cent in 
1990-91 to 52.67 per cent in 1999-2000 (Table C-13 and Figure c-xi). 
Two points are noteworthy from above discussion. First, there is 
a slight decline of public debt-income ratio during the period in reference, 
in particular during the second half of this period (i.e. 1995-96 to 1999-
2000) and second and more important is that this decline in total 
liabilities to GDP ratio is mainly due to decline in external debt - GDP 






































o pe! O 
.Si 
• ff4 
fis, "rt '.S 
Q t2 :3 
^ H J 
C X « 




• « - ( 









V . a 
O J 
to 
.a - '5 
• a s © 
^ -^ 2 
«« « o 
O S ca 
"« 
s U -w 
0) ^ 
5 Q 
0 "3 I- 3 
S ••; 




( ^ ( N 






OS 0 0 
• * • * 
0 0 ( N 
in vo 
i n ^ 
T t T t 
^ i n 
CO CO 
i n 0 0 
( N - * 




( N VO 
o o\ 
as Tj-
. — ( T—1 
i n i n 
vo r-in o 
O 0 0 
t - - t - -
• * o 
o in 





o r-CO r -





O - H 














































































» - H 
"' 
CM 

























1 - H 











1 - H 
CN 






1 - H 
CO 




































1 - H 
m 
m 
1 - H 


























































































































































































r-~ i n 
• * 















1 - H 
•^ 



























- H l O 
OS OS 
1 1 




















NO O ON CN 
1 1 
i n O N ^• 
OS Os 5? 























?l OS S 
6 -r 
.t3 _c2 
CO 7 3 



























































, ,^  ON 














• ^ 1 ': 













" ^ • i 


























It appears that the high internal liabilities - income ratio is less on account 
of government of India's lendings to state governments and public 
enterprises^ and more on account of Government of India's own account 
fiscal requirements. 
5.5.2 Debt Servicing and Other Implications 
Debt servicing is viable so long as debt servicing - repayment 
of debt and interest does not distort fiscal balance and the debt. The 
burden of debt servicing depends not only on the amount of debt and 
interest but also on maturity and mode of interest payments. B.B. 
Bhattacharya and S. Guha points out in this regard, 
'The burden is relatively higher on shorter maturity of debt. The 
actual debt burden is however not always reflected properly in the budget. 
If there is no amortisation and debt has to be paid in lump sum at the end 
of maturity period then the budget for the intermediate period will not 
reflect the true burden of debt servicing. Similarly if there is no annual 
payment of interest rate and entire interest due is paid at lump sum at the 
end of the maturity period then the budget for the intermediate period will 
not reflect true burden of debt servicing. In practice debts are of various 
types with different maturity, interest rates and mode of repayment, and so 
the relative burden of debt servicing would depend on relative weights of 
alternative types of debt'.^ 
Table C-14 and Figure c-xii shows that the interest cost of 
internal pbulic debt of Government of India has risen over the years. 
Debt service payments of the central government have risen inexorably 
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1995-99 and around 72 per cent in 1999-2000. The day is not far off when 
the tax revenues will equal debt service payments. As a proportion of total 
revenue receipts debt service has increased from about 30 per cent in 
1985-90 to about 51 per cent in 1999-2000. As a proportion of total 
expenditure, debt service payments have increased from about 16.5 per 
cent in 1985-90 to about 31 per cent in 1999-2000. As a ratio to GDP, 
debt service payments have increased from 3.4 per cent in 1985-90 to 
about 4.6 per cent in 1995-99 and around 5 per cent in 1999-2000. 
Another consequence of rising debt srevice is that the revenue deficit has 
increased form about 32 per cent as a proportion of fiscal deficit in 
1985-90 to about 50 per cent in 1995-99. In other words, half of current 
borrowing goes to finance curent expediture. By definition curent 
expenditure yields on economic returns in the future and hence debt 
service payments will continue to rise in the forseable future unless a 
significant connection is made in this situation. 
With increasing levels of borrowing to finance activities which 
have zero or low yields, interest payments increase inexorably. Thus non-
productive committed current expenditures rise giving rise to higher and 
higher revenue deficits. This leads to yet higher and higher borrowing 
levels. Because of debt service payments forming a higher proportion of 
both revenues and expenditures on all other activities of the government 
suffer, since wages and salaries, interest payments, defence expenditures, 
pensions, food subsidies are all committed expenditures with little or no 
flexibility. The main sufferer in this process is government capital 
expenditure in both social and infrastructure facilities. High debt service 
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payments also preclude increase in or even maintenance of current real 
levels of expenditures in social services. 
The continued high levels of public borrowings also have an 
effect on the rest of the economy through prevalence of high interest 
rates. Because of the necessity to finance government deficits the Reserve 
Bank of India has to keep the level of both CRR and SLR high on deposits 
in commercial banks. This leads to the necessity for banks to have higher 
margins on their commercial activities thereby subjecting the rest of the 
economy to high interest rates. Moreover, because of the voracious 
appetite of the government for garnering resources from the whole 
financial sector, including small savings, insurance and the like, the 
continued high fiscal deficit levels also impede financial sector reforms 
which are necessary for the economy to achieve higher efficiency levels. 
With this scenario the possibility of achieving fiscal stabilization would 
seem rather difficult. 
Finally, there is indeed a ray of hope for the taming of the deficit 
problem. The recent turnout of the central government's fiscal accounts 
demonstrates that the budget objectives of around 5 per cent fiscal deficit 
as a ratio to GDP has been met. It seems that the deficit problem is being 
squarely addressed as the primary economic issue to be tackled and the 
numbers seem to indicate so. However, when the consolidated public 
sector including state governments, public enterprises and the oil pool 
account are considered, a staggering deficit figure of over 10 per cent of 
GDP is arrived at. Clearly, the deficit problem remains well ensconced on 
the economic horizon, and the likelihood of a bequest of a phenomenal 
public debt to posterity remains quite real. 
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5.6 TRENDS IN DEFICIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
DURING STABILIZATION PERIOD (1991 ONWARDS) 
There are various measures of fiscal imbalance which we have 
already discussed. Here we would like to highlight only three measures 
i.e. revenue deficit, primary deficit and fiscal deficit. The revenue deficit 
is a measure which shows the excess of current expenditure over the 
current receipts. The primary deficit is the fiscal deficit net of interest 
payments which reflects the current fiscal stance of the government. And 
finally, there is the fiscal deficit which measures the total borrowing 
requirements of the government. Table C-15 and Figure c-xiii shows that 
revenue deficit during the first five years of stabilization period was 3.04 
per cent as a ratio to GDP which rose to 3.08 per cent in the second 
period. This higher revenue deficit reflects the growing mismatch between 
revenue receipts and revenue expenditure. Main factor responsible for the 
mismatch is interest payments. Due to higher interest payments during the 
period in reference growth of revenue expenditure is also higher as 
compared to revenue receipts, which creates a huge revenue deficit. Even 
after ten years of fiscal stabilization process persistent high revenue 
deficit proves to be a serious threat to the fiscal health of the economy. 
Primary deficit, which measures fiscal deficit net of interest payments 
shows the seriousness of the fiscal problem created by interest payments. 
Primary deficit declined from 1.34 per cent during 1990-91 to 1994-95 
to 0.36 per cent during 1995-96 to 1999-2000. The sharp decline in the 
primary deficit clearly indicates that government has been successful to 
some extent in tackling the problem of fiscal instability. Though, revenue 
deficit has been increased during the stabilization period on the one hand. 
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TABLE : C-15 
TRENDS IN PARAMETERS OF DEFICIT OF THE CENTRAL 































































Note : 1. Ratios to GDP at current market prices (Base : 1993-94) 
2. The Fiscal Deficit excludes the transfer of states' share in 
the small savings collections 
Source : 1. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic 
survey, 2000-2001. 
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fiscal deficit has been declined on the other during the same period. Fiscal 
deficit has declined from 5.44 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 1994-95 to 
4,74 per cent in 1999-2000, Decline in fiscal deficit was not as much as 
expected due to higher interest payments. 
Thus, we can say that for the long term fiscal stability 
government must retire it's debt, which will reduce the level of interest 
payments. This is possible by the way of using a part of disinvestment 
proceeds for this purpose. 
5.6.1 Financing of the Fiscal Deficit 
Government debt rises when government expenditure-current 
and capital exceeds its income i.e. tax and non tax current revenue, 
interest receipts and profits from public sector undertakings. Normally 
the government makes a saving in current account and utilises it for 
financing a part of its capital expenditure. The deficit in capital account 
raises public debt Table C-16 shows that in the period-1 revenue 
expenditure exceeds revenue receipts of the government. The gap between 
the two increased in the period-II which it is more than 3 per cent of GDP 
and still rising. The basic reason for this appears to be almost stagnant 
tax-GDP and revenue -GDP ratio in the last period. It is evident from table 
C-16 that total government expenditure as a proportion of GDP declined 
from an average of 17.6 per cent in period-I to 14.9 per cent in period-II. 
However, the ratio of capital expenditure and revenue expenditure as per 
cent of GDP over the same period shows different trends. The fall in the 
share of capital expenditure as per cent of GDP in period-II reflects 
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share of gross tax revenue (net tax revenue) as a proportion of GDP has 
fallen from 10.0 per cent (7.4 per cent) on an average in period-I to 9.1 
per cent (6.6 per cent) in period-II. This has been accompanied by some 
significant structural changes in the composition of tax revenue. Over the 
same period, the share of direct taxes GDP has incereased and that of 
indirect taxes fallen. Direct taxes are less distortionary and more 
inequitable in impact vis-a-vis indirect taxes. Revenue deficit as a 
proportion of GDP on an average basis swelled from 1.9 per cent in 
period-I to 3.1 per cent in period-II while similar ratio for gross fiscal 
deficit shows a decline. This reflects that borrowings during period-II 
were mainly used for current consumption rather than investment. 
The difference between government total expenditure (current 
plus capital) and income is government deficit, which has to be financed 
through borrowing from various sources : external, internal banking and 
non-banking private sector. Table C-17 & Figure c-xiv shows that there is 
a perceptible shift towards market related borrowings in the financing of 
gross fiscal deficit in period-II. The share of market barrowings in the 
financing of fiscal deficit increased form an average of about 26 per cent 
in period-I to about 50 per cent in period-II. External assistance is no 
longer an important source of financing the fiscal deficit of the 
government. As it is shown in table C-17 and Figure c-xiv that the share of 
external financing has been declined to 5.2 per cent of the total financig 
in the period-II from 10.3 per cent in period-I. Earlier, a substantial 
portion of the fiscal deficits was financed by monetisation. This is no 
longer resorted to and hence the explicit interest cost of the fiscal deficit 
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TABLE : C-17 
FINANCING OF THE GROSS FISCAL DEFICIT (Per cent share) 
1980-81 to 1991-92 1992-93 to 1999-2000 
Market Borrowings 26.2 49.7 
Budget Deficit 22.6 12.7 
Other Liabilities 40.9 32.4 
External Financing 10.3 5.2 






































4 - * 
UJ 
g] 































has consequently increased, which in turn induces more revenue deficit 
and eventually total deficit. 'One way to break this dynamic growth of 
public borrowing would be to reduce the primary deficit, that is budget 
deficit minus interest payment'.^ 
As of now there is evidence of decline in the fiscal deficit in the 
recent years. Thus, in the immediate future there is possibility of a decline 
in internal debt-GDP ratio of the central government. As a result the 
problem of fiscal instability might be solved to some extent. 
Thus it is clear from above discussion, that the 1990s have 
witnessed a fall in the collection of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP in 
general and a fall in the collection of indirect taxes as a proportion of 
GDP in particular. However during the same period revenue expenditure as 
a ratio to GDP shown a rising trend. This mismatch between revenue and 
expenditure resulted in sizeable revenue and fiscal deficits which was 
financed by borrowing. As a result of excessive borrowings interest 
burden further increased which inturn increased the revenue expenditure. 
There is wide agreement that the budgets of the government were 
out of balance in the recent past and now the restoration of fiscal balance 
is one of the most urgent tasks in the agenda of further economic reform. 
There is not only a wide gap between revenue and expenditure resulting in 
deficits; the composition of the government expenditure is also quite out 
of line with the proper role that the government should be playing and the 
functions they should be performing at the present stage of development. 
It could also be argued that the revenue structure needs to be altered to 
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make it more broad-based and equitable. Thus, a significant structural 
reform of the budget is needed as much as the reduction of the fiscal 
deficit. In this regard Chelliah, R.J. et al. (1996) suggested that : 
'Reduction in revenue and fiscal deficits requires faster growth 
in revenues and slower growth in public expenditure. The process of fiscal 
adjustment to reduce deficits must incorporate the needed structural 
changes. In other words, the rate of growth of revenues must be raised and 
the growth of expenditures slowed down in such a manner that structure of 
public finances will be simultaneously changed in the desired direction'.'° 
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NOTES 
i) Eminent economist, Arthur Laffer has argued that lower tax rates 
are quite consistent with the increase in tax revenue. He has 
shown the relationship between tax rates and the total tax revenue 
collected with the help of a curve named after him as Laffer curve. 
ii) It is more transparent to fulfil the government's redistribution 
objective through the expenditure system by directly targeting the 
weak and vulnerable. This is not, however, a full solution since it 
is typically difficult to set up appropriate and adequate delivery 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, expenditure seems to be better suited 
to the objective than is the tax structure which tends to become 
distorted as multiple objectives creep into it. 
iii) Though there is a complementarity between primary health care 
and population control. But other significant determinants of the 
latter are female education, child nutrition, safe water supply and 
sanitation. A cogent population policy should need to incorporate 
all these elements. 
iv) The revenue account includes tax revenue, interest receipts and 
dividends on the receipts side. On the expenditure side are 
included interest payments, wages and salaries and subsidies. 
These relate to general, economic and social services (including 
defence). Capital accounts receipts include recovery of loans, 
disinvestment and borrowings while expenditures relate to capital 
formation (plan or non-plan). Plan expenditure relates to capital 
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expenditure on programmes as well as plan driven revenue 
expenditure on operations and maintenance in a current plan. Non-
plan expenditure includes operations and maintenance on assets 
created in previous plans apart from interest payments, subsidies, 
defence, and wages and salaries on other non-plan expenditure. 
v) State governments and public enterprises often failed to honour 
their debts to government of India, resulting in either government 
of India absorbing a part or whole of the debt as its own debt or 
rescheduling the payment. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
We have made an attempt in the foregoing chapters to examine 
the problem of fiscal stabilization in Indian economy since seventh plan 
(i.e. since 1985). The analysis of the foregoing pages shows that the 
origins of the fiscal crisis in the developing countries was in stagnant 
revenues coupled with uncontrolled expenditures, alongwith foreclosed 
foreign borrowings. As a result governments had to rely on domestic 
sources of financing, which could result either in runaway inflation or 
pushed the economy into debt-trap or in a combination of both. 
Chapter II tries to explain that most of the developing countries 
where there was a fiscal crisis, have registered a decline in the share of 
the direct taxes in general and that of income taxe in particular in total 
revenues. Simultaneously, higher rates of custom duties further reduced 
the buoyancy of the tax system in such countries. Thus, chapter-II 
concludes that experience of developing countries reveals that the 
emergence of the fiscal crisis was result of stagnant revenues alongwith 
rapid growing public expenditures and public debt. The fiscal crisis forced 
many countries to undertake fiscal stabilization programmes. Chapter II 
has surveyed some major issues that arise in the process to overcome the 
problem of fiscal stabilization. It also analysed possible effects of the 
fiscal stabilization measures, its quality and its sequencing. Finally, we can 
say, that the objective of fiscal stabilization cannot be achieved through 
shock therapy. However, good fiscal measures always took time in the 
restoration of fiscal stabilization. 
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During the seventh plan period (1985-90) the fiscal sector of 
the economy was possibly in the severest crisis in the post-independence 
era. All symptoms were almost similar as experienced by the developing 
countries, discussed in chapter-II. An analysis of chapter-Ill reveals that 
the government expenditure had been outpacing revenues since late 
seventies, leading the government to resort to substantial borrowings. The 
public debt reached to such a level that interest payments turned out to be 
the largest component of public expenditure. From 11.6 per cent in 1980-
81 interest payments as a share of total expenditure increased to 21.4 per 
cent in 1990-91. Non-plan expenditure increased uncontrolled during the 
period in reference. In the realm of tax revenue, during the 1980s the ratio 
of total tax revenue to GDP had moved up from 9.93 per cent in 1980-85 
to 11.20 per cent in 1985-90. A major problem with the tax system was 
that the share of direct taxes had virtually stagnated during the seventh 
plan period, it was 2.41 per cent in 1980-81 and averaged around 2.49 per 
cent of GDP in 1988-89. Thus the entire increase in the tax to GDP ratio 
has been brought about by exploiting indirect taxes. As it has been 
discussed in chapter-II in most of the economies where fiscal crisis 
incepted, direct taxes (which is considered most buoyant) as a ratio to 
GDP were either stagnant or on decline. India, also experienced the same 
trend along with high import duty. 
It has also been recognized in the foregoing analysis that it is 
the progressive acceleration of government expenditure growth which has 
led to the emergence of a fiscal crisis despite a steady increase in the tax-
GDP ratio during 1980s, which exceeded the long-term fiscal policy 
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targets in every year of the seventh plan period. The largest increase in the 
share of revenue expenditures over the period came about on account of 
increase in interest payments. Government expenditure in India during the 
seventh plan period grew at a rapid rate, faster than both GDP and 
government revenues, with low and declining level of cost recoveries. The 
analysis of the trends in public expenditure during the second part of the 
eighties have shown sharp increase in expenditures on quasi-public goods, 
subsidies and transfer payments. The increasing share of current 
expenditures and, particularly, those on wages and salaries, food and 
fertilizer subsidies and sharp reduction in the share of capital expenditures 
have also been evidenced. The foregoing analysis have shown that the 
public debt to GDP ratio increased throughout the eighties, going upto 
almost 59 per cent at the end of the decade. As is now well known, the 
proximate reasons for this situation were the failure of the public sector 
enterprises to generate investible resources and the explosive growth of 
current expenditure of the government. In such a situation falling of the 
government into debt-trap was real. The failure of the public sector 
enterprises to generate profits have also contributed to the fiscal crisis, 
because these enterprises have dominated the provision of infrastructure 
and critical intermediates. Their inefficiency has led to downstream 
inefficiencies in a multiplier fashion. Then again, the restrictive trade and 
industrial licensing framework, for instance, led to serious loss of 
efficiency by reducing the scale of output, eliminating effective 
competition, creating bottlenecks, etc. which resulted in the reduction of 
returns, thereby affecting the GDP growth. In turn, the revenues raised 
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from the economy, for any given tax rates were adversely affected, and the 
necessity to undertake budgetary expenditures to support the creation of 
public sector jobs and for consumption, contributed to the fiscal deficit. 
Gross capital formation out of budgetary resources, which 
comprised 40.1 per cent of total expenditure in 1980-81, had steadily 
gone down to 32.7 per cent by 1990-91. Two other features need to be 
mentioned in this context. First, gross capital formation out of budgetary 
resources, which grew at an average rate of 18.8 per cent in the early 
eighties, appears to have started to decline from 1986-87. Secondly, the 
rate of increase in gross capital formation turned negative in 1990-91. In 
the meantime the gross savings of the government had turned negative for 
the first time in 1984-85, and dissaving has been growing over the years. 
The impact of the above trends resulted in the expansion of 
money supply. Alongwith the large revenue deficits there was large budget 
deficits during the seventh plan period. This in turn had contributed to a 
large monetised deficit. Money supply grew at an average annual rate of 
about 17.5 per cent during the seventh plan period. This contributed to the 
double digit increase in CPI inflation during 1990-91.) Thus, foregoing 
analysis reveals that by the end of eighties, a severe problem of fiscal 
stabilizaiton emerged. All the indicators of fiscal imbalance were on rise 
throughout the eighties. During this period the gross fiscal deficit rose 
from 6.2 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 to 8.3 per cent in 1990-91, the 
revenue deficit registered similar trend and rose to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 
1990-91 from 1.5 per cent in 1980-81. The fiscal imbalance, fuelled by 
the revenue and budget deficit and financed by the borrowings and the 
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decumulation of reserves, was accompanied by accelerated inflation to 
double-digit levels. Such a fiscal situation had become unsustainable. 
To remove the deficit and bring fiscal stability, fiscal 
stabilization measures were introduced in 1991. The essential features 
of the central government's overall fiscal strategy for controlling the 
budgetary deficit comprises : expenditure compression, reduction in 
subsidies, reduced budgetary allocations to public enterprises, rationalised 
adminsitered prices, and completion of tax reforms. An analysis of 
c^gJer-TV reveals that the government had reduced provision for subsidies 
in respect of fertilizers, food and export promotion. The provision of 
subsidy in respect of Public Distribution System (PDS) was difficult to 
eliminate, but could be restricted to the non-affluent. This however was 
more easily said than done; government in a democratic setup functioned 
under several compulsions and constraints. Even then government was 
making efforts to reduce subsidies through increases in prices of 
commodities supplied under the PDS. Reduction in interest burden 
postulated sizeable reduction in borrowings, and in order to tackle the 
problem at its roots, the budgetary strategy had to be revised : it was 
necessary to revert to the formulation of a surplus budget on revenue 
account. Another area of expenditure, in which effective cuts were 
proposed, was administration and grants. Thus, government in its fiscal 
stabilization measures had proposed to reduce expenditure both plan as 
well as non-plan. 
With double digit inflation, and high budget and fiscal deficit and 
the precarious foreign exchange and current account position in 1990-91, 
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the fiscal stabilization programme was directed inter alia at drastically 
cutting the budget deficit and tightening monetary policy with the 
objective of reducing inflation and achieving external sector viability. 
Reforms in the public sector enterprises have also been introduced in the 
form of disinvestment and autonomy etc. The government needed to 
increase revenues in order to contain the fiscal deficit, as also to improve 
the ratio of taxes to GDP. Government proposed to implement various 
suggestions made by the Chelliah committee on tax reforms. In the field 
of direct taxes, the TRC recommended moderate direct tax rates with 
reduced tax deductions and exemptions, coupled with effective 
enforcement. Gradual reduction in both personal and corporate taxation 
was envisaged for the future. Customs tariff reform includes : gradual 
reduction in average tariff level, rationalisation of customs duties and 
import policies for consumer goods in a phased manner, and exemptions 
from countervailing duty eliminated. These measures were designed to 
ensure that the Indian economy becomes competitive and integrates with 
the global economy through freer trade. While MODVAT would be 
extended to all sectors, the ultimate objective was to move to a full 
fledged value added tax (VAT). Tax base should be widened to include 
exempt commodities and some services. A significant feature of tax 
reforms would be to move towards only one or two rates for raw materials 
and intermediate goods. 
India's experience regarding impact of fiscal stabilization 
measures shows that efforts at restoration of fiscal stability proved 
difficult on account of certain factors as it has been experienced by 
various countries where IMF assisted fiscal stabilization programmes are 
in operation. 
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excise duties and raising that of direct taxes. The shift away from foreign 
trade taxes and excise duties appears to have taken place at the cost of 
overall revenue growth. The rise in the relative share of direct taxes has 
resulted partly from the decline in the revenue from customs and excise. 
The foregoing analysis indicates towards the lack of success 
with expenditure reduction. There has been a sharp rise in interest 
payments. It is clear that the compensation has come not only from 
decreases in other items of current expenditure such as subsidies, 
defence and general administration, but also capital and plan 
expenditures. Throughout the 1990s, while capital expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP have fallen sharply, the revenue expenditures net of 
interest payments have stagnated. It is evident in the foregoing analysis 
that the ratio of capital expenditures to GDP has fallen from about 6 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 2.6 per cent in 1999-2000. Though, the ratio of net 
revenue expenditures which fell sharply between 1990-91 and 1996-97, 
has risen in recent times, but well below to its 1989-90 figure. Despite 
this the fiscal deficit is proving uncontrollable. If we use the older 
definition of the fiscal deficit, which included small savings transferred 
to the states, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio which fell from 7.9 per cent 
in 1990-91 to 4.9 per cent in 1996-97, has since risen to 7 per cent in 
1999-2000 and was expected to remain at around 6.8 per cent in 2000-
2001. 
Economic reforms have also meant a change in the way the 
government's deficit is financed. Till the early 1990s, a considerable part 
of the deficit on the government's budget was financed with borrowing 
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It is clear from the foregoing analysis of chapter-V, that the 
1990s have witnessed a fall in the collection of tax revenue as a 
proportion of GDP. Between 1990-91 and 1999-2000, when there were 
substantial tax rates reductions the ratio of gross tax revenue to GDP 
declined from 10.8 per cent to 9.2 per cent. A remarkable feature of the 
centre's revenue trends in the reform years brought out by the foregoing 
analysis is the jump in the share of direct taxes of the total tax revenue 
from around 19 per cent in 1985-90 to 29 per cent in 1995-99, and was 
expected to reach at around 32 per cent level in 1999-2000. Acceleration 
of collections from corporation tax is particularly striking, from 9.6 per 
cent of the total revenue in 1985-90 to around 15.4 per cent in 1995-99, 
and stood at around 17.2 per cent in 1999-2000. Personal income tax has 
also shown greater buoyancy in the reform period, from 9.12 per cent of 
the total revenue during 1985-90 rose to around 14 per cent during 1995-
99. The leap in revenue from direct taxes, however, has not been able to 
neutralise the decline that has taken place in the indirect taxes. Revenue 
from customs and excise, which together accounted for over 79 per cent 
during 1985-90 has declined to 66 per cent during 1995-99. Revenue 
from indirect taxes had started decelerating even before the reforms but 
the decline has been sharper in the reform period. There has been a 
noticeable shift in the tax structure at the centre. The two key aims of the 
reforms, viz., lessening the weight of foreign trade taxes and increasing 
that of direct taxes, are evidently materialising. The rise in the share of 
income tax has, however, not sufficed to make-up fully for the loss from 
the tariff reforms. In sum, reforms so far have succeeded in making a 
small dent on India's tax structure by reducing the weight of customs and 
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from the central bank against ad-hoc treasury bills issued by the 
government. The interest rate on such borrowing was, at around 4.6 per 
cent, much lower than the interest rate on borrowing from the open 
market. A crucial aspect of financial reform has been the reduction of 
such borrowing from the Central Bank to zero, resulting sharp rise in the 
average interest rate on government borrowing. 
With the adoption of economic reforms, reform of public sector 
enterprises became inevitable. The new strategy essentially involved 
refocussing but not curtailing state activity and channelising resources and 
effort in high priority areas. In 1991-92 profit after tax to net worth was 
3.9 per cent which rose to 10.2 per cent in 1997-98. This shows an 
improvement in the rate of return on capital employed in PSUs. Whatever 
limited progress has been achieved in initiating public sector reforms has 
largely been linked to the process of disinvestment. The foregoing 
analysis reveals that the goal has fallen short of expectations and the 
disinvestment strategy has itself been bogged down by controversies. 
During 2000-2001 non-tax revenue from dividends and profits from PSUs 
has exceeded the budget expectations. Thus, the shortfall in disinvestment 
has been partly offset by this increase. If this pattern continues for a 
longer period and an enhancement of revenue from disinvestment, it would 
be very important for retiring of public debt so that the fiscal deficit can 
be reduced significantly. 
There is greater consensus that in the recent past the budgets of 
the central government were out of balance and now the restoration of 
fiscal balance is one of the most improtant task in the agenda of further 
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economic reform. There is not only a wide gap between revenue and 
expenditure resulting in deficits, the composition of expenditure is also 
quite out of line. Revenue structure needs to be altered to make it more 
broad based and equitable. Thus, a significant fiscal reform is needed for 
the restoration of the fiscal stability. > ' i 
At the conclusion of this tour de horizon of problem of fiscal 
stabilization in the Indian economy we can say that, though the problem 
of fiscal stabilization has been sorted out to some extent, but a lot has to 
be done for consistent and long-term fiscal stability. 
6.2 SUGGESTIONS 
A few important points may however, be mentioned in the light 
of above discussion so as to make fiscal stability a long-lasting feature. 
The key objective of fiscal reform has to be a reduction in debt service 
payments. This has to be acheived by a progressive reduction in public 
debt and through higher revenues. The possibility of achieving higher 
revenues through increased rates of taxes is both undesirable and 
infeasible. Higher tax revenues can be achieved only through buoyancy and 
expansion of the tax base. Thus the main instruments for achieving a 
sustained fiscal balance are : 
* The yield of income tax can be increased at least by broadeningthe base 
r 
and strengthening the administration while at the same time ensuring that 
the main aim of the administration would be to collect increasing revenues 
without harassment that the exacting illegal payments will be drastically 
cut down. The base income tax can be widened by; 
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a) removing many exemptions that are unjustified and reducing the 
magnitude of some of the concessions, 
b) bringing into the tax net a large number of income earners who are 
evading tax, 
c) introducing such acceptable simplified procedures as the estimated 
income scheme, and 
d) introducing a minimum profits tax on all business income other than 
income of professionals. 
* Effort should be made to bring more companies into the group of tax 
filers. At the same time, the so-called zero tax companies can be 
made to pay some tax. 
* There is agreement in principle that the base of excise duty must be 
broadened and the rates must be moderate. Multiplicity of rates is to 
be done away with. 
* The VAT principle should be extended to the textile sector and the tax 
should be levied at the fabric stage also. For this purpose, the duty on 
artificial yarn of different kinds should be brought down and some 
simple way must be found to levy tax on the powerloom sector. 
* The base of the services tax should be expanded. In order to minimise 
possible cascading effect, services which are generally used as major 
inputs should not be brought under tax and the rate of tax should be 
relatively low. 
* With the rates of custom duties coming down, it would be necessary 
to subject at most all imports to some import duty. That would also 
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* 
be economically a rational policy. The minimum rate could be 10 per 
cent and the maximum rate on goods other than consumer goods 
should be 30 per cent. 
At first, consumer goods requiring sophisticated technology may be 
permitted to be imported, then, gradually the imports of other 
consumer goods should be liberalised. The rate of duty on consumer 
goods may be kept 50 per cent to start with. 
* It is generally agreed that government has overextended itself. 
Fortunately the economic reform programme has made many 
activities and the associated staff redundant. Apart from that, 
gradually the government sector should withdraw itself from the 
production of private goods. 
* The central government should cut down the size of ministries and 
departments dealing with subjects which are mainly the 
responsibilities of the states. 
* There is an agreement regarding the surplus staff in general 
administration and also in the administration of functional 
departments. There is also over-staffing of engineers in the public 
works department. This surplus staff must be identified and shed off. 
* The share of interest payments must be brought down by limiting the 
fiscal deficit and by retiring some of the existing debt. Given the size 
of the debt, retirement would achieve only a relatively small 
reduction in the debt burden. However, through the sale of seized gold 
and some of the government lands and through disinvestment of PSUs 
* 
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shares a sizeable amount could be raised and used for the retirement 
of debt. 
Subsidies have to be reduced mainly because the government cannot 
afford the luxury of providing wide ranging subsidies for production. 
Subsidies directly targeted at consumers from the vulnerable groups 
should be developed and implemented to safeguard the government's 
objective of income distribution. Carefully developed small projects 
that are practical and implementable, with a clear beginning and a 
fixed termination, are more likely to be successful than nationally 
announced mega projects short of sufficient funds and subject to wide 
misappropriation. 
* Expenditure control mechanisms have to be given teeth. In particular, 
there should be full follow-up by government departments and 
resolution of problems after the completion of scrutiny by the CAG's 
reports. 
A clear position must be articulated to privatise existing public sector 
enterprises except those that may be regarded as strategic. This 
action is not only necessary for generating resources for retiring 
public debt but is also necessary for the long-term health of the 
enterprises generating themselves. We must adopt a new approach to 
public sector enterprises which recognises that privatising them 
would be the best way of making sure that the core of Indian industry 
grows, remains competitive and is enabled to compete internationally. 
* 
* The government must clarify the objectives of the process of 
privatisation and seek to forge a consensus. The objectives must be 
229 
both the strengthening of these enterprises to enable them to compete 
and grow, and to contribute to the restoration of fiscal health of the 
country. The return from privatisation must not be used for current 
expenditures. They should be explicitly used for retiring public debt 
so that the interest burden is progressively reduced. 
* While it is difficult to prescribe a particular size for the public debt, 
it is possible to set up a monitoring unit with strong recommendatory 
powers for the containment of public debt. For example, such a writ 
set up within the RBI and headed by the governor of RBI could be 
given the final authority to cut off the government's ability to borrow 
except under specified contingencies. Such extreme measures as 
earmarked taxes or nonflouting of expenditure ceilings or cut off of 
the issuance of additional public debt are not warranted under 
ordinary circumstances. But they are necessary when a country's 
fiscal performance needs improvement in a hurry. 
It may be concluded that viable fiscal stabilization may be 
restored, if the above suggestions are taken into consideration and 
implemented in an earnest and proper manner. 
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